Editing Unification of Germany (section)

==Prelude==
=== ''Vormärz'' ===
{{Main|Vormärz}}
The period of Austrian and Prussian police-states and vast censorship between the Congress of Vienna and the [[Revolutions of 1848 in Germany]] later became widely known as the ''[[Vormärz]]'' ("before March"), referring to March 1848. During this period, European liberalism gained momentum; the agenda included economic, social, and political issues. Most European liberals in the ''Vormärz'' sought unification under nationalist principles, promoted the transition to capitalism, and sought the expansion of male suffrage, among other issues. Their "radicalization" depended upon where they stood on the spectrum of [[Universal suffrage|male suffrage]]: the wider the definition of suffrage, the more radical they had the potential to be.{{Sfn|Sperber|1993}}

The surge of German [[nationalism]], stimulated by the experience of Germans in the Napoleonic period and initially allied with [[liberalism]], shifted political, social, and cultural relationships within the German states.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Namier |first=Lewis |title=Avenues of History |date=1952 |publisher=Macmillan |location=New York |page=34 |oclc=422057575 |ol=6114891M |author-link=Lewis Namier}}</ref> In this context, one can detect nationalism's roots in the experience of Germans in the Napoleonic period.{{Sfn|Nipperdey|1996|pp=1–3}} Furthermore, implicit and sometimes explicit promises made during the [[German Campaign of 1813]] engendered an expectation of [[popular sovereignty]] and widespread participation in the political process, promises that largely went unfulfilled once peace had been achieved.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|pp=407–408, 444}}

==== Emergence of liberal nationalism and conservative response ====
[[File:Wartburg demonstration 1817.jpg|thumb|alt=students carrying flags and banners march to the castle on the hill|In October, 1817, approximately 500 students rallied at [[Wartburg Castle]], where [[Martin Luther]] had sought refuge over three centuries earlier, to demonstrate in favor of national unification. Wartburg was chosen for its symbolic connection to German national character. Contemporary colored wood engraving<ref>{{Harvnb|Sheehan|1989|pp=460–470}}; [http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_image.cfm?image_id=426&language=english German Historical Institute]</ref>]]
[[File:Zug-zum-hambacher-schloss 1-1200x825.jpg|thumb|alt=men and women marching to the ruined castle on top of a hill|Pro-nationalist participants march to the ruins of Hambach Castle in 1832. Students and some professionals, and their spouses, predominated. They carried the flag of the underground ''Burschenschaft'', which later became the basis of the flag of modern Germany.]]
[[File:Bildarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz.jpg|thumb|upright=1.3|alt=Men sitting around a table. Most of them are muzzled, some are gagged as well, some have blindfolds on, and some have their ears muffled.|A German caricature mocking the [[Carlsbad Decrees]], which suppressed freedom of expression]]
Despite considerable conservative reaction, ideas of unity joined with notions of popular sovereignty in German-speaking lands. The ''[[Burschenschaft]]'' student organizations and popular demonstrations, such as those held at [[Wartburg]] Castle in October 1817, contributed to a growing sense of unity among German speakers of Central Europe.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|pp=442–445}}

At the [[Wartburg Festival]] in 1817 the first real movements among students were formed – fraternities and student organizations emerged. The colors black, red and gold were symbolic of this. Agitation by student organizations led conservative leaders such as [[Klemens Wenzel, Prince von Metternich]], to fear the rise of nationalist sentiment.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|pp=407–408, 444}}

The assassination of German dramatist [[August von Kotzebue]] in March 1819 by a radical student seeking unification was followed on 20 September 1819 by the proclamation of the [[Carlsbad Decrees]], which hindered intellectual leadership of the nationalist movement.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|pp=407–408, 444}} Metternich was able to harness conservative outrage at the assassination to consolidate legislation that would further limit the press and constrain the rising liberal and nationalist movements. Accordingly, these decrees drove the ''Burschenschaften'' underground, restricted the publication of nationalist materials, expanded censorship of the press and private correspondence, and limited academic speech by prohibiting university professors from encouraging nationalist discussion. The decrees were the subject of [[Johann Joseph von Görres]]'s pamphlet ''Teutschland [archaic: Deutschland] und die Revolution'' (''Germany and the Revolution'') (1820), in which he concluded that it was both impossible and undesirable to repress the free utterance of public opinion by reactionary measures.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|pp=442–445}}

The [[Hambach Festival]] (''Hambacher Fest'') in May 1832 was attended by a crowd of more than 30,000.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|pp=610–613}} Promoted as a [[county fair]],{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|p=610}} its participants celebrating fraternity, liberty, and national unity. Celebrants gathered in the town below and marched to the ruins of [[Hambach Castle]] on the heights above the small town of Hambach, in the Palatinate province of Bavaria. Carrying flags, beating drums, and singing, the participants took the better part of the morning and mid-day to arrive at the castle grounds, where they listened to speeches by nationalist orators from across the political spectrum. The overall content of the speeches suggested a fundamental difference between the German nationalism of the 1830s and the French nationalism of the [[July Revolution]]: the focus of German nationalism lay in the education of the people; once the populace was educated as to what was needed, it would reach those goals. The Hambach rhetoric emphasized the overall peaceable nature of German nationalism: the point was not to build barricades, a very "French" form of nationalism, but to build emotional bridges between groups.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|p=612}} As he had done in 1819, after the [[August von Kotzebue|Kotzebue]] assassination, Metternich used the popular demonstration at Hambach to push conservative social policy. The "Six Articles" of 28 June 1832 above all else reaffirmed the principle of monarchical authority. On 5 July, the Frankfurt Diet voted for an additional 10 articles, which reiterated existing rules on censorship, restricted political organizations, and limited other public activity. Furthermore, the member states agreed to send military assistance to any government threatened by unrest.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|p=613}} [[Karl Philipp von Wrede|Prince Wrede]] led half of the Bavarian army to the Palatinate to "subdue" the province. Several hapless Hambach speakers were arrested, tried and imprisoned; one, Karl Heinrich Brüggemann (1810–1887), a law student and representative of the secretive ''Burschenschaft'', was sent to Prussia, where he was first condemned to death, but later pardoned.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|pp=610–613}}

