Editing Two truths doctrine (section)

===Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism===
[[File:Nagarjuna with 84 mahasiddha.jpg|thumb|right|230px|''[[Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]] with 84 [[Mahasiddha|Mahāsiddhas]]'' ({{Circa|1750}}), Tibetan Buddhist ''[[thangka]]'' currently preserved in the [[Rubin Museum of Art]], New York City]]

====Mādhyamaka school====
The distinction between the two truths (''satyadvayavibhāga'') was fully developed by [[Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]] ({{Circa|150|250 CE}}), founder of the [[Madhyamaka|Mādhyamaka]] school of Buddhist philosophy.{{sfn|Matilal|2002|pp=203-208}}{{sfn|Garfield|2002|p=91}} Mādhyamika philosophers distinguish between ''saṃvṛti-satya'', "empirical truth",<ref>{{Cite web |title=Saṃvṛti-satya {{!}} Truth, Illusion & Reality {{!}} Britannica |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/samvrti-satya |access-date=2025-04-10 |website=www.britannica.com |language=en}}</ref> "relative truth",<ref group=web name="urbandharma">[http://www.urbandharma.org/udnl2/nl031604.html ''The Urban Dharma Newsletter. March 16, 2004'']</ref> "truth that keeps the ultimate truth concealed",{{sfn|Chattopadhyaya|2001|pp=103-106}} and ''paramārtha-satya'', ultimate truth.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Paramārtha-satya {{!}} Buddhist concept {{!}} Britannica |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/paramartha-satya |access-date=2025-04-10 |website=www.britannica.com |language=en}}</ref><ref group=web name="urbandharma"/>

''Saṃvṛti-satya'' can be further divided in ''tathya-saṃvṛti'' or ''loka-saṃvṛti'', and ''mithya-saṃvṛti'' or ''aloka-saṃvṛti'',{{sfn|Joshi|1977|p=174}}{{sfn|Nakamure|1980|p=285}}{{sfn|Dutt|1930}}{{sfn|Stcherbatsky|1989|p=54}} "true saṃvṛti" and "false saṃvṛti".{{sfn|Stcherbatsky|1989|p=54}}<ref group=web name="urbandharma"/><!--START OF NOTE-->{{refn|group=note|According to Lal Mani Joshi, [[Bhāviveka]] (6th century CE), the founder of the [[Svātantrika]] sub-school of Mādhyamaka philosophy, classified ''saṃvṛti'' into ''tathya-saṃvṛti'' and ''mithya-saṃvṛti''.{{sfn|Joshi|1977|p=174}} [[Chandrakirti|Chandrakīrti]] (7th century CE), one of the main proponents of the [[Prasaṅgika]] sub-school of Mādhyamaka philosophy, divided ''saṃvṛti'' into ''loka-saṃvṛti'' and ''aloka-saṃvṛti''.{{sfn|Joshi|1977|p=174}}{{sfn|Nakamure|1980|p=285}} [[Shantideva|Śāntideva]] (8th century CE) and his commentator Prajñakaramati (950-1030<ref group=web>[http://www.rigpawiki.org/index.php?title=Praj%C3%B1akaramati Rigpawiki, ''Prajñakaramati'']</ref>) both use the terms ''tathya-saṃvṛti'' and ''mithya-saṃvṛti''.{{sfn|Dutt|1930}}{{sfn|Stcherbatsky|1989|p=54}} [[Kumārila Bhaṭṭa]], an influential 8th-century [[Hindu philosophy|Hindu philosopher]] of the [[Mīmāṃsā]] school, in commenting on Mādhyamaka philosophy, also uses the terms ''loka-saṃvṛti'' and ''aloka-saṃvṛti''.{{sfn|Chattopadhyaya|2001|pp=103-106}} [[Tiruppattur R. Venkatachala Murti|T. R. V. Murti]], in his ''The Central Philosophy of Buddhism'', uses the term ''aloka'', and refers to the synonym ''mithya-saṃvṛti''.{{sfn|Murti|2013|p=245}}<br/><br/>Murti: "In calling it 'loka samvrti,' it is implied that there is some appearance which is ''aloka'' - non-empirical, i.e. false for the emprical consciousness even."{{sfn|Murti|2013|p=245}}<br/><br/>David Seyfort Ruegg further comments: "The ''samvrti'' in worldly usage is termed ''lokasamvrti''; and while it can serve no real purpose to distinguish an ''alokasamvrti'' opposed to it (from the point of view of ultimate reality both are unreal, though in different degrees from the relative standpoint), one may nevertheless speak of an ''alokasamvrti'' as distinct from it when considering that there exist persons who can be described as 'not of the world' (''alokah'') since they have experiences which are falsified because their sense-faculties are impaired (and which, therefore, do not belong to the general worldly consensus."{{sfn|Seyfort Ruegg|1981|p=74-75}}}}<!--END OF NOTE--> ''Tathya-saṃvṛti'' or "true saṃvṛti" refers to "things" which concretely exist and can be perceived as such by the senses, while ''mithya-saṃvṛti'' or "false saṃvṛti" refers to false cognitions of "things" which do not exist as they are perceived.{{sfn|Dutt|1930}}{{sfn|Stcherbatsky|1989|p=54}}{{sfn|Chattopadhyaya|2001|pp=103-106}}<!--START OF NOTE-->{{refn|group=note|An often-used explanation in Madhyamaka literature is the perception of a snake. The perception of a real snake is ''tathya-saṃvṛti'', concretely existing. In contrast, a rope which is mistakenly perceived as a snake is ''mithya-saṃvṛti''. Ultimately both are false, but "the snake-seen-in-the-rope" is less true than the "snake-seen-in-the-snake". This gives an epistemological hierarchy in which ''tathya-saṃvṛti'' stands above ''mithya-saṃvṛti''.<ref group=web name="urbandharma"/>{{sfn|Chattopadhyaya|2001|pp=103-106}} Another example given in the Mādhyamaka philosophical literature to distinguish between ''tathya-saṃvṛti'' and ''mithya-saṃvṛti'' is "water-seen-in-the-pool" (''loka saṃvṛti'') as contrasted with "water-seen-in-the-mirage" (''aloka samvriti'').}}<!--END OF NOTE--><!--START OF NOTE-->{{refn|group=note|''Mithya-saṃvṛti'' or "false saṃvṛti" cam also be given as ''asatya'', "untruth."<ref group=web name="urbandharma"/> Compare [[Peter Harvey (academic)|Peter Harvey]], noting that in ''[[Chandogya Upanishad]]'', 6.15.3 [[Brahman]] is ''satya'', and [[Richard Gombrich]], commenting on the Upanishadic identity of microcosm and macrocosm, c.q. [[Ātman (Hinduism)|Ātman]] and [[Brahman]], which according to the Buddha is ''asat'', "something that does not exist."{{sfn|Gombrich|1990|p=15}} Compare also [[Atiśa]]: "One may wonder, "From where did all this come in the first place, and to where does it depart now?" Once examined in this way, [one sees that] it neither comes from anywhere nor departs to anywhere. All inner and outer phenomena are [[Tathatā|just like that]]."{{sfn|Brunholzl|2004|p=295}}}}<!--END OF NOTE-->

