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Philosophy of space and time
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==Conventionalism== The position of [[conventionalism]] states that there is no fact of the matter as to the geometry of space and time, but that it is decided by convention. The first proponent of such a view, [[Henri Poincaré]], reacting to the creation of the new [[non-Euclidean geometry]], argued that which geometry applied to a space was decided by convention, since different geometries will describe a set of objects equally well, based on considerations from his [[sphere-world]]. This view was developed and updated to include considerations from relativistic physics by [[Hans Reichenbach]]. Reichenbach's conventionalism, applying to space and time, focuses around the idea of [[coordinative definition]]. Coordinative definition has two major features. The first has to do with coordinating units of length with certain physical objects. This is motivated by the fact that we can never directly apprehend length. Instead we must choose some physical object, say the Standard Metre at the [[Bureau International des Poids et Mesures]] (International Bureau of Weights and Measures), or the [[wavelength]] of [[cadmium]] to stand in as our unit of length. The second feature deals with separated objects. Although we can, presumably, directly test the equality of length of two measuring rods when they are next to one another, we can not find out as much for two rods distant from one another. Even supposing that two rods, whenever brought near to one another are seen to be equal in length, we are not justified in stating that they are always equal in length. This impossibility undermines our ability to decide the equality of length of two distant objects. Sameness of length, to the contrary, must be set by definition. Such a use of coordinative definition is in effect, on Reichenbach's conventionalism, in the General Theory of Relativity where light is assumed, i.e. not discovered, to mark out equal distances in equal times. After this setting of coordinative definition, however, the geometry of spacetime is set. As in the absolutism/relationalism debate, contemporary philosophy is still in disagreement as to the correctness of the conventionalist doctrine.
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