Crucially, both the Wartburg rally in 1817 and the Hambach Festival in 1832 had lacked any clear-cut vision for unification. At Hambach, the positions of the many speakers illustrated their disparate agendas. Held together only by the idea of unification, their notions of how to achieve this did not include specific plans but instead rested on the nebulous idea that the ''Volk'' (the people), if properly educated, would bring about unification on their own. Grand speeches, flags, exuberant students, and picnic lunches did not translate into a new political, bureaucratic, or administrative apparatus. While many spoke about the need for a constitution, no such document emerged from the key nationalist rallies. In 1848, nationalists sought to remedy that problem.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|pp=610–615}}

==== Economy and the customs union ====
[[File:1834customstarrifs.jpg|thumb|upright=1.3|alt=drawing of a wagon loaded with barrels, covered with a tarp, stuck between two border signs, the driver paying a fee to cross. Caption reads "German cartoon on customs prior to the Zollverein, 1834".|This drawing offered a satirical commentary on the prevalence of toll barriers in the many German states, circa 1834. Some states were so small that transporters loaded and reloaded their cargoes two and three times a day.]]
Several other factors complicated the rise of [[nationalism]] in the German states. The man-made factors included political rivalries between members of the German confederation, particularly between the Austrians and the Prussians, and socio-economic competition among the commercial and merchant interests, and the old land-owning and aristocratic interests. Natural factors included widespread drought in the early 1830s, and again in the 1840s, and a food crisis in the 1840s. Further complications emerged as a result of a shift in industrialization and manufacturing; as people sought jobs, they left their villages and small towns to work during the week in cities, returning for a day and a half on weekends.{{Sfn|Blackbourn|1994}}

The economic, social and cultural dislocation of ordinary people, the economic hardship of an economy in transition, and the pressures of meteorological disasters all contributed to growing problems in Central Europe.{{Sfn|Sperber|1993|p=3}} The failure of most of the governments to deal with the food crisis of the mid-1840s, caused by the [[Phytophthora infestans|potato blight]] (related to the [[Great Famine (Ireland)|Great Irish Famine]]) and several seasons of bad weather, encouraged many to think that the rich and powerful had no interest in their problems. Those in authority were concerned about the growing unrest, political and social agitation among the working classes, and the disaffection of the [[intelligentsia]]. No amount of censorship, fines, imprisonment, or banishment, it seemed, could stem the criticism. Furthermore, it was becoming increasingly clear that both Austria and Prussia wanted to be the leaders in any resulting unification; each would inhibit the drive of the other to take the lead in unification.{{Sfn|Blackbourn|1998|p=127}}

Formation of the ''[[Zollverein]]'', an institution key to unifying the German states economically, helped to create a larger sense of economic unification. Initially conceived by the Prussian Finance Minister [[Hans, Count von Bülow]], as a Prussian [[customs union]] in 1818, the ''Zollverein'' linked the many Prussian and [[Hohenzollern]] territories. Over the ensuing thirty years (and more) other German states joined. The Union helped to reduce protectionist barriers between the German states, especially improving the transport of raw materials and finished goods, making it both easier to move goods across territorial borders and less costly to buy, transport, and sell raw materials. This was particularly important for the emerging industrial centers, most of which were located in the Prussian regions of the [[Rhineland]], the [[Saar River|Saar]], and the [[Ruhr (river)|Ruhr]] valleys.<ref>{{Harvnb|Sheehan|1989|pp=465–467}}; {{Harvnb|Blackbourn|1998|pp=106–107}}</ref> States more distant from the coast joined the Customs Union earlier. Not being a member mattered more for the states of south Germany, since the external tariff of the Customs Union prevented customs-free access to the coast (which gave access to international markets). Thus, by 1836, all states to the south of Prussia had joined the Customs Union, except Austria.<ref name="keller">{{Cite book |last1=Keller |first1=Wolfgang |title=The Trade Impact of the Zollverein |last2=Shiue |first2=Carol |date=5 March 2013 |publisher=University of Colorado |location=Boulder |pages=10, 18}}</ref>

In contrast, the coastal states already had barrier free access to international trade and did not want consumers and producers burdened with the import duties they would pay if they were within the Zollverein customs border. Hanover on the north coast formed its own customs union – the "Tax Union" or [[Steuerverein]] – in 1834 with Brunswick and with Oldenburg in 1836. The external tariffs on finished goods and overseas raw materials were below the rates of the Zollverein. Brunswick joined the Zollverein Customs Union in 1842, while Hanover and Oldenburg finally joined in 1854<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ploeckl |first=Florian |date=August 2010 |title=The Zollverein and the Formation of a Customs Union |url=http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/history/paper84/ploeckl84.pdf |journal=Economic and Social History Series, Nuffield College, Oxford, Nuffield College |issue=Discussion Paper 84 |page=23}}</ref> After the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg were annexed by Prussia and thus annexed also to the Customs Union, while the two Mecklenburg states and the city states of Hamburg and Bremen joined later because they were reliant on international trade. The Mecklenburgs joined in 1867, while Bremen and [[Accession of Hamburg to the German Customs Union (Zollverein)|Hamburg joined in 1888]].<ref name="keller" />

