Editing Philosophical methodology (section)

=== Conceptual analysis ===
The goal of [[conceptual analysis]] is to decompose or ''analyze'' a given concept into its fundamental constituents. It consists in considering a philosophically interesting concept, like [[knowledge]], and determining the [[necessary and sufficient conditions]] for whether the application of this concept is true.<ref name="Eder">{{cite journal |last1=Eder |first1=Anna-Maria A. |last2=Lawler |first2=Insa |last3=van Riel |first3=Raphael |title=Philosophical methods under scrutiny: introduction to the special issue philosophical methods |journal=Synthese |date=1 March 2020 |volume=197 |issue=3 |pages=915–923 |doi=10.1007/s11229-018-02051-2 |s2cid=54631297 |language=en |issn=1573-0964|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=SHAFFER |first1=MICHAEL J. |title=The Problem of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions and Conceptual Analysis |journal=Metaphilosophy |date=2015 |volume=46 |issue=4/5 |pages=555–563 |doi=10.1111/meta.12158 |jstor=26602327 |s2cid=148551744 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26602327 |issn=0026-1068}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Shaffer |first1=Michael |title=Introduction to Philosophy: Logic |date=18 November 2020 |publisher=Rebus Foundation |url=https://press.rebus.community/intro-to-phil-logic/chapter/chapter-5-necessary-and-sufficient-conditions/ |language=en |chapter=5. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions}}</ref><ref name="MacmillanPhilosophy"/> The resulting claim about the relation between the concept and its constituents is normally seen as knowable [[a priori]] since it is true only in virtue of the involved concepts and thereby constitutes an [[analytic truth]].<ref name="DalyHandbook"/><ref name="Eder"/> Usually, philosophers use their own intuitions to determine whether a concept is applicable to a specific situation to test their analyses. But other approaches have also been utilized by using not the intuitions of philosophers but of regular people, an approach often defended by [[Experimental philosophy|experimental philosophers]].<ref name="Eder"/>

[[G. E. Moore]] proposed that the correctness of a conceptual analysis can be tested using the [[Open-question argument|open question method]]. According to this view, asking whether the decomposition fits the concept should result in a closed or pointless question.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Laskowski |first1=N. G. |last2=Finlay |first2=Stephen |title=The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics |date=2017 |publisher=Routledge |pages=536–551 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LASCAI |chapter=Conceptual Analysis in Metaethics}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Myers |first1=C. Mason |title=Moore's Paradox of Analysis |journal=Metaphilosophy |date=1971 |volume=2 |issue=4 |pages=295–308 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-9973.1971.tb00330.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MYEMPO}}</ref> If it results in an open or intelligible question, then the analysis does not exactly correspond to what we have in mind when we use the term. This can be used, for example, to reject the [[utilitarian]] claim that "[[good]]ness" is "whatever maximizes [[happiness]]". The underlying argument is that the question "Is what is good what maximizes happiness?" is an open question, unlike the question "Is what is good what is good?", which is a closed question.<ref>{{cite book |last1=McPherson |first1=Tristram |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=2015 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/open-question-argument/v-1 |language=en |chapter=Open question argument}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Hurka |first1=Thomas |title=Moore's Moral Philosophy |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore-moral/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=27 February 2022 |date=2021}}</ref> One problem with this approach is that it results in a very strict conception of what constitutes a correct conceptual analysis, leading to the conclusion that many concepts, like "goodness", are simple or indefinable.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/>

[[Willard Van Orman Quine]] criticized conceptual analysis as part of his criticism of the [[analytic-synthetic distinction]]. This objection is based on the idea that all claims, including how concepts are to be decomposed, are ultimately based on [[empirical evidence]].<ref name="DalyHandbook"/><ref name="Eder"/> Another problem with conceptual analysis is that it is often very difficult to find an analysis of a concept that really covers all its cases. For this reason, [[Rudolf Carnap]] has suggested a modified version that aims to cover only the most paradigmatic cases while excluding problematic or controversial cases. While this approach has become more popular in recent years, it has also been criticized based on the argument that it tends to change the subject rather than resolve the original problem.<ref name="Eder"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Leitgeb |first1=Hannes |last2=Carus |first2=André |title=Rudolf Carnap > D. Methodology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/carnap/methodology.html |website=plato.stanford.edu |access-date=27 February 2022 |date=2020}}</ref> In this sense, it is closely related to the method of [[conceptual engineering]], which consists in redefining concepts in fruitful ways or developing new interesting concepts. This method has been applied, for example, to the concepts of [[gender]] and [[Race (human categorization)|race]].<ref name="Eder"/>