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===Security and concealment issues=== {{hatnote|For more information on the 2004 elections see: [[2004 United States election voting controversies#Voting machines|2004 United States election voting controversies: Voting machines]]}} In January 2003, Diebold Election Systems' proprietary software, and election files, hardware and software specifications, program files, voting program patches, on its file transfer protocol site, were leaked, later 7 August 2003 leaked to ''[[Wired (magazine)|Wired]]''.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Manjoo |first1=Farhad |title=An open invitation to election fraud |url=http://www.salonmag.com/tech/feature/2003/09/23/bev_harris/index_np.html |website=[[Salon.com]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20031009131908/http://www.salonmag.com/tech/feature/2003/09/23/bev_harris/index_np.html |archive-date=2003-10-09 |date=2003-09-23}}</ref> <ref>{{cite news |last1=McWilliams |first1=Brian |title=New Security Woes for E-Vote Firm |url=http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,59925,00.html |work=[[Wired (magazine)#Website|Wired News]] |date=2003-08-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20031008132304/http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,59925,00.html |archive-date=2003-10-08}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Harris |first1=Bev |author1-link=Bev Harris |title=BREAKING NEWS: Voting System Integrity Flaw |url=http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0302/S00036.htm |access-date=6 June 2021 |work=[[Scoop News]] |date=5 February 2003 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20031002222108/http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0302/S00036.htm |archive-date=2003-10-02 |quote=Diebold Election Systems, which builds the AccuVote machines, both optical scan and touch-screen, was parking files on an unprotected public Internet location. Not a few files β thousands of files; election files, hardware and software specifications, program files, voting program patches β and sometimes, files with curious names.}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=The research and activism arm of BlackBox Voting.com |url=http://www.blackboxvoting.org/ |website=BlackBoxVoting.org |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030713155032/http://www.blackboxvoting.org/ |archive-date=2003-07-13}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author1=BlackBoxVoting.org |title=Diebold Demands Pull-Down of Black Box Voting |url=http://www.talion.com/blackboxvoting.org.htm |publisher=Talion.com: Red Dog Publicity & inexpensive PR support |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030927011636/http://www.talion.com/blackboxvoting.org.htm |archive-date=2003-09-27 |date=2003-09-26}}</ref> In 2004, [[Avi Rubin]], a professor of computer science at [[Johns Hopkins University]] and Technical Director of the [[Information Security Institute]], analyzed the source code used in these voting machines and reported "this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts."<ref>{{Cite book | doi = 10.1109/SECPRI.2004.1301313 | issn = 1081-6011 | pages = 27β40 | last = Kohno | first = T. | author2=A. Stubblefield |author3=A. D. Rubin |author4=D. S. Wallach | title = IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2004. Proceedings. 2004 | chapter = Analysis of an electronic voting system | url = http://avirubin.com/vote.pdf | year = 2004 | isbn = 978-0-7695-2136-7 | citeseerx = 10.1.1.100.4963 | s2cid = 12203239 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book | publisher = Broadway | isbn = 978-0-7679-2210-4 | last = Rubin | first = Aviel David | title = Brave New Ballot: The Battle to Safeguard Democracy in the Age of Electronic Voting | date = 2006-09-05 | page = [https://archive.org/details/bravenewballotba00rubi/page/288 288] | url-access = registration | url = https://archive.org/details/bravenewballotba00rubi/page/288 }}</ref> Following the publication of this paper, the [[State of Maryland]] hired [[Science Applications International Corporation]] (SAIC) to perform another analysis of the Diebold voting machines. SAIC concluded "[t]he system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of compromise."<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20060827160641/http://www.dbm.maryland.gov/dbm_publishing/public_content/dbm_search/technology/toc_voting_system_report/votingsystemreportfinal.pdf Archived version of State of Maryland's Risk Assessment Report regarding Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System and Processes.] Archived on August 27, 2006. Retrieved January 6, 2009.</ref> In January 2004, ''RABA Technologies'', a security company in [[Columbia, Maryland]], did a security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote, confirming many of the problems found by Rubin and finding some new vulnerabilities.