==== Roads and railways ====
By the early 19th century, German roads had deteriorated to an appalling extent. Travelers, both foreign and local, complained bitterly about the state of the ''Heerstraßen'', the military roads previously maintained for easy troop movement. As German states ceased to be a military crossroads, however, the roads improved; the length of hard–surfaced roads in Prussia increased from {{convert|3800|km|mi|sp=us}} in 1816 to {{convert|16600|km|mi|sp=us}} in 1852, helped in part by the invention of [[macadam]]. By 1835, [[Heinrich von Gagern]] wrote that roads were the "veins and arteries of the body politic..." and predicted that they would promote freedom, independence and prosperity.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|p=465}}As people moved around, they came into contact with others, on trains, at hotels, in restaurants, and for some, at fashionable resorts such as the spa in [[Kurhaus (Baden-Baden)|Baden-Baden]]. Water transportation also improved. The blockades on the Rhine had been removed by Napoleon's orders, but by the 1820s, steam engines freed riverboats from the cumbersome system of men and animals that towed them upstream. By 1846, 180 steamers plied German rivers and [[Lake Constance]], and a network of canals extended from the [[Danube]], the [[Weser]], and the [[Elbe]] rivers.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|p=466}}

As important as these improvements were, they could paled in comparison to the impact of the railway. German economist [[Friedrich List]] called the railways and the Customs Union "Siamese Twins", emphasizing their important mutually beneficial relationship.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|pp=467–468}} He was not alone: the poet [[August Heinrich Hoffmann von Fallersleben]] wrote a poem in which he extolled the virtues of the ''Zollverein'', which he began with a list of commodities that had contributed more to German unity than politics or diplomacy.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|p=502}} Historians of the [[German Empire]] later regarded the railways as the first indicator of a unified state; the patriotic novelist, [[Wilhelm Raabe]], wrote: "The German empire was founded with the construction of the first railway..."{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|p=469}} Not everyone greeted the ''iron monster'' with enthusiasm. The Prussian king [[Frederick William III]] saw no advantage in traveling from Berlin to [[Potsdam]] a few hours faster, and Metternich refused to ride it at all. Others wondered if the railways were an "evil" that threatened the landscape: [[Nikolaus Lenau]]'s 1838 poem ''An den Frühling'' (''To Spring'') bemoaned the way trains destroyed the pristine quietude of German forests.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|p=458}}

The [[Bavarian Ludwig Railway]], which was the first passenger or freight rail line in the German lands, connected [[Nuremberg]] and [[Fürth]] in 1835. Although it was {{convert|6|km|mi|sp=us}} long and only operated in daylight, it proved both profitable and popular. Within three years, {{convert|141|km|mi|sp=us}} of track had been laid, by 1840, {{convert|462|km|mi|sp=us}}, and by 1860, {{convert|11157|km|mi|sp=us}}. Lacking a geographically central organizing feature (such as a national capital), the rails were laid in webs, linking towns and markets within regions, regions within larger regions, and so on. As the rail network expanded, it became cheaper to transport goods: in 1840, 18 ''[[Pfennig]]s'' per ton per kilometer and in 1870, five ''Pfennigs''. The effects of the railway were immediate. For example, raw materials could travel up and down the [[Ruhr]] Valley without having to unload and reload. Railway lines stumulated economic activity by creating demand for commodities and by facilitating commerce. In 1850, inland shipping carried three times more freight than railroads; by 1870, the situation was reversed, and railroads carried four times more. Rail travel changed how cities looked and how people traveled. Its impact reached throughout the social order, affecting the highest born to the lowest. Although some of the outlying German provinces were not serviced by rail until the 1890s, the majority of the population, manufacturing centers, and production centers were linked to the rail network by 1865.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|pp=466–467}}

==== Geography, patriotism and language ====
[[File:Maas memel etsch belt.svg|thumb|German linguistic area (green) and political boundaries around 1841 (grey) in comparison to the text's geographic references (bold blue)]]
As travel became easier, faster, and less expensive, Germans started to see unity in factors ''other'' than their language. The [[Brothers Grimm]], who compiled a massive dictionary known as ''The Grimm'', also assembled a compendium of folk tales and fables, which highlighted the story-telling parallels between different regions.{{Efn|They traced the roots of the German language, and drew its different lines of development together.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Brothers Grimm online |url=http://www.pitt.edu/~dash/grimm.html#jointpublication |website= Grimm Brothers' Home Page |access-date=April 27, 2023}}</ref>}} [[Karl Baedeker]] wrote guidebooks to different cities and regions of Central Europe, indicating places to stay, sites to visit, and giving a short history of castles, battlefields, famous buildings, and famous people. His guides also included distances, roads to avoid, and hiking paths to follow.<ref>{{in lang|de}} Hans Lulfing,  ''Baedecker, Karl'', ''Neue Deutsche Biographie (NDB)''. Band 1, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1953, p. 516 f.</ref>

