Editing Ranked pairs (section)

== Criteria ==
Of the formal [[voting criteria]], the ranked pairs method passes the [[Majority favorite criterion|majority criterion]], the [[monotonicity criterion]], the [[Smith criterion]] (which implies the [[Condorcet criterion]]), the [[Condorcet loser criterion]], and the [[independence of clones criterion]]. Ranked pairs fails the [[consistency criterion]] and the [[participation criterion]]. While ranked pairs is not fully [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives|independent of irrelevant alternatives]], it still satisfies [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives#Local independence|local independence of irrelevant alternatives]] and [[independence of Smith-dominated alternatives]], meaning it is likely to roughly satisfy IIA "in practice."

=== Independence of irrelevant alternatives ===<!--This section is linked from [[Condorcet method]]-->
Ranked pairs fails [[independence of irrelevant alternatives]], like all other [[Ranked voting|ranked voting systems]]. However, the method adheres to a less strict property, sometimes called [[independence of Smith-dominated alternatives]] (ISDA). It says that if one candidate (X) wins an election, and a new alternative (Y) is added, X will win the election if Y is not in the [[Smith set]]. ISDA implies the Condorcet criterion.
=== Comparison table ===
The following table compares ranked pairs with other single-winner election methods:{{Comparison of Schulze to preferential voting systems}}