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.raba.com/press/TA_Report_AccuVote.pdf |title=Trusted Agent Report Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System, RABA Innovative Solution Cell (RiSC) |date=March 25, 2004 |access-date=November 22, 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080512084047/http://www.raba.com/press/TA_Report_AccuVote.pdf |archive-date=May 12, 2008 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Guernsey |first1=Lisa |title=Holding the Vote-Counting Machines Accountable |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/16/technology/circuits/holding-the-votecounting-machines-accountable.html |access-date=6 June 2021 |work=The New York Times |date=2004-09-16 |quote=What about other attempts at tampering? In a simulation last year, a team of experts with RABA Technologies, a security company in Columbia, Md., attempted to hack into the cards by guessing passwords. The team was able to gain access to the cards' contents after a few guesses and create a forged supervisor card. With such a card, a perpetrator could disable a touch-screen unit.}}</ref> In June 2005, the ''Tallahassee Democrat'' reported that when given access to Diebold optical scan vote-counting computers, Black Box Voting, a nonprofit election watchdog group founded by [[Bev Harris]], hired Finnish computer expert Harri Hursti and conducted a project in which vote totals were altered, by replacing the memory card that stores voting results with one that had been tampered with. Although the machines are supposed to record changes to data stored in the system, they showed no record of tampering after the memory cards were swapped. In response, a spokesperson for the Florida Department of State said, "Information on a blog site is not viable or credible."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://reclaimdemocracy.org/leon_florida_vote_test/ |title=Tests in Leon County, Florida, Demonstrate Ease of Vote Count Hacking |work=Reclaim Democracy! |publisher=Reclaimdemocracy.org |date=June 4, 2005 |access-date=17 September 2021}}</ref> In early 2006, a study for the state of California corroborated and expanded on the problem;<ref>"[https://web.archive.org/web/20070611092341/http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/security_analysis_of_the_diebold_accubasic_interpreter.pdf Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter]"</ref> on page 2 the California report states that: "Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots" and "Harri Hursti's attack does work: Mr. Hursti's attack on the AV-OS is definitely real. He was indeed able to change the election results by doing nothing more than modifying the contents of a memory card. He needed no passwords, no cryptographic keys, and no access to any other part of the voting system, including the GEMS election management server." [[File:Desi accuvote-tsx vvpat.jpg|thumb|AccuVote-TSx [[DRE voting machine]] with [[Voter-verified paper audit trail|VVPAT]] attachment, at right]] A new vulnerability, this time with the TSx DRE machines, was reported in May 2006. According to Professor Rubin, the machines are "much, much easier to attack than anything we've previously said... On a scale of one to 10, if the problems we found before were a six, this is a 10. It's a totally different ballgame."<ref>{{cite web |author1=[[Hacker House]] |title=election hacking |url=https://github.com/hackerhouse-opensource/electionhacking |website=[[GitHub]] |access-date=6 June 2021 |date=2021-03-18 |quote=Useful tools and configuration files for injecting your own code into a Diebold AccuVote TSx system. To make use of these utilities you will need an OpenOCD compatible debugger such as the TinCanTools FlySwatter 2. You will also benefit from a PCMCIA to CompactFlash adapter and NE2000-based ethernet PCMCIA card. You need to ensure that you get a compatible card, you can then load your own EXE or ROM onto the Diebold AccuVote TSx system. You can also make use of the flash memory to make your adjustments {{sic|permenant}}.}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Election Machine Hacking: Diebold AccuVote-TSx Runs 'Space Invaders' |url=https://hacker.house/lab/hacking-elections-diebold-accuvote-tsx-runs-space-invaders/ |website=[[Hacker House]] |access-date=6 June 2021 |date=2019-10-24 }}</ref> According to Rubin, the system is intentionally designed so that anyone with access can update the machine software, without a pass code or other security protocol. Diebold officials said that although any problem can be avoided by keeping a close watch on the machines, they are developing a fix.