The words of [[August Heinrich Hoffmann von Fallersleben]] expressed not only the linguistic unity of the German people but also their geographic unity. In ''Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles'', officially called ''[[Das Lied der Deutschen]]'' ("''The Song of the Germans''"), Fallersleben called upon sovereigns throughout the German states to recognize the unifying characteristics of the German people.<ref>{{in lang|de}} Peter Rühmkorf, Heinz Ludwig Arnold, ''Das Lied der Deutschen'' Göttingen: Wallstein, 2001, {{ISBN|3-8924-4463-3}}, pp. 11–14.</ref> Such other patriotic songs as "[[Die Wacht am Rhein]]" ("The Watch on the Rhine") by [[Max Schneckenburger]] began to focus attention on geographic space, not limiting "Germanness" to a common language. Schneckenburger wrote "The Watch on the Rhine" in a specific patriotic response to French assertions that the Rhine was France's "natural" eastern boundary. In the refrain, "Dear fatherland, dear fatherland, put your mind to rest / The watch stands true on the Rhine", and in other such patriotic poetry as Nicholaus Becker's "Das Rheinlied" ("The Rhine"), Germans were called upon to defend their territorial homeland. In 1807, [[Alexander von Humboldt]] argued that national character reflected geographic influence, linking landscape to people. Concurrent with this idea, movements to preserve old fortresses and historic sites emerged, and these particularly focused on the Rhineland, the site of so many confrontations with France and Spain.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Dominick |first=Raymond III |title=The Environmental Movement in Germany |date=1992 |publisher=Indiana University |isbn=0-2533-1819-X |location=Bloomington |pages=3–41 |ol=1549008M}}</ref>

=== German revolutions and Polish uprising of 1848–1849 ===

The widespread—mainly German—[[Revolutions of 1848 in Germany|revolutions of 1848–49]] sought unification of Germany under a single constitution. The revolutionaries pressured various state governments, particularly those in the [[Rhineland]], for a parliamentary assembly that would have the responsibility to draft a constitution. Ultimately, many of the left-wing revolutionaries hoped this constitution would establish [[universal suffrage|universal male suffrage]], a permanent national parliament, and a unified Germany, possibly under the leadership of the Prussian king. This seemed to be the most logical course since Prussia was the strongest of the German states, as well as the largest in geographic size. Meanwhile, center-right revolutionaries sought some kind of expanded suffrage within their states and potentially, a form of loose unification. Finally, the Polish majority living in the share of Polish territory annexed by Prussia [[Greater Poland uprising (1848)|pursued their own liberation agenda]].{{Citation needed|date=December 2024}}

==== Frankfurt Parliament====
[[File:Parliament Frankfurt Pauls Church 1848.jpg|thumb|alt=Romanesque church, men marching into it, through a phalanx of uniformed men, houses and church are draped in banners and flags|Pre-parliament delegates processing into [[Paulskirche|Paul's Church]] in Frankfurt, where they laid the groundwork for electing a National Parliament<ref>{{in lang|de}} Badische Heimat/Landeskunde online 2006 [http://www.zum.de/Faecher/G/BW/Landeskunde/rhein/geschichte/1848/national03.htm Veit's Pauls Church ''Germania'']. Retrieved 5 June 2009.</ref>]]

Their pressure resulted in a variety of elections, based on different voting qualifications, such as the [[Prussian three-class franchise]], which weighted votes based on the amount of taxes paid and therefore gave some electoral groups—chiefly the wealthier, landed ones—greater representative power.{{Sfn|Blackbourn|1998|pp=138–164}}

On 27 March 1849, the [[Frankfurt Parliament]] passed the ''[[Paulskirchenverfassung]]'' (Constitution of St. Paul's Church) and offered the title of ''Kaiser'' (Emperor) to the Prussian king [[Frederick William IV]] the next month. He refused for a variety of reasons. Publicly, he replied that he could not accept a crown without the consent of the actual states, by which he meant the princes. Privately, he feared opposition from the other German princes and military intervention from Austria or Russia. He also held a fundamental distaste for the idea of accepting a crown from a popularly elected parliament: he would not accept a crown of "clay".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sperber |first=Jonathan |title=Revolutionary Europe, 1780–1850 |date=2000 |publisher=Longman |isbn=0-5822-9446-0 |location=New York |ol=6779824M |author-link=Jonathan Sperber}}.{{page needed|date=May 2025}}</ref> Despite franchise requirements that often perpetuated many of the problems of sovereignty and political participation liberals sought to overcome, the Frankfurt Parliament did manage to draft a constitution and reach an agreement on the ''kleindeutsch'' solution. While the liberals failed to achieve the unification they sought, they did manage to gain a partial victory by working with the German princes on many constitutional issues and collaborating with them on reforms.{{Sfn|Blackbourn|1998|pp=176–179}}

