Editing Russian Ground Forces (section)

==== First Chechen War ====
{{See also|First Chechen War}}
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Chechens declared independence in November 1991, under the leadership of a former Air Forces officer, General [[Dzhokhar Dudayev|Dzhokar Dudayev]].<ref>{{cite report
 |last        = Finch
 |first       = Raymond C. III, MAJ
 |url         = http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/yrusfail/yrusfail.htm
 |title       = Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya
 |publisher   = Foreign Military Studies Office
 |location    = Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20061015123847/http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/yrusfail/yrusfail.htm
 |archive-date= 15 October 2006
}}</ref> The continuation of Chechen independence was seen as reducing Moscow's authority; Chechnya became perceived as a haven for criminals, and a hard-line group within the Kremlin began advocating war. A Security Council meeting was held 29 November 1994, where Yeltsin ordered the Chechens to disarm, or else Moscow would restore order. Defence Minister [[Pavel Grachev]] assured Yeltsin that he would "take Grozny with one airborne assault regiment in two hours."<ref>{{Cite journal
 |last    = Herspring
 |first   = Dale
 |s2cid   = 110963490
 |title   = Undermining Combat Readiness in the Russian Military
 |journal = Armed Forces & Society
 |volume  = 32
 |issue   = 4
 |pages   = 512–531
 |date    = July 2006
 |issn    = 0095-327X
 |doi     = 10.1177/0095327X06288030
 }} [citing {{cite report
 |last        = Blandy
 |first       = C. W.
 |title       = Chechnya: Two Federal Interventions: An interim comparison and assessment
 |publisher   = Conflict Studies Research Centre
 |docket      = P29
 |date        = January 2000
 |page        = 13
 |url         = http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/caucasus/P29
 |access-date = 9 September 2010
 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20101219095730/http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/caucasus/P29
 |archive-date= 19 December 2010
}}]</ref>

The operation began on 11 December 1994 and, by 31 December, Russian forces were entering [[Grozny]], the Chechen capital. The 131st Motor Rifle Brigade was ordered to make a swift push for the centre of the city, but was then virtually destroyed in Chechen ambushes. After finally seizing Grozny amid fierce resistance, Russian troops moved on to other Chechen strongholds. When Chechen militants took hostages in the [[Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis]] in Stavropol Kray in June 1995, peace looked possible for a time, but the fighting continued. Following this incident, the separatists were referred to as ''insurgents'' or ''terrorists'' within Russia.

Dzhokar Dudayev was assassinated in a Russian [[airstrike]] on 21 April 1996, and that summer, a Chechen attack [[Battle of Grozny (August 1996)|retook Grozny]]. [[Alexander Lebed]], then Secretary of the Security Council, began talks with the Chechen rebel leader [[Aslan Maskhadov]] in August 1996 and signed an agreement on 22/23 August; by the end of that month, the fighting ended.<ref>{{Cite book
  |last1  = Scott
  |first1 = Harriet Fast
  |last2  = Scott
  |first2 = William F.
  |title  = Russian Military Directory
  |year   = 2002
  |page   = 328}}</ref>
The formal ceasefire was signed in the [[Dagestan]]i town of [[Khasavyurt]] on 31 August 1996, stipulating that a formal agreement on relations between the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the Russian federal government need not be signed until late 2001.

Writing some years later, [[Dmitri Trenin]] and Aleksei Malashenko described the Russian military's performance in Chechniya as "grossly deficient at all levels, from commander-in-chief to the drafted private."<ref>{{Cite book
  | last1 = Trenin
  | first1 = Dmitri V.
  | last2 = Malashenko
  | first2 = Aleksei V.
  | title = Russia's Restless Frontier
  | location = Washington DC
  | publisher = Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  | year = 2004
  | page = 106
  | isbn = 0-87003-204-6}}</ref> The Ground Forces' performance in the First Chechen War has been assessed by a British academic as "appallingly bad".{{sfn|Orr|2000||page=82}} Writing six years later, Michael Orr said "one of the root causes of the Russian failure in 1994–96 was their inability to raise and deploy a properly trained military force."{{sfn|Orr|2000|page=87}}

Then Lieutenant Colonel [[Mark Hertling]] of the U.S. Army had the chance to visit the Ground Forces in 1994:
<blockquote>The Russian barracks were spartan, with twenty beds lined up in a large room similar to what the U.S. Army had during World War II. The food in their mess halls was terrible. The Russian "training and exercises" we observed were not opportunities to improve capabilities or skills, but rote demonstrations, with little opportunity for maneuver or imagination. The military college classroom where a group of middle- and senior-ranking officers conducted a regimental map exercise was rudimentary, with young soldiers manning radio-telephones relaying orders to imaginary units in some imaginary field location. On the motor pool visit, I was able to crawl into a T-80 tank—it was cramped, dirty, and in poor repair—and even fire a few rounds in a very primitive simulator.{{sfn|Hertling|2022}}</blockquote>

In June 1999 Russian forces, though not the Ground Forces, were involved in a confrontation with NATO. Parts of the [[1st Separate Airborne Brigade]] of the [[Russian Airborne Forces]] raced to seize control of [[Pristina Airport]] in what became [[Kosovo]], leading to the [[Incident at Pristina airport]].