[[Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]]'s ''[[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]]'' provides a logical defense for the claim that [[Śūnyatā|all things are empty]] (''śūnyatā'') and [[Anattā|devoid of any inherently-existing self-nature]] (''anātman'').{{sfn|Garfield|2002|p=91}} Emptiness itself, however, is also shown to be "empty", and Nāgārjuna's assertion of "the emptiness of emptiness" prevents the mistake of believing that emptiness may constitute a higher or ultimate reality.{{sfn|Garfield|2002|p=38–39}}{{sfn|Siderits|2003}}{{refn|group=note|See also [http://emptinessteachings.com/2014/09/11/the-two-truths-of-buddhism-and-the-emptiness-of-emptiness/ Susan Kahn, ''The Two Truths of Buddhism and The Emptiness of Emptiness'']}}{{refn|group=note|Some have interpreted ''paramarthika satya'' or "ultimate truth" as constituting a metaphysical 'Absolute' or [[noumenon]], an "ineffable ultimate that transcends the capacities of discursive reason."{{sfn|Siderits|2003}} For example T. R. V. Murti (1955), ''The Central Philosophy of Buddhism'', who gave a [[Neo-Kantianism|neo-Kantian]] interpretation.{{sfn|Westerhoff|2009|p=9}}}} Nāgārjuna's view is that "the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth".{{sfn|Siderits|2003}} According to Siderits, Nāgārjuna is a "semantic anti-dualist" who posits that there are only conventional truths.{{sfn|Siderits|2003}} [[Jay L. Garfield]] explains: {{quote|Suppose that we take a conventional entity, such as a table. We analyze it to demonstrate its emptiness, finding that there is no table apart from its parts [...] So we conclude that it is empty. But now let us analyze that emptiness […]. What do we find? Nothing at all but the table’s lack of inherent existence [...] To see the table as empty [...] is to see the table as conventional, as dependent.{{sfn|Garfield|2002|p=38–39}}}}