==== The aborted 1848–1849 German Empire in retrospective analysis ====
{{further|German Empire (1848–1849)}}
Scholars of German history have engaged in decades of debate over how the successes and failures of the Frankfurt Parliament contribute to the historiographical explanations of German nation building. One school of thought, which emerged after [[World War I|The Great War]] and gained momentum in the aftermath of [[World War II]], maintains that the failure of German liberals in the Frankfurt Parliament led to [[bourgeoisie]] compromise with conservatives (especially the conservative [[Junker]] landholders), which subsequently led to the so-called ''[[Sonderweg]]'' (distinctive path) of 20th-century German history.<ref>See, e.g.: [[Ralf Dahrendorf]], ''German History''{{Nonspecific|date=April 2023}}, (1968), pp. 25–32; {{Cite book |last=Wehler |first=Hans-Ulrich |title=Das Deutsche Kaiserreich, 1871–1918 |date=1973 |publisher=Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht |isbn=3-5253-3340-4 |location=Göttingen |pages=10–14 |oclc=873428 |ol=23130743M |author-link=Hans-Ulrich Wehler |language=de}}; {{Harvnb|Krieger|1973}}; {{Harvnb|Grew|Bien|1978|pp=312–345}}; {{Cite book |last1=Kocka |first1=Jürgen |title=Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth Century Europe |last2=Mitchell |first2=Allan |author-link=Jürgen Kocka |date=1993 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-8549-6414-7 |ol=8300088M}}; {{Cite journal |last=Kocka |first=Jürgen |author-link=Jürgen Kocka |date=January 1988 |title=German History before Hitler: The Debate about the German Sonderweg |journal=Journal of Contemporary History |volume=23 |issue=1 |jstor=260865 |pages=3–16|doi=10.1177/002200948802300101 |s2cid=159651458 }}; {{Cite book |last=Berghahn |first=Volker |title=Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century |date=1982 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-5213-4748-8 |ol=2382839M |author-link=Volker Berghahn}}</ref> Failure to achieve unification in 1848, this argument holds, resulted in the late formation of the nation-state in 1871, which in turn delayed the development of positive national values. [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] often called on the German public to sacrifice all for the cause of their great nation, but his regime did not create German nationalism: it merely capitalized on an intrinsic cultural value of German society that still remains prevalent even to this day.<ref>World Encyclopedia V.3 p. 542.</ref> Furthermore, this argument maintains, the "failure" of 1848 reaffirmed latent aristocratic longings among the German middle class; consequently, this group never developed a self-conscious program of modernization.<ref>For a summary of this argument, see {{Harvnb|Blackbourn|Eley|1984|loc=Part 1}}.</ref>

More recent scholarship has rejected this idea, claiming that Germany did not have an actual "distinctive path" any more than any other nation, a historiographic idea known as [[exceptionalism]].{{Sfn|Blackbourn|Eley|1984|loc=Part 1}} Instead, modern historians claim 1848 saw specific achievements by the liberal politicians. Many of their ideas and programs were later incorporated into Bismarck's social programs (e.g., social insurance, education programs, and wider definitions of suffrage). In addition, the notion of a distinctive path relies upon the underlying assumption that some other nation's path (in this case, the United Kingdom's) is the accepted norm.{{Sfn|Blackbourn|Eley|1984|loc=Chapter 2}} This new argument further challenges the norms of the British-centric model of development: studies of national development in Britain and other "normal" states (e.g., France or the United States) have suggested that even in these cases, the modern nation-state did not develop evenly. Nor did it develop particularly early, being rather a largely mid-to-late-19th-century phenomenon.{{Sfn|Blackbourn|Eley|1984|pp=286–293}} Since the end of the 1990s, this view has become widely accepted, although some historians still find the ''Sonderweg'' analysis helpful in understanding the period of [[National Socialism]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kocka |first=Jürgen |author-link=Jürgen Kocka |date=February 2003 |title=Comparison and Beyond |journal=History and Theory |volume=42 |issue=1 |doi=10.1111/1468-2303.00228 |pages=39–44}}; {{Cite journal |last=Kocka |first=Jürgen |date=February 1999 |title=Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German ''Sonderweg'' |journal=History and Theory |volume=38 |issue=1 |doi=10.1111/0018-2656.751999075 |author-link=Jürgen Kocka |pages=40–50}}.</ref><ref>For a representative analysis of this perspective, see {{Harvnb|Evans|1987}}.</ref>

=== Problem of spheres of influence: The Erfurt Union and the Punctation of Olmütz ===
[[File:Image Germania (painting).jpg|thumb|alt=The allegorical figure of Germania (robed woman, sword, flowing hair) is standing, holding sword|This depiction of ''Germania'', also by [[Philipp Veit]], was created to hide the organ of the [[Paulskirche|Paul's Church]] in Frankfurt, during the meeting of the Parliament there, March 1848–49. The sword was intended to symbolize the ''Word of God'' and to mark the renewal of the people and their triumphant spirit.]]

After the Frankfurt Parliament disbanded, Frederick William IV, under the influence of General [[Joseph von Radowitz|Joseph Maria von Radowitz]], supported the establishment of the [[Erfurt Union]]—a federation of German states, excluding Austria—by the free agreement of the German princes. This limited union under Prussia would have almost eliminated Austrian influence on the other German states. Combined diplomatic pressure from Austria and Russia (a guarantor of the 1815 agreements that established European spheres of influence) forced Prussia to relinquish the idea of the Erfurt Union at a meeting in the small town of [[Olomouc|Olmütz]] in Moravia. In November 1850, the Prussians—specifically Radowitz and Frederick William—agreed to the restoration of the German Confederation under Austrian leadership. This became known as the [[Punctation of Olmütz]], but among Prussians it was known as the "Humiliation of Olmütz."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Taylor |first=A. J. P. |title=The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918 |date=1980 |orig-date=1954 |publisher=Clarendon |isbn=978-0-1988-1270-8 |location=Oxford |page=37 |ol=7402365M |author-link=A. J. P. Taylor}}</ref>

Although seemingly minor events, the Erfurt Union proposal and the Punctation of Olmütz brought the problems of influence in the German states into sharp focus. The question became not a matter of ''if'' but rather ''when'' unification would occur, and ''when'' was contingent upon strength. One of the former Frankfurt Parliament members, [[Johann Gustav Droysen]], summed up the problem:

