Editing Operation Spring Awakening (section)

== Soviet preparation ==

=== Interrupted Soviet offensive preparations ===
On 17 February 1945, the [[Stavka of the Supreme High Command]] instructed the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts to prepare for an offensive towards Vienna which would begin on March 15.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=21}} However, from 17 to 18 February, the 2nd Ukrainian Front noticed the 1st SS Panzer division Leibstandarte and the 12th SS Panzer division Hitlerjugend fighting at the Garam River during the German Operation Southwind.<ref name=":3" /> Knowing that German [[Panzer division]]s were not created for defensive purposes, the Soviet Fronts in Hungary became suspicious of the enemy's intentions. Prisoners taken during Operation Southwind testified that the Germans were in fact preparing to gather a large offensive force.<ref name=":3" /> By 20 February, the Soviet fronts in Hungary began to understand what the Germans planned to do.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=21}} The security of the lands west of the Danube, particularly in the south which held the Hungarian oil fields, was the Germans' main priority at this stage of the war.

=== Soviet defensive preparations ===
As the 2nd Ukrainian Front held the territory of Budapest and the lands north of the Hungarian capital, defensive preparations in this sector were not paid much attention due to the lower likelihood of attack, but this was not the same in the south. 3rd Ukrainian Front marshal Fyodor Tolbukhin ordered his armies to prepare for a German offensive on his entire Front, preparation of which would have to be completed no later then 3 March.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|pp=21–22}} To ensure sufficient supply of war materials and fuel, stockpiles were set up on either side of the Danube, a ferry was put into use and additional temporary bridges and gas pipelines were built on the Danube River.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=930}}<ref name="Osprey" />

Tolbukhin's plan was to initially slow down the German advance to rob their offensive of momentum, then begin grinding down the attacking armies, then initiate the planned Soviet offensive to finish off the remaining German forces.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|pp=21–22}} This plan, along with the strategic deployment of the Soviet forces, was quite similar to that of the [[Battle of Kursk]], although it utilized experiences learned in 1943. The 3rd Ukrainian Front worked on digging in, creating extensive trench networks ideal for anti-tank defenses, along with defensive earthworks for the artillery and infantry. The main differences between the Soviet defenses during the Battle of Kursk and the Balaton defensive operation (the Russian name for Operation Spring Awakening) was the relative short time frame allowed for defensive preparations (half a month), the smaller number of Soviet forces partaking in the defensive, and a reduced focus on perfecting the defensive lines as after all the 3rd Ukrainian Front would need to start its offensive from these lines. Other minor differences included the lack or limited use of barbed wire installations, anti-tank obstacles, and bunkers,{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=26}} although the [[4th Guards Army]] command did suggest placing the burnt out wrecks of 38 previously destroyed German tanks into advantageous positions; it is unclear how many were actually set up.<ref name=":3" />

Tolbukhin's 3rd Ukrainian Front had 5 Armies plus 1 Air Army, in addition it also had the [[First Army (Bulgaria)|1st Bulgarian Army]]{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=22}} with the [[3rd Army (Yugoslav Partisans)|3rd Yugoslav Partisan Army]] also partaking in the defense. The 3rd Ukrainian Front would be set up in a two echelon defensive layout, with the 4th Guards Army, 26th Army, and 57th Army, and the 1st Bulgarian Army in the first echelon, while the [[27th Army (Soviet Union)|27th Army]] would be held back in the second echelon for reserve.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=22}} The 4th Guards Army's three Guards Rifle Corps and one Guards Fortified District would be spread out over a 39&nbsp;km front and reach 30&nbsp;km deep, broken into two belts with one behind the other.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=22}} The 26th Army, which was expected to take the brunt of the German offensive, arranged its three Rifle Corps along a 44&nbsp;km front but only 10–15&nbsp;km deep.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=23}} The 26th Army's Corps' would be layered in two belts whose defensive preparations had originally begun back on 11 February,{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=23}} prior to any sign of German offensive intentions. The 57th Army's one Guards Rifle and one Rifle Corps were spread along a 60&nbsp;km front and 10–15&nbsp;km deep; the Army would receive another Rifle Corps during the fighting.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=24}} The 27th Army's one Guards Rifle and two Rifle Corps would remain in reserve unless the situation in the 26th Army called for its use.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=24}} Held in reserve, the 3rd Ukrainian Front also had the 18th Tank Corps and 23rd Tanks Corps, along with the [[1st Guards Mechanized Corps (Soviet Union)|1st Guards Mechanized Corps]] and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=25}} While these Armies were preparing for the imminent offensive, the [[17th Air Army]] was busy flying reconnaissance missions, although they could not report on much due to excellent German camouflage.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=30}}

Because of the serious tank losses of January–February along the Margit line, Marshal Tolbukhin ordered that no Front/Army level counter-attacks were to take place, and local tactical attacks should be very limited; the only objective was to hold the Front and grind down the German offensive.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=26}} The two tanks Corps would remain under the 26th and 27th Armies to be utilized only in dire need.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=26}} The defensive strategy of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was one of anti-tank defense as this was what the Germans were going to use. On average for every kilometer of Front, 700+ anti-tank and 600+ anti-infantry mines were placed, with these numbers rising to 2,700 and 2,900 respectively in the 26th Army's sector.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=27}} Between the 4th Guards Army and 26th Guards Army, 66 anti-tank zones were created whose depth reached 30–35&nbsp;km.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=27}} Each anti-tank position had 8–16 artillery guns and a similar number of anti-tank guns.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=27}} A prime example of the scale of defensive installments can be seen in the 26th Army's 135th Rifle Corps. Between 18 February and 3 March the 233rd Rifle Division had dug 27 kilometers of trenches, 130 gun and mortar positions, 113 dugouts, 70 command posts and observation points, and laid 4,249 antitank and 5,058 antipersonnel mines, all this on a frontage of 5 kilometers. Although there were no tanks in this defensive zone, there was an average of 17 anti-tank guns per kilometer forming 23 tank killing grounds.<ref name="hitlers-last-offensive">{{cite web |url=https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/hitlers-last-offensive-operation-spring-awakening/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170414183459/http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/hitlers-last-offensive-operation-spring-awakening/ |archive-date=2017-04-14 |title=Hitler's Last Offensive: Operation Spring Awakening}}</ref>

=== Overarching Soviet military structure ===
The Soviet forces, contrary to the Germans, did not have such odd structural complications as the Soviet armies could make independent decisions while the [[Stavka]] could intervene when asked or if necessary;<ref name=":17">{{Cite book|last=Maier|first=Georg|title=Drama Between Budapest and Vienna|publisher=J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Inc.|year=2004|isbn=0-921991-78-9|location=Canada|pages=5}}</ref> a much more straightforward military structure with clear boundaries. This is an example of a de-centralized command. It was not uncommon for the Soviets to actually search out and exploit the boundaries between the OKW and OKH as they knew these areas would suffer from poorer military command;<ref name=":17" /> the advance to Budapest is an example.<ref name=":16" />