Editing Richard Helms (section)

===Viet Cong numbers===
Differences and divisions might emerge within the ranks of analysts, across the spectrum of the [[Federal government of the United States|USG]] Intelligence Community. Helms had a statutory mandate with the responsibility for reconciling the discrepancies in information, or the conflicting views, promoted by the various American intelligence services, e.g., by the large [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] or by the [[Bureau of Intelligence and Research]] at the United States State Department. While the CIA might agree on its own Estimates, other department reports might disagree, causing difficulties, and making inter-agency concord problematic. The process of reaching the final consensus could become a contentious negotiation.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 198–199 (Helms re Vietnam drawn into "larger paper wars").</ref><ref>Cf., Cline (1976) pp. 207–208 (coordination of intelligence re Defense, State, CIA).</ref><ref>Cf., Ranelagh (1986) p. 25 (Helms re DCI), 26 ("countless bureaucratic battles"), 111 (coordination), 166 (Defense, State, CIA), 196–197 (estimates), 346 (finesss), 412–413 (DCI role).</ref>

[[File:Visit of President Johnson in Vietnam.jpg|thumb|[[Lyndon Baines Johnson|President Johnson]] in Vietnam 1966, awarding a medal to a U.S. soldier]]
In 1965, Johnson substantially escalated the war by sending large numbers of American combat troops to fight in South Vietnam, and ordered warplanes to bomb the North. Nonetheless, the military put stiff pressure on him to escalate further. In the "paper wars" that followed, Helms at the CIA was regularly asked for intelligence reports on military action, e.g., the political effectiveness of bombing [[Hanoi]]. The military resented such a review of its conduct in the war.<ref>Tucker, editor, ''Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' (Oxford Univ. 1998, 2000) pp. 311–312: "Order of Battle Dispute (1967)".</ref>

The American strategy had become the pursuit of a [[Attrition warfare|war of attrition]]. The objective was to make the [[Viet Cong]] enemy suffer more losses than it could timely replace. Accordingly, the number of combatants fielded by the communist insurgency at any one time was a key factor in determining whether the course of the war was favorable or not. The political pressure on the CIA to conform to the military's figures of enemy casualties became intense. Under Helms, CIA reports on the Viet Cong order of battle numbers were usually moderate; the CIA also questioned whether the strategy employed by the U.S. Army would ever compel Hanoi to negotiate. Helms himself was evidently sceptical, yet Johnson never asked for his personal opinion.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 198–200 (CIA reports), 203 (Helm's own views).</ref> This dispute between the Army and the CIA over the number of Viet Cong combatants became bitter, and eventually common knowledge in the administration.<ref>Robert S. McNamara, ''In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam'' (New York: Times Books/Random House 1995) pp. 237–239.</ref><ref>Tucker, editor, ''Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' (Oxford Univ. 1998, 2000) p. 311.</ref>

According to one source, CIA Director Richard Helms "used his influence with Lyndon Johnson to warn about the growing dangers of U.S. involvement in Vietnam."<ref>John Ranelagh, "Central Intelligence Agency" p. 122, in ''The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World'' (2d ed., 2001).</ref> On the other hand, [[Stansfield Turner]] (DCI 1977–1981) describes Helms' advisory relationship to Lyndon Johnson as being overly loyal to the office of president. Hence, the CIA staff's frank opinions on Vietnam were sometimes modified before reaching President Johnson.<ref>Turner (2005) pp. 120–121.</ref> At one point the CIA analysts estimated enemy strength at 500,000, while the military insisted it was only 270,000. No amount of discussion could resolve the difference. Eventually, in September 1967, the CIA under Helms went along with the military's lower number for the combat strength of the Vietnamese Communist forces.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 324–329.</ref><ref>Powers (1979) pp. 213–216.</ref> This led a CIA analyst directly involved in this work to file a formal complaint against DCI Helms, which was accorded due process within the Agency.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 326–328. The analyst was Sam Adams and his complaint about Helms was heard by a CIA review board.</ref><ref>Long after the war was over, civil litigation ensued between General Westmoreland and CBS which directly touched on the Viet Cong numbers controversy. Tucker, editor, ''Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' (2000) p. 311. Also see below: "Later years".</ref>