{{Blockquote|
We cannot conceal the fact that the whole [[German question]] is a simple alternative between Prussia and Austria. In these states, German life has its positive and negative poles—in the former, all the interests [that] are national and reformative, in the latter, all that are dynastic and destructive. The German question is not a constitutional question but a question of power; and the Prussian monarchy is now wholly German, while that of Austria cannot be.<ref>{{Cite book |first= Johann Gustav |last=Droysen |author-link= Johann Gustav Droysen |url=http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/germanunification.html# |title=Modern History Sourcebook: Documents of German Unification, 1848–1871 |access-date=9 April 2009}}</ref>}}

Unification under these conditions raised a basic diplomatic problem. The possibility of German (or [[Italian unification|Italian]]) unification would overturn the overlapping [[Sphere of influence|spheres of influence]] system created in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna. The principal architects of this convention, [[Klemens Wenzel, Prince von Metternich|Metternich]], [[Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh|Castlereagh]], and [[Alexander I of Russia|Tsar Alexander]] (with his foreign secretary Count [[Karl Nesselrode]]), had conceived of and organized a Europe balanced and guaranteed by four "[[great powers]]": Great Britain, France, Russia, and Austria, with each power having a geographic sphere of influence. France's sphere included the Iberian Peninsula and a share of influence in the Italian states. Russia's included the eastern regions of Central Europe and a balancing influence in the Balkans. Austria's sphere expanded throughout much of the Central European territories formerly held by the [[Holy Roman Empire]]. Britain's sphere was the rest of the world, especially the seas.{{Sfn|Zamoyski|2007|pp=100–115}}

This sphere of influence system depended upon the fragmentation of the German and Italian states, not their consolidation. Consequently, a German nation united under one banner presented significant questions. There was no readily applicable definition for who the German people would be or how far the borders of a German nation would stretch. There was also uncertainty as to who would best lead and defend "Germany", however it was defined. Different groups offered different solutions to this problem. In the ''[[Kleindeutschland]]'' ("Lesser Germany") solution, the German states would be united under the leadership of the [[House of Hohenzollern|Prussian Hohenzollerns]]; in the ''[[Kleindeutschland and Großdeutschland|Grossdeutschland]]'' ("Greater Germany") solution, the German states would be united under the leadership of the [[Habsburg monarchy|Austrian Habsburgs]]. This controversy, the latest phase of the [[German dualism]] debate that had dominated the politics of the German states and Austro-Prussian diplomacy since the 1701 creation of the [[Kingdom of Prussia]], would come to a head during the following twenty years.{{Sfn|Blackbourn|1998|pp=160–175}}

=== External expectations of a unified Germany ===
Other nationalists had high hopes for the German unification movement, and the frustration with lasting German unification after 1850 seemed to set the national movement back. Revolutionaries associated national unification with progress. As [[Giuseppe Garibaldi]] wrote to German revolutionary [[Karl Blind]] on 10 April 1865, "The progress of humanity seems to have come to a halt, and you with your superior intelligence will know why. The reason is that the world lacks a nation [that] possesses true leadership. Such leadership, of course, is required not to dominate other peoples but to lead them along the path of duty, to lead them toward the brotherhood of nations where all the barriers erected by egoism will be destroyed." Garibaldi looked to Germany for the "kind of leadership [that], in the true tradition of medieval chivalry, would devote itself to redressing wrongs, supporting the weak, sacrificing momentary gains and material advantage for the much finer and more satisfying achievement of relieving the suffering of our fellow men. We need a nation courageous enough to give us a lead in this direction. It would rally to its cause all those who are suffering wrong or who aspire to a better life and all those who are now enduring foreign oppression."
{{Efn|The remainder of the letter exhorts the Germans to unification: "This role of world leadership, left vacant as things are today, might well be occupied by the German nation. You Germans, with your grave and philosophic character, might well be the ones who could win the confidence of others and guarantee the future stability of the international community. Let us hope, then, that you can use your energy to overcome your moth-eaten thirty tyrants of the various German states. Let us hope that in the center of Europe you can then make a unified nation out of your fifty millions. All the rest of us would eagerly and joyfully follow you."<ref>Mack Smith, Denis (ed.). ''Garibaldi (Great Lives Observed)'', Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969, p. 76.</ref>}}

German unification had also been viewed as a prerequisite for the creation of a European federation, which [[Giuseppe Mazzini]] and other European patriots had been promoting for more than three decades:
{{Blockquote|
In the spring of 1834, while at Berne, Mazzini and a dozen refugees from Italy, Poland and Germany founded a new association with the grandiose name of [[Young Europe]]. Its basic, and equally grandiose idea, was that, as the French Revolution of 1789 had enlarged the concept of individual liberty, another revolution would now be needed for national liberty; and his vision went further because he hoped that in the no doubt distant future free nations might combine to form a loosely federal Europe with some kind of federal assembly to regulate their common interests. [...] His intention was nothing less than to overturn the European settlement agreed [to] in 1815 by the Congress of Vienna, which had reestablished an oppressive hegemony of a few great powers and blocked the emergence of smaller nations. [...] Mazzini hoped, but without much confidence, that his vision of a league or society of independent nations would be realized in his own lifetime. In practice Young Europe lacked the money and popular support for more than a short-term existence. Nevertheless he always remained faithful to the ideal of a united continent for which the creation of individual nations would be an indispensable preliminary.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mack Smith |first=Denis |url=https://archive.org/details/mazzini00mack_0 |title=Mazzini |publisher=Yale University Press |year=1994 |isbn=978-0-300-05884-0 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/mazzini00mack_0/page/11 11–12] |url-access=registration}}</ref>}}

