Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
Paraconsistent logic
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
== Relation to other logics == One important type of paraconsistent logic is [[relevance logic]]. A logic is ''relevant'' if it satisfies the following condition: : if ''A'' → ''B'' is a theorem, then ''A'' and ''B'' share a [[logical constant|non-logical constant]]. It follows that a [[relevance logic]] cannot have (''p'' ∧ ¬''p'') → ''q'' as a theorem, and thus (on reasonable assumptions) cannot validate the inference from {''p'', ¬''p''} to ''q''. Paraconsistent logic has significant overlap with [[many-valued logic]]; however, not all paraconsistent logics are many-valued (and, of course, not all many-valued logics are paraconsistent). [[Dialetheic logic]]s, which are also many-valued, are paraconsistent, but the converse does not hold. The ideal 3-valued paraconsistent logic given below becomes the logic [[three-valued logic|RM3]] when the contrapositive is added. [[Intuitionistic logic]] allows ''A'' ∨ ¬''A'' not to be equivalent to true, while paraconsistent logic allows ''A'' ∧ ¬''A'' not to be equivalent to false. Thus it seems natural to regard paraconsistent logic as the "[[duality (mathematics)|dual]]" of intuitionistic logic. However, intuitionistic logic is a specific logical system whereas paraconsistent logic encompasses a large class of systems. Accordingly, the dual notion to paraconsistency is called ''paracompleteness'', and the "dual" of intuitionistic logic (a specific paracomplete logic) is a specific paraconsistent system called ''anti-intuitionistic'' or ''dual-intuitionistic logic'' (sometimes referred to as ''Brazilian logic'', for historical reasons).<ref>See Aoyama (2004).</ref> The duality between the two systems is best seen within a [[sequent calculus]] framework. While in intuitionistic logic the sequent : <math>\vdash A \lor \neg A</math> is not derivable, in dual-intuitionistic logic : <math>A \land \neg A \vdash</math> is not derivable{{citation needed|reason=I think that's a typo. Not sure, though|date=April 2017}}. Similarly, in intuitionistic logic the sequent : <math>\neg \neg A \vdash A</math> is not derivable, while in dual-intuitionistic logic : <math>A \vdash \neg \neg A</math> is not derivable. Dual-intuitionistic logic contains a connective # known as ''pseudo-difference'' which is the dual of intuitionistic implication. Very loosely, {{nowrap|1=''A'' # ''B''}} can be read as "''A'' but not ''B''". However, # is not [[truth-functional]] as one might expect a 'but not' operator to be; similarly, the intuitionistic implication operator cannot be treated like "{{nowrap|1=¬ (''A'' ∧ ¬''B'')}}". Dual-intuitionistic logic also features a basic connective ⊤ which is the dual of intuitionistic ⊥: negation may be defined as {{nowrap|1=¬''A'' = (⊤ # ''A'')}} A full account of the duality between paraconsistent and intuitionistic logic, including an explanation on why dual-intuitionistic and paraconsistent logics do not coincide, can be found in Brunner and Carnielli (2005). These other logics avoid explosion: [[implicational propositional calculus]], [[positive propositional calculus]], [[equivalential calculus]] and [[minimal logic]]. The latter, minimal logic, is both paraconsistent and paracomplete (a subsystem of intuitionistic logic). The other three simply do not allow one to express a contradiction to begin with since they lack the ability to form negations.
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)