Editing Strong dollar policy (section)

=== 1977–1978 ===
In 1977 the Carter administration advocated and initiated the “locomotive theory”, which posits that big economies pull along their smaller brethren. Carter’s theory asked for concessions from the smaller countries to benefit the U.S. for the high price the U.S. has incurred for their benevolence after the 1973-75 recession.<ref>{{Cite journal| issn = 0043-2636| volume = 115| issue = 1| pages = 38–50| last = Bronfenbrenner| first = Martin| title = On the Locomotive Theory in International Macroeconomics| journal = Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv| date = 1979| jstor = 40438717| doi = 10.1007/BF02696340| s2cid = 154245012}}</ref> The American initiative met with staunch German and Japanese resistance at first. In response, U.S. authorities let it be known that they would allow the dollar to depreciate against the dissenting countries' currencies in the absence of [[Macroeconomics|macroeconomic]] stimuli.<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.2307/2131223| issn = 0022-3816| volume = 47| issue = 3| pages = 1001–1004| last = Scheuerman| first = William| title = United States International Economic Policy in Action: Diversity of Decision Making. Stephen D. Cohen, Ronald I. Meltzer| journal = The Journal of Politics| date = 1985-08-01| jstor = 2131223}}</ref> Eventually, Japanese prime minister [[Takeo Fukuda]] agreed to the U.S. stimulus request in late 1977.<ref>{{Cite news| issn = 0190-8286| last = Rowen| first = Hobart| title = Japan Acts To Approve Stimulus| newspaper = Washington Post| date = 1978-09-02| url = https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1978/09/02/japan-acts-to-approve-stimulus/216d79f5-642d-42a8-9a64-2af46b54c569/}}</ref> A year later at the [[4th G7 summit|Bonn Economic Summit]] in July 1978, German Chancellor [[Helmut Schmidt]] acceded to [[Fiscal policy|expansionary fiscal policy]] as a part of a package of mutual concessions.<ref>{{Cite book| publisher = Springer Science & Business Media| isbn = 978-1-4615-5143-0| last = Iida| first = Keisuke| title = International Monetary Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, and Germany| date = 2012-12-06}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book| edition = 2nd| publisher = Lexington, Mass. : Lexington Books| isbn = 978-0-669-05144-5| pages = [https://archive.org/details/copingwithusjapa00dest/page/243 243–70]| last1 = Destler| first1 = I. M.| last2 = Sato| first2 = Hideo| title = Coping with U.S.-Japanese economic conflicts| chapter = Locomotives on different tracks, macroeconomic diplomacy, 1977-1979| date = 1982| chapter-url = https://archive.org/details/copingwithusjapa00dest| url = https://archive.org/details/copingwithusjapa00dest/page/243}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book| edition = 1st| publisher = Brookings Institution Press| isbn = 978-0-8157-1178-0| pages = [https://archive.org/details/cannationsagreei0000unse/page/12 12–140]| last1 = Putnam| first1 = Robert D.| last2 = Henning| first2 = C. Randall| title = Can Nations Agree?| chapter = The Bonn Summit of 1978: A Case Study in Coordination| series = Issues in International Economic Cooperation| date = 1989| jstor = 10.7864/j.ctv80cd2w.5| chapter-url = https://archive.org/details/cannationsagreei0000unse/page/12}}</ref>