Editing Political polarization (section)

===The public===
In democracies and other [[Representative democracy|representative governments]], citizens vote for the political actors who will represent them. Some scholars argue that political polarization reflects the public's ideology and voting preferences.<ref name="galston-09" /><ref name="garner-10">{{cite journal | last1 = Garner | first1 = Andrew | last2 = Palmer | first2 = Harvey | title = Polarization and issue consistency over time | journal = [[Political Behavior (journal)|Political Behavior]] | volume = 33 | issue = 2 | pages = 225–246 | publisher = [[Springer Science+Business Media|Springer]] | doi = 10.1007/s11109-010-9136-7 | date = June 2011 | s2cid = 143137236 }}</ref><ref name="mason-12">{{cite journal|last=Mason|first=Lilliana |title=The rise of uncivil agreement: issue versus behavioral polarization in the American electorate|journal=[[American Behavioral Scientist]]|date=January 2013|volume=57|issue=1|pages=140–159 | publisher = [[SAGE Publications|SAGE]] |doi= 10.1177/0002764212463363 |s2cid=147084342 }}</ref><ref name="murakami-07">{{cite journal|last=Murakami|first=Michael H.|title=How party polarization affects candidate evaluations: the role of ideology|journal=Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, Illinois|year=2007|url=http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/1/0/3/3/pages210336/p210336-1.php|access-date=2013-04-22|archive-date=2015-04-03|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150403113327/http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/1/0/3/3/pages210336/p210336-1.php|url-status=dead}}</ref> Dixit and Weibull (2007) claim that political polarization is a natural and regular phenomenon. Party loyalism is a strong element of voters' thinking. Individuals who have higher political knowledge will not be influenced by anything a politician says. The polarization is merely a reflection of the party that the voter belongs to, and whichever direction it moves in.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Barber |first1=Michael |last2=Pope |first2=Jeremy C. |title=Does Party Trump Ideology? Disentangling Party and Ideology in America |journal=American Political Science Review |date=February 2019 |volume=113 |issue=1 |pages=38–54 |doi=10.1017/S0003055418000795|s2cid=150286388 }}</ref> They argue that there is a link between public differences in ideology and the polarization of representatives, but that an increase in preference differences is usually temporary and ultimately results in compromise.<ref name="dixit-07">{{cite journal|last1=Dixit|first1=Avinash K. | last2 = Weibull |first2= Jörgen W. |title=Political polarization|journal=[[Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America|Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences]]|date=1 May 2007|volume=104|issue=18 |pages=7351–7356 |doi=10.1073/pnas.0702071104 |pmid=17452633 |pmc=1863477 | jstor = 25427490 | publisher = [[National Academy of Sciences]] |bibcode=2007PNAS..104.7351D |doi-access=free }}</ref> Fernbach, Rogers, Fox and Sloman (2013) argue that it is a result of people having an exaggerated faith in their understanding of complex issues. Asking people to explain their policy preferences in detail typically resulted in more moderate views. Simply asking them to list the reasons for their preferences did not result in any such moderation.<ref>{{Citation
 | last1 =Fernbach
 | first1 =Phillip
 | last2 =Rogers
 | first2 =Todd
 | last3 =Fox
 | first3 =Craig
 | last4 =Sloman
 | first4 =Steven
 | title =Political Extremism Is Supported by an Illusion of Understanding
 | journal =Psychological Science
 | volume =24
 | issue =6
 | pages =939–946
 | date =25 April 2013
 | url =https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/todd_rogers/files/political_extremism.pdf
 | doi =10.1177/0956797612464058| pmid =23620547
 | s2cid =6173291
 }}</ref>