In [[Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]]'s ''[[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]]'', the two truths doctrine is used to defend the identification of [[Pratītyasamutpāda|dependent origination]] (''pratītya-samutpāda'') with [[Śūnyatā|emptiness]] itself (''śūnyatā''): {{quote|The Buddha's teaching of the Dharma is based on two truths: a truth of worldly convention and an ultimate truth. Those who do not understand the distinction drawn between these two truths do not understand the Buddha's profound truth. Without a foundation in the conventional truth the significance of the ultimate cannot be taught. Without understanding the significance of the ultimate, liberation is not achieved.<ref>Nagarjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārika 24:8–10. Jay L. Garfield|''Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way'': pp. 296, 298</ref>}}

In Nāgārjuna's own words: {{quote|8. The teaching by the Buddhas of the Dharma has recourse to two truths:<br/>
The world-ensconced truth and the truth which is the highest sense.<br/>
9. Those who do not know the distribution (vibhagam) of the two kinds of truth<br/>
Do not know the profound "point" (tattva) in the teaching of the Buddha.<br/>
10. The highest sense of the truth is not taught apart from practical behavior,<br/>
And without having understood the highest sense one cannot understand nirvana.<ref>[http://www.orientalia.org/article492.html Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Verse 24] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050208100348/http://www.orientalia.org/article492.html |date=February 8, 2005 }}</ref>}}

Nāgārjuna based his statement of the two truths on the ''Kaccāyanagotta Sutta''. In this text, [[Gautama Buddha|Śākyamuni Buddha]], speaking to the monk Kaccāyana Gotta on the topic of right view, describes the [[Middle Way|middle course]] (''madhyamāpratipada'') between the extreme philosophical views of [[Sassatavada|eternalism]] (or [[Absolute (philosophy)|absolutism]]) and [[Ajita Kesakambali#From Buddhist sources|annihilationism]] (or [[nihilism]]): {{quote|By and large, Kaccāyana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "non-existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one.<ref>Source: [https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.015.than.html Kaccāyanagotta Sutta on Access to Insight] (accessed: Sept 14th 2023) </ref>}}

According to the [[Tibetology|Tibetologist]] Alaka Majumder Chattopadhyaya, although Nāgārjuna presents his understanding of the two truths as a clarification of the teachings of the [[Gautama Buddha|historical Buddha]], the two truths doctrine as such is not part of the earliest Buddhist tradition.{{sfn|Chattopadhyaya|2001|p=21-3,94,104}}

====Buddhist Idealism====

=====Yogācāra=====
The [[Yogacara|Yogācāra]] school of Buddhist philosophy distinguishes the [[Yogacara#The Three Natures|Three Natures]] and the ''[[Trikāya]]''. The Three Natures are:<ref>{{cite book |title=Buddhist Epistemology |author=S.R. Bhatt & Anu Meherotra |pages=7 |year=1967}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition |author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya |pages=107 |year=2001}}</ref>
*''Paramarthika'' (transcendental reality), also referred to as ''Parinispanna'' in Yogācāra literature: ''The level of a storehouse of consciousness that is responsible for the appearance of the world of external objects. It is the only ultimate reality.''
*''Paratantrika'' (dependent or empirical reality): ''The level of the empirical world experienced in ordinary life''. For example, the snake-seen-in-the-snake.
*''Parikalpita'' (imaginary). For example, the snake-seen-in-a-dream.

=====''Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra''=====
The ''[[Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra]]'', one of the earliest [[Mahayana sutras|Mahāyāna Sūtras]], took an idealistic turn in apprehending reality. Japanese Buddhist scholar [[D. T. Suzuki]] writes the following explanation: {{quote|The ''Laṅkā'' is quite explicit in assuming two forms of knowledge: the one for grasping the absolute or entering into the realm of [[Mind-only]], and the other for understanding existence in its dual aspect in which logic prevails and the ''[[vijñāna]]s'' are active. The latter is designated [[Vikalpa|discrimination]] (''vikalpa'') in the ''Laṅkā'' and the former [[Prajñā (Buddhism)|transcendental wisdom or knowledge]] (''prajñā''). To distinguish these two forms of knowledge is most essential in Buddhist philosophy.}}