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Thomas Schelling
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===''The Strategy of Conflict'' (1960)=== ''The Strategy of Conflict'', which Schelling published in 1960,<ref name=":5">{{cite book |title=The Strategy of Conflict |last=Schelling |first=Thomas C. |year=1980 |edition=Reprint, illustrated and revised. |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0674840317 |page=309 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7RkL4Z8Yg5AC&q=thomas+schelling+strategy+of+conflict |access-date=September 21, 2010}}</ref> pioneered the study of bargaining and [[strategic management|strategic behavior]] in what he refers to as "conflict behavior."<ref name=":12">{{Cite journal |last=Powell |first=Robert |date=2006 |title=War as a Commitment Problem |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818306060061 |journal=International Organization |volume=60 |issue=1 |pages= |doi=10.1017/s0020818306060061 |doi-broken-date=November 5, 2024 |issn=0020-8183 |via= |s2cid=15861342}}</ref> ''The Times Literary Supplement'' in 1995 ranked it as one of the 100 most influential books in the 50 years since 1945.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.interleaves.org/~rteeter/grttls.html|title=100 Most Influential Books Since the War (TLS)|first=Robert|last=Teeter|website=www.interleaves.org}}</ref> In this book Schelling introduced concepts such as the [[Focal point (game theory)|"focal point"]] and "credible commitment." In a 1961 review, International Relations scholar [[Morton Kaplan]] described the book as a "strikingly original contribution" and a "landmark in the literature."<ref name="Kaplan 1961 642–652">{{Cite journal |last=Kaplan |first=Morton A. |date=1961 |title=Strategy and International Politics |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/strategy-and-international-politics/B8D7B5793A4954C5BA499EC6F2AA78E8 |journal=World Politics |language=en |volume=13 |issue=4 |pages=642–652 |doi=10.2307/2009441 |jstor=2009441 |s2cid=144001424 |issn=1086-3338|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Schelling's book comprised a series of scholarly journal articles that he had published over the period 1957–1960.<ref name="Kaplan 1961 642–652"/> Schelling encourages in his work a strategic view toward conflict that is equally "rational" and "successful."<ref name=":5" /> He believes that conflict cannot be based merely on one's intelligence but must also address the "advantages" associated with a course of action. He considers that the advantages that are gleaned should be firmly fixed in a value system that is both "explicit" and "consistent."<ref name=":5" /> Also, conflict has a distinct meaning. In Schelling's approach, it is not enough to defeat an opponent, but one must also seize opportunities to co-operate of which there are usually many. He points out that it is only on the rarest of occasions, in what is known as "pure conflict," that the participants' interests are implacably opposed.<ref name=":5" /> He uses the example of "a war of complete extermination" to illustrate this phenomenon.<ref name=":5" /> Co-operation, if available, may take many forms and thus potentially involve everything from "deterrence, limited war, and disarmament" to "negotiation."<ref name=":5" /> Indeed, it is through such actions that participants are left with less of a conflict and more of a "bargaining situation."<ref name=":5" /> The bargaining itself is best thought of in terms of the other participant's actions, as any gains one might realize are highly dependent upon the "choices or decisions" of their opponent.<ref name=":5" /> Communication between parties, though, is another matter entirely. Verbal or written communication is known as "explicit," and involves such activities as "offering concessions."<ref name=":5" /> What happens, though, when this type of communication becomes impossible or improbable? This is when something called "tacit maneuvers" become important.<ref name=":5" /> Think of this as action-based communication. Schelling uses the example of one's occupation or evacuation of strategic territory to illustrate this latter communication method. In an article celebrating Schelling's Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics,<ref>[https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/11/AR2005101101336.html "A Nobel Laureate Who's Got Game"], ''The Washington Post'', October 12, 2005.</ref> [[Michael Kinsley]], ''[[Washington Post]]'' [[op-ed|op‑ed]] columnist and one of Schelling's former students, anecdotally summarizes Schelling's reorientation of game theory thus: "[Y]ou're standing at the edge of a cliff, chained by the ankle to someone else. You'll be released, and one of you will get a large prize, as soon as the other gives in. How do you persuade the other guy to give in, when the only method at your disposal—threatening to push him off the cliff—would doom you both? Answer: You start dancing, closer and closer to the edge. That way, you don't have to convince him that you would do something totally irrational: plunge him and yourself off the cliff. You just have to convince him that you are prepared to take a higher risk than he is of accidentally falling off the cliff. If you can do that, you win."
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