Editing Problem of evil (section)

===Logical problem of evil<!--'Logical problem of evil' redirects here-->{{anchor|Epicurus}}===
{{main|Epicurean paradox}}
[[File:Epikouros BM 1843.jpg|thumb|right|upright|The earliest statement of the problem of evil is attributed to Epicurus, but this attribution is uncertain.]]
The problem of evil possibly originates from the Greek philosopher [[Epicurus]] (341–270 BCE).<ref>The formulation may have been wrongly attributed to Epicurus by Lactantius, who, from his Christian perspective, regarded Epicurus as an [[atheist]]. According to Mark Joseph Larrimore, (2001), ''The Problem of Evil'', pp. xix–xxi. Wiley-Blackwell. According to [[Reinhold F. Glei]], it is settled that the argument of theodicy is from an academical source which is not only not epicurean, but even anti-epicurean. Reinhold F. Glei, ''Et invidus et inbecillus. Das angebliche Epikurfragment bei Laktanz, De ira dei 13, 20–21'', in: ''Vigiliae Christianae'' 42 (1988), pp. 47–58</ref> Hume summarizes Epicurus's version of the problem as follows: "Is [god] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?"<ref>{{cite web |last1=Hume |first1=David |title=Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion |url=https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4583/4583-h/4583-h.htm |website=Project Gutenberg |access-date=17 June 2024}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Hickson|first=Michael W.|editor1-last=McBrayer|editor1-first=Justin P.|editor2-last=Howard-Snyder|editor2-first=Daniel|date=2014|chapter=A Brief History of Problems of Evil|title=The Blackwell Companion to The Problem of Evil|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=J0ScAgAAQBAJ&pg=PT26|location=Hoboken, New Jersey|publisher=Wiley-Blackwell|isbn=978-1-118-60797-8|pages=6–7}}</ref>

The logical argument from evil is as follows:
{{blockquote|
P1. If an [[omnipotent]], [[omnibenevolent]] and [[omniscient]] god exists, then evil does not.

P2. There is evil in the world.

C1. Therefore, an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient god does not exist.}}

This argument is of the form {{lang|la|[[modus tollens]]}}: if its premise (P1) is true, the conclusion (C1) follows of necessity. To show that the first premise is plausible, subsequent versions tend to expand on it, such as this modern example:<ref name="IepEvidential" />

{{blockquote|
P1a. God exists.

P1b. God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient.

P1c. An omnipotent being has the power to prevent that evil from coming into existence.

P1d. An omnibenevolent being would want to prevent all evils.

P1e. An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence, and knows every way in which those evils could be prevented.

P1f. A being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, who is able to prevent that evil from coming into existence, and who wants to do so, would prevent the existence of that evil.

P1. If there exists an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient God, then no evil exists.

P2. Evil exists (logical contradiction).}}

Both of these arguments are understood to be presenting two forms of the 'logical' problem of evil. They attempt to show that the assumed premises lead to a [[logical]] [[contradiction]] that cannot all be correct. Most philosophical debate has focused on the suggestion that God would want to prevent all evils and therefore cannot coexist with any evils (premises P1d and P1f), but there are existing responses to every premise (such as [[Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense|Plantinga's response to P1c]]), with defenders of theism (for example, [[Augustine of Hippo|St. Augustine]] and [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|Leibniz]]) arguing that God could exist and allow evil if there were good reasons.

If God lacks any one of these qualities{{snd}}omniscience, omnipotence, or omnibenevolence{{snd}}then the logical problem of evil can be resolved. [[Process theology]] and [[open theism]] are modern positions that limit God's omnipotence or omniscience (as defined in traditional theology) based on free will in others.