=== Prussia's growing strength: ''Realpolitik'' ===

[[File:BismarckRoonMoltke.jpg|thumb|alt=three men in military uniforms carrying pickel helmets—the ones with pikes sticking out of the crowns|The convergence of leadership in politics and diplomacy by Bismarck, left, reorganization of the army and its training techniques by [[Albrecht von Roon]] (center), and the redesign of operational and strategic principles by [[Helmuth von Moltke the Elder|Helmuth von Moltke]] (right) placed Prussia among the most powerful states in European affairs after the 1860s.]]

King [[Frederick William IV]] suffered a stroke in 1857 and could no longer rule. This led to his brother [[Wilhelm I, German Emperor|William]] becoming [[prince regent]] of the Kingdom of Prussia in 1858. Meanwhile, [[Helmuth von Moltke the Elder|Helmuth von Moltke]] had become chief of the [[Prussian General Staff]] in 1857, and [[Albrecht von Roon]] would become [[Prussian Minister of War]] in 1859.{{Sfn|Holt|Chilton|1917|p=27}} This shuffling of authority within the Prussian military establishment would have important consequences. Von Roon and William (who took an active interest in military structures) began reorganizing the Prussian army, while Moltke redesigned the strategic defense of Prussia by streamlining operational command. Prussian army reforms (especially how to pay for them) caused a [[constitutional crisis]] beginning in 1860 because both parliament and William—via his minister of war—wanted control over the military budget. William, crowned King Wilhelm I in 1861, appointed [[Otto von Bismarck]] to the position of [[Minister-President of Prussia]] in 1862. Bismarck resolved the crisis in favor of the war minister.{{Sfn|Holt|Chilton|1917|pp=13–14}}

The [[Crimean War]] of 1854–55 and the [[Second Italian War of Independence|Italian War of 1859]] disrupted relations among Great Britain, France, Austria, and Russia. In the aftermath of this disarray, the convergence of von Moltke's operational redesign, von Roon and Wilhelm's army restructure, and Bismarck's diplomacy influenced the realignment of the European balance of power. Their combined agendas established Prussia as the leading German power through a combination of foreign diplomatic triumphs—backed up by the possible use of Prussian military might—and an internal conservatism tempered by pragmatism, which came to be known as ''[[Realpolitik]]''.{{Sfn|Blackbourn|1998|pp=175–179}}

Bismarck expressed the essence of ''Realpolitik'' in his subsequently famous [[Blood and Iron (speech)|"Blood and Iron" speech]] to the Budget Committee of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies on 30 September 1862, shortly after he became Minister President: "The great questions of the time will not be resolved by speeches and majority decisions—that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by iron and blood."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hollyday |first=Frederic B. M. |title=Bismarck |date=1970 |publisher=Prentice Hall |isbn=978-0-1307-7362-3 |location=Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey |pages=16–18 |ol=4576160M}}</ref> Bismarck's words, "iron and blood" (or "blood and iron", as often attributed), have often been misappropriated as evidence of a German lust for blood and power.{{Sfn|Blackbourn|Eley|1984|loc=Part I}} First, the phrase from his speech "the great questions of time will not be resolved by speeches and majority decisions" is often interpreted as a repudiation of the political process—a repudiation Bismarck did not himself advocate.{{Efn|Bismarck had "cut his teeth" on German politics, and German politicians, in Frankfurt: a quintessential politician, Bismarck had built his power-base by absorbing and co-opting measures from throughout the political spectrum. He was first and foremost a politician, and in this lied his strength. Furthermore, since he trusted neither Moltke nor Roon, he was reluctant to enter a military enterprise over which he would have no control.{{Sfn|Mann|1971|loc=Chapter 6|pp=316–395}}}} Second, his emphasis on blood and iron did not imply simply the unrivaled military might of the Prussian army but rather two important aspects: the ability of the assorted German states to produce iron and other related war materials and the willingness to use those war materials if necessary.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hull |first=Isabel V. |title=Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany |date=2005 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-0-8014-7293-0 |edition=New |location=Ithaca, New York |pages=90–108, 324–333 |ol=7848816M |author-link=Isabel V. Hull}}</ref>

By 1862, when Bismarck made his speech, the idea of a German nation-state in the peaceful spirit of [[Pan-Germanism]] had shifted from the liberal and democratic character of 1848 to accommodate Bismarck's more conservative ''Realpolitik''. Bismarck sought to link a unified state to the Hohenzollern dynasty, which for some historians remains one of Bismarck's primary contributions to the creation of the [[German Empire]] in 1871.{{Sfn|Howard|1968|p=40}} While the conditions of the treaties binding the various German states to one another prohibited Bismarck from taking unilateral action, the politician and diplomat in him realized the impracticality of this.{{Sfn|Mann|1971|pp=390–395}} To get the German states to unify, Bismarck needed a single, outside enemy that would declare war on one of the German states first, thus providing a ''[[casus belli]]'' to rally all Germans behind. This opportunity arose with the outbreak of the [[Franco-Prussian War]] in 1870. Historians have long debated Bismarck's role in the events leading up to the war. The traditional view, promulgated in large part by late 19th- and early 20th-century pro-Prussian historians, maintains that Bismarck's intent was always German unification. Post-1945 historians, however, see more short-term opportunism and cynicism in Bismarck's manipulation of the circumstances to create a war, rather than a grand scheme to unify a nation-state.{{Sfn|Taylor|1988|loc=Chapter 1 and Conclusion}} Regardless of motivation, by manipulating events of 1866 and 1870, Bismarck demonstrated the political and diplomatic skill that had caused Wilhelm to turn to him in 1862.{{Sfn|Howard|1968|pp=40–57}}