<ref>[http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2006/05/12/1647862.htm Experts see new Diebold flaw: They call it worst security glitch to date in state's voting machines and a 'big deal'] TMCnet.com, May 12, 2006</ref> [[Michael Shamos|Michael I. Shamos]], a professor of computer science at [[Carnegie Mellon University]] who is a proponent of electronic voting and the examiner of electronic voting systems for Pennsylvania, stated "It's the most severe security flaw ever discovered in a voting system." [[Douglas W. Jones]], a professor of computer science at the [[University of Iowa]], stated "This is the barn door being wide open, while people were arguing over the lock on the front door." Diebold spokesman [[David Bear]] played down the seriousness of the situation, asserting that "For there to be a problem here, you're basically assuming a premise where you have some evil and nefarious election officials who would sneak in and introduce a piece of software. I don't believe these evil elections people exist."<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/12/us/12vote.html?_r=3&oref=slogin&oref=slogin&oref=slogin New Fears of Security Risks in Electronic Voting Systems] New York Times, May 12, 2006. Also see [http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11391 Security Focus] in depth four page report.</ref> On October 30, 2006, researchers from the [[University of Connecticut]] demonstrated new [[Vulnerability (computing)|vulnerabilities]] in Diebold AccuVote-OS optical scan voting terminal. The system can be compromised even if its removable memory card is sealed in place.<ref>[http://voter.engr.uconn.edu/voter/Reports.html Security Assessment of the Diebold Optical Scan Voting Terminal] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080510111914/http://voter.engr.uconn.edu/voter/Reports.html |date=May 10, 2008 }} (UConn VoTeR Center and Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Connecticut, October 30. 2006)</ref> On September 13, 2006, Director of the ''Center for Information and Technology Policy''<ref>{{cite web |title=Home |url=https://citp.princeton.edu/ |website=Center for Information Technology Policy |publisher=[[Princeton University]] |access-date=6 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071031100349/https://citp.princeton.edu/ |archive-date=2007-10-31 |location=[[Princeton, New Jersey]] |url-status=live}}</ref> at [[Princeton University]], Professor [[Edward Felten]], and graduate students [[Ariel Feldman]] and [[Alex Halderman]] discovered severe security flaws in a Diebold AccuVote-TS [[voting machine]].<ref>{{cite news |last1=Schulberg |first1=Jessica |title=Good News For Russia: 15 States Use Voting Machines That Have Been Easily Hackable For More Than A Decade |url=https://www.huffpost.com/entry/electronic-voting-machines-hack-russia_n_5967e1c2e4b03389bb162c96 |access-date=6 June 2021 |work=[[HuffPost]] |date=2017-07-17 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=POTTER |first1=NED |title=Elections Easy to Steal, Say Computer Scientists |url=https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=2450290&page=1 |access-date=6 June 2021 |work=ABC News |date=September 15, 2006 |language=en }}</ref> Their findings claimed, "Malicious software running on a single voting machine can steal votes with little if any risk of detection. The malicious software can modify all of the records, audit logs, and counters kept by the voting machine, so that even careful forensic examination of these records will find nothing amiss."<ref>{{cite journal |author1 = Ariel J. Feldman |author2 = J. Alex Halderman |author3 = Edward W. Felten |title = Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine |publisher = [[Princeton University]] |date = September 13, 2006 |url = http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/ts-paper.pdf |access-date = 2007-05-07 |url-status = dead |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070513135051/http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/ts-paper.pdf |archive-date = May 13, 2007 }} </ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Feldman |first1=Ariel J. |last2=Halderman |first2=J. Alex |last3=Felten |first3=Edward W. |author1-link=Ariel J. Feldman |author2-link=J. Alex Halderman |author3-link=Edward Felten |title=Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine |url=https://citp.princeton.edu/our-work/voting/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171212130414/http://citp.princeton.edu/research/voting/ |archive-date=2017-12-12 |url-status=live |website=Center for Information Technology Policy |access-date=6 June 2021 |date=September 13, 2006}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author1=CITP Princeton |title=Security Demonstration of DieBold AccuVote-TS Electronic Voting Machine |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B8TXuRA4IQM |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211212/B8TXuRA4IQM| archive-date=2021-12-12 |url-status=live|publisher=via: [[YouTube]] |access-date=6 June 2021 |language=en |date=2016-11-30}}{{cbignore}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author1=CITP Princeton |title=Access to Diebold AccuVote-TS Electronic Voting Machine β close up |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BIBFEAGi9MA |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211212/BIBFEAGi9MA| archive-date=2021-12-12 |url-status=live|publisher=via: [[YouTube]] |access-date=6 June 2021 |language=en |date=2016-12-01}}{{cbignore}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author1=CITP Princeton |title=Access Diebold AccuVote-TS Electronic Voting Machine β angle view |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QfqBOo_JKc0 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211212/QfqBOo_JKc0| archive-date=2021-12-12 |url-status=live|publisher=via: [[YouTube]] |access-date=6 June 2021 |language=en |date=2016-12-01 }}{{cbignore}}</ref> On November 2, 2006, [[HBO]] premiered ''[[Hacking Democracy]]'', a documentary about the vulnerability of electronic voting machines (primarily Diebold) to hacking and inaccurate vote totals. The company argued that the film was factually inaccurate and urged HBO to air a disclaimer explaining that it had not verified any of the claims.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.hackingdemocracy.com/downloads/hbo_letter.pdf |title=Cease and Desist letter from Diebold Elections' President David Byrd |access-date=November 22, 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111018001746/http://www.hackingdemocracy.com/downloads/hbo_letter.pdf |archive-date=October 18, 2011 |df=mdy-all }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|author=Michael Janofsk |url=http://www.seattlepi.com/national/290653_diebold01.html |title=Seattle PI story on the Diebold press release regarding 'Hacking Democracy' |publisher=Seattlepi.com |date=October 31, 2006 |access-date=November 22, 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last=Clarke |first=Gavin |url=https://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/11/02/diebold_hacking_democracy/ |title=Article from 'The Register' regarding Diebold's letters to HBO |publisher=Theregister.co.uk |date=November 2, 2006 |access-date=November 22, 2011}}</ref> However, corroboration and validation for the exploits shown in ''Hacking Democracy'' was published in a report for the state of California (see above). In January 2007, a photo of the key used to open Diebold voting machines was posted in the company's website. It was found possible to duplicate the key based on the photo. The key unlocks a compartment which contains a removable [[memory card]], leaving the machine vulnerable to tampering.<ref>[http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1113 Diebold shows how to make your own voting machine key].</ref> A report commissioned by Ohio's top elections official on December 15, 2007, found that all five voting systems used in Ohio (made by Elections Systems and Software; Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold Election Systems); and Hart InterCivic) have critical flaws that could undermine the integrity of the 2008 general election.<ref>{{cite web |title=Ohio Elections Official Calls Machines Flawed (Published 2007) |website=[[The New York Times]] |date=December 15, 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210610082312/https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/15/us/15ohio.html?_r=1 |archive-date=2021-06-10 |url-status=live |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/15/us/15ohio.html?_r=1&oref=slogin |last1=Driehaus |first1=Bob }}</ref> On July 17, 2008, [[Stephen Spoonamore]] made the claim that he had "fresh evidence regarding election fraud on Diebold electronic voting machines during the 2002 Georgia gubernatorial and senatorial elections." Spoonamore is "the founder and until recently the CEO of Cybrinth LLC, an information technology policy and security firm that serves Fortune 100 companies." He claims that Diebold Election Systems Inc. COO [[Bob Urosevich]] personally installed a computer patch on voting machines in two counties in [[Georgia (U.S. state)|Georgia]], and that the patch did not fix the problem it was supposed to fix.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://rawstory.com//news/2008/Cybersecurity_expert_raises_allegations_of_2004_0717.html |archive-date=2017-04-25 |url-status=dead |archiveurl=https://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20170425221956/http://www.rawstory.com/news/2008/Cybersecurity_expert_raises_allegations_of_2004_0717.html|title=The Raw Story β GOP cyber-security expert suggests Diebold tampered with 2002 election|work=rawstory.com}}</ref> Reports have indicated that then [[Georgia Secretary of State]] [[Cathy Cox (American politician)|Cathy Cox]] did not know the patch was installed until after the election.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://rawstory.com/news/2008/Documents_reveal_Georgia_was_warned_of_0730.html|title=The Raw Story β Documents show Georgia's Secretary of State knew of Diebold patch|work=rawstory.com}}</ref>
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