Studies undertaken in the U.S. (2019) and the UK (2022) have found that political polarization is generally less acute among the public than is portrayed in the media.<ref>{{cite web
 |url= https://perceptiongap.us/
 |title= The Perception Gap
 |work= More in Common
 |author= Stephen Hawkins, Daniel Yudkin, Tim Dixon
 |date =June 2019
|access-date= 11 May 2022
}}</ref><ref name ="InCommon">{{cite web
 |url= https://ourglobalfuture.com/reports/the-centre-holds/
 |title= The Centre holds
 |work= Global Future
 |author= Renie Anjeh, Isabel Doraisamy
 |date= April 2022
 |access-date= 11 May 2022
 |archive-date= 1 May 2022
 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20220501112852/https://ourglobalfuture.com/reports/the-centre-holds/
 |url-status= dead
 }}</ref> Moreover, non-nuanced reporting by the media about poll data and public opinions can even aggravate political polarization.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Willems |first1=Jurgen |last2=Meyfroodt |first2=Kenn |date=2024-01-30 |title=Debate: Reporting pre-election polls: it is less about average Jane and Joe, and more about polarized Karen and Kevin |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09540962.2024.2306912 |journal=Public Money & Management |volume=44 |issue=3 |language=en |pages=185–186 |doi=10.1080/09540962.2024.2306912 |issn=0954-0962|hdl=1854/LU-01HNDE8TMQF8BFNFMTD2P3A21T |hdl-access=free }}</ref>

[[Morris P. Fiorina]] (2006, 2008) posits the hypothesis that polarization is a phenomenon which does not hold for the public, and instead is formulated by commentators to draw further division in government.<ref name="fiorina-08" /><ref name="fiorina-06">{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/culturewarmythof00fior|title=Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America|last=Fiorina|first=Morris P.|author2=Samuel J. Abrams|author3=Jeremy C. Pope|publisher=[[Pearson Longman]]|year=2006|isbn=978-0321276407}}</ref><ref name="born-94">{{cite journal|last=Born|first=Richard|title=[Split-ticket voters, divided government, and Fiorina's policy-balancing model]: rejoinder|journal=[[Legislative Studies Quarterly]]|date=February 1994|volume=19 |issue=1 |pages=126–129| publisher = [[American Political Science Association]] |jstor=439804}}</ref> Fiorina connects this phenomenon to what he describes as "party sorting", which is where political ideologies tend to associate with specific political parties (conservatives with the Republican Party and liberals with the Democratic party).<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Fiorina |first1=Morris |last2=Mathew |first2=Levendusky |date=2006 |title=Disconnected: The political class versus the people. Red and Blue Nation: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences of America's Polarized Politics |url=https://bpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/web.sas.upenn.edu/dist/9/244/files/2016/10/fl_brookings_volume-1aluxd6.pdf |access-date=12 March 2024}}</ref> Other studies indicate that cultural differences focusing on ideological movements and geographical polarization within the United States constituency is correlated with rises in overall political polarization between 1972 and 2004.<ref name="abramowitz-08" /><ref name="abramowitz-05">{{cite journal | url = http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/Abramowitz.pdf | last1 = Abramowitz | first1 = Alan | last2 = Saunders | first2 = Kyle L. | title = Why can't we all just get along? The reality of polarized America | journal = The Forum | volume = 3 | issue = 2 | pages = 1–22 | publisher = [[Walter de Gruyter|De Gruyter]] | doi = 10.2202/1540-8884.1076 | date = July 2005 | s2cid = 145471342 | url-status = bot: unknown | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20131019203620/http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/Abramowitz.pdf | archive-date = 2013-10-19 }}</ref>

Religious, ethnic, and other cultural divides within the public have often influenced the emergence of polarization. According to Layman et al. (2005), the ideological split between U.S. Republicans and Democrats also crosses into the religious cultural divide. They claim that Democrats have generally become more [[moderate]] in religious views whereas Republicans have become more traditionalist. For example, political scientists have shown that in the United States, voters who identify as Republican are more likely to vote for a strongly [[evangelical]] candidate than Democratic voters.<ref name="campbell-11">{{cite journal|last1=Campbell|first1=David E.|last2 = Green | first2 = John C. | last3 = Layman | first3 = Geoffrey C. |title=The party faithful: partisan images, candidate religion, and the electoral impact of party identification|journal=[[American Journal of Political Science]]|date= January 2011|volume=55|issue=1|pages=42–58 |doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00474.x | publisher = [[Wiley-Blackwell|Wiley]] |doi-access=free}}</ref> This correlates with the rise in polarization in the United States.<ref name="layman-05">{{cite journal|last1=Layman |first1= Geoffrey C. | last2 =Green | first2 = John C. |title=Wars and rumours of wars: the contexts of cultural conflict in American political behaviour|journal=[[British Journal of Political Science]]|date=January 2006|volume=36|issue=1 |pages=61–89 | publisher = [[Cambridge University Press|Cambridge Journals]] |doi=10.1017/S0007123406000044 | jstor = 4092316 |s2cid= 144870729 }}</ref> Another theory contends that religion does not contribute to full-group polarization, but rather, [[coalition]] and party activist polarization causes party shifts toward a political extreme.<ref name="brooks-04">{{cite journal|url=http://sociology.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/3858/A_Great_Divide.pdf|last=Brooks|first=Clem|author2=Manza, Jeff|title=A great divide? Religion and political change in U.S. national elections, 1972–2000|journal=[[The Sociological Quarterly]]|date=1 May 2004|volume=45|issue=3|pages=421–450|doi=10.1111/j.1533-8525.2004.tb02297.x|publisher=[[Wiley-Blackwell|Wiley]]|s2cid=1887424|access-date=22 April 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100611202750/http://sociology.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/3858/A_Great_Divide.pdf|archive-date=11 June 2010|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

In some post-colonial countries, the public may be polarized along ethnic divides that remain from the colonial regime.<ref name="bhavnani-08">{{cite journal|last1=Bhavnani|first1=Ravi | last2 =Miodownik | first2= Dan|title=Ethnic polarization, ethnic salience, and Civil War |journal=[[Journal of Conflict Resolution]] |date=February 2009 |volume=53 |issue=1 |pages=30–49 |doi=10.1177/0022002708325945 | publisher = [[SAGE Publications|SAGE]] |s2cid=145686111 }}</ref> In [[South Africa]] in the late 1980s, members of the conservative, pro-apartheid [[National Party (South Africa)|National Party]] were no longer supportive of [[apartheid]], and, therefore, no longer ideologically aligned with their party. Dutch [[Afrikaners]], white English, and native Africans split based on racial divisions, causing polarization along ethnic lines.<ref name="sisk-89">{{cite journal|last=Sisk|first=Timothy D.|title=White politics in South Africa: politics under pressure|journal=[[Africa Today]]|date=January 1989|volume=36|issue=1 |pages=29–39 | publisher = [[Indiana University Press]] |jstor=4186531}}</ref><ref name="darity-09">{{citation | url = http://www.cpc.unc.edu/research/publications/3710 | last = Darity | first = William A. | contribution = Economic theory and racial economic inequality | editor-last1 = Dodson | editor-first1 = Howard | editor-last2 = Palmer | editor-first2 = Colin A. | title = The Black condition | pages = 1–43 | publisher = Michigan State University Press | location = East Lansing, Michigan | year = 2009 | isbn = 978-0870138386 | postscript = . | access-date = 2016-02-12 | archive-date = 2017-05-10 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170510105746/http://www.cpc.unc.edu/research/publications/3710 | url-status = dead }}</ref>

[[Economic inequality]] can also motivate the polarization of the public.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Stewart |first1=Alexander J. |last2=McCarty |first2=Nolan |last3=Bryson |first3=Joanna J. |title=Polarization under rising inequality and economic decline |journal=[[Science Advances]] |date=2020 |volume=6 |issue=50 |doi=10.1126/sciadv.abd4201 |pmid=33310855 |pmc=7732181 |arxiv=1807.11477 |bibcode=2020SciA....6.4201S |doi-access=free}}</ref> For example, in post-[[World War I]] [[Germany]], the [[Communist Party of Germany]], and the [[Nazism|National Socialists]], a [[fascism|fascist]] party, emerged as the dominant political ideologies and proposed to address Germany's economic problems in drastically different ways.<ref name="sartori-66" /><ref name="sartori-76" /> In [[Venezuela]], in the late 20th century, presidential candidate [[Hugo Chávez]] used economic inequality in the country to polarize voters, employing a popular and aggressive tone to gain popularity.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last1=Márquez |first1=Laureano |title=Historieta de Venezuela: De Macuro a Maduro |last2=Eduardo |first2=Sanabria |publisher=Gráficas Pedrazas |year=2018 |isbn=978-1-7328777-1-9 |edition=1st |page=151 |chapter=Llegó la dictablanda |author-link=Laureano Márquez}}</ref>