[[File:Jutland Peninsula map.PNG|thumb|upright=1.1|From north to south: The Danish part of [[Jutland]] in purple and terracotta, [[Duchy of Schleswig|Schleswig]] in red and brown, and [[Duchy of Holstein|Holstein]] in lime yellow. The [[Schleswig-Holstein Question]] was about the status of those territories.]]

Three episodes proved fundamental to the unification of Germany. First, the death [[Frederick VII of Denmark#Succession crisis|without male heirs]] of [[Frederick VII of Denmark]] led to the [[Second War of Schleswig]] in 1864. Second, the [[Italian unification|unification of Italy]] provided Prussia an ally against Austria in the [[Austro-Prussian War]] of 1866. Finally, France—fearing Hohenzollern encirclement—declared war on Prussia in 1870, resulting in the [[Franco-Prussian War]]. Through a combination of Bismarck's diplomacy and political leadership, [[Albrecht von Roon|von Roon]]'s military reorganization, and [[Helmuth von Moltke the Elder|von Moltke]]'s military strategy, Prussia demonstrated that none of the European signatories of the [[Treaty of Paris (1815)|1815 peace treaty]] could guarantee Austria's sphere of influence in Central Europe, thus achieving Prussian hegemony in Germany and ending the dualism debate.<ref>{{Harvnb|Sheehan|1989|pp=900–904}}; {{Harvnb|Wawro|1996|pp=4–32}}; {{Harvnb|Holt|Chilton|1917|p=75}}</ref>

=== The Schleswig-Holstein Question ===
{{Main|Schleswig–Holstein question}}

The first episode in the saga of German unification under Bismarck came with the Schleswig-Holstein Question. On 15 November 1863, [[Christian IX of Denmark|Christian IX]] became king of Denmark and duke of [[Duchy of Schleswig|Schleswig]], [[Duchy of Holstein|Holstein]], and [[Saxe-Lauenburg#Post-Napoleon|Lauenburg]], which the Danish king held in [[personal union]]. On 18 November 1863, he signed the [[History of Schleswig-Holstein#The November Constitution|Danish November Constitution]] which replaced The Law of Sjælland and The Law of Jutland, which meant the new constitution applied to the Duchy of Schleswig. The [[German Confederation]] saw this act as a violation of the [[London Protocol (1852)|London Protocol of 1852]], which emphasized the status of the Kingdom of Denmark as distinct from the three independent duchies. The German Confederation could use the ethnicities of the area as a rallying cry: Holstein and Lauenburg were largely of German origin and spoke German in everyday life, while Schleswig had a significant Danish population and history. Diplomatic attempts to have the November Constitution repealed collapsed, and fighting began when Prussian and Austrian troops crossed the [[Eider (river)|Eider river]] on 1 February 1864.{{Citation needed|date=December 2024}}

Initially, the Danes attempted to defend their country using an ancient earthen wall known as the ''[[Danevirke]]'', but this proved futile. The Danes were no match for the combined Prussian and Austrian forces and their modern armaments. The [[needle gun]], one of the first [[bolt action rifle]]s to be used in conflict, aided the Prussians in both this war and the [[Austro-Prussian War]] two years later. The rifle enabled a Prussian soldier to fire five shots while lying prone, while its muzzle-loading counterpart could only fire one shot and had to be reloaded while standing. The [[Second Schleswig War]] resulted in victory for the combined armies of Prussia and Austria, and the two countries won control of Schleswig and Holstein in the concluding [[Treaty of Vienna (1864)|peace of Vienna]], signed on 30 October 1864.{{Sfn|Holt|Chilton|1917|p=75}}
{{clear}}

=== War between Austria and Prussia, 1866 ===
{{Main|Austro-Prussian War}}
[[File:Map-AustroPrussianWar.svg|thumb|upright=1.3|Situation at the time of the outbreak of the war:
{{legend|#0062BD |Prussia}}
{{legend|#FF5850 |Austria}}
{{legend|#04C6FF |Prussia's allies}}
{{legend|#FFB1BD |Austria's allies}}
{{legend|#2DDDA0 |Neutral members of the German Confederation}}
{{legend|#FFFEA5 |Under joint administration (Schleswig-Holstein)}}]]

The second episode in Bismarck's unification efforts occurred in 1866. In concert with [[Italian unification|the newly formed Italy]], Bismarck created a diplomatic environment in which Austria declared war on Prussia. The dramatic prelude to the war occurred largely in Frankfurt, where the two powers claimed to speak for all the German states in the parliament. In April 1866, the Prussian representative in [[Florence]] signed a secret agreement with the Italian government, committing each state to assist the other in a war against Austria. The next day, the Prussian delegate to the Frankfurt assembly presented a plan calling for a national constitution, a directly elected national Diet, and universal suffrage. German liberals were justifiably skeptical of this plan, having witnessed Bismarck's difficult and ambiguous relationship with the Prussian ''Landtag'' (State Parliament), a relationship characterized by Bismarck's cajoling