Editing Preemptive war (section)

===Invasion of Iraq (2003)===
{{See also|2003 Invasion of Iraq}}
The doctrine of preemption gained renewed interest following the [[2003 invasion of Iraq|American-led invasion of Iraq]]. The [[George W. Bush administration]] claimed that it was necessary to intervene to prevent [[Saddam Hussein]] from deploying [[Weapon of mass destruction|WMDs]]. At the time, American decision-makers claimed that Saddam's [[weapons of mass destruction]] might be given to militant groups and that the nation's security was at a great risk. Congress passed its [[Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002|joint resolution]]
in October 2002, authorizing the American president to use military force against Saddam's government.<ref name="George">George, and [[Jens David Ohlin|Jens Ohlin]]. ''Defending Humanity''. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.</ref> However, The [[Iraq Intelligence Commission#Findings|Iraq Intelligence Commission confirmed in its 2005 report]] that no [[nuclear weapon]]s or [[biological weapon]]s capability existed. [[Rationale for the Iraq War#Criticisms of the rationale for the Iraq war|Many critics have questioned the true intention of the administration for invading Iraq]], based on possibility of [[retaliation]] in the [[September 11 attacks]].

====Arguments for preemptive war during Bush administration====
=====Sofaer's four elements=====
The scholar [[Abraham David Sofaer]] identified four key elements for justification of preemption:<ref>{{cite journal | author = Sofaer Abraham D | year = 2003 | title = On the Necessity of Pre-emption | journal = European Journal of International Law | volume = 14 | issue = 2| page = 220 | doi = 10.1093/ejil/14.2.209 | doi-access = free }}</ref>
# The nature and magnitude of the threat involved;
# The likelihood that the threat will be realized unless preemptive action is taken;
# The availability and exhaustion of alternatives to using force;
# Whether using preemptive force is consistent with the terms and purposes of the UN Charter and other applicable international agreements.

=====Walzer's three elements=====
Professor Mark R. Amstutz, citing [[Michael Walzer]], adopted a similar but slightly-varied set of criteria and noted three factors to evaluate the justification of a preemptive strike.<ref>Mark R. Amstutz, ''[https://archive.org/details/internationaleth0000amst_w8u3/page/122 <!-- quote=preemptive "six day war". --> International Ethics: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global Politics]''</ref>
# The existence of an intention to injure;
# The undertaking of military preparations that increase the level of danger; and
# The need to act immediately because of a higher degree of risk.

=====Counter proliferation self-help paradigm=====
[[File:F-16netz002.jpg|thumb|right|Israeli Air Force F-16A ''[[Netz 107]]'' with 6.5 aerial victory marks and [[Operation Opera|Osirak]] bombing mark]]
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by [[rogue nations]] gave rise to a certain argument by scholars on preemption.<ref>Colonel Guy Roberts, USMC (Ret) 27 ''Denver Journal of International Law & Policyy'' 483</ref><ref>Steven C. Welsh, [http://www.cdi.org/news/law/preemptive-war.cfm Preemptive War and International Law] Center for Defense Information, 5 December 2003</ref><ref>Kacerauskis pp. 84–85</ref> They argued that the threat need not be "imminent" in the classic sense and that the illicit acquisition of the weapons, with their capacity to unleash massive destruction, by rogue states, created the requisite threat to peace and stability as to have justified the use of preemptive force. [[NATO]]'s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMD, [[Guy Roberts]], cited the 1962 [[Cuban Missile Crisis]], the 1998 US [[Operation Infinite Reach|attack]] on a [[Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory|Sudanese pharmaceutical plant]], (identified by US intelligence to have been a chemical weapons facility) and the [[Operation Opera|1981 Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear facility at Osirak]] as examples of the counterproliferation self-help paradigm.<ref>Roberts, n. 528–536</ref> Regarding the Osirak attack, Roberts noted that at the time, few legal scholars argued in support of the Israeli attack, but he noted further that "subsequent events demonstrated the perspicacity of the Israelis, and some scholars have re-visited that attack arguing that it was justified under anticipatory self-defense."<ref>Roberts n. 530–532</ref> After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, US forces captured a number of documents detailing conversations that Saddam had with his inner sanctum.<ref name="hussein">{{cite news|title=Papers From Iraqi Archive Reveal Conspiratorial Mind-Set of Hussein|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/world/middleeast/archive-offers-rare-glimpse-inside-mind-of-saddam-hussein.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=Saadam%20Hussein&st=cse|author=Gordon, Michael R.|date=25 October 2011|work=New York Times}}</ref> The archive of documents and recorded meetings confirm that [[Saddam Hussein]] was indeed aiming to strike at Israel.<ref name=hussein/> In a 1982 conversation Hussein stated, "Once Iraq walks out victorious, there will not be any Israel." Of Israel's anti-Iraqi endeavors he noted, "Technically, they [the Israelis] are right in all of their attempts to harm Iraq."<ref name=hussein/>

==== Post–Bush administration period (2009–present) ====
After the departure of the Bush administration, the Obama administration adopted and continued many policies of the [[Bush Doctrine]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.chicagotribune.com/2011/05/23/obama-adopts-the-bush-doctrine/|work=Chicago Tribune|first=Charles|last=Krauthammer|title=Obama adopts the Bush Doctrine|date=23 May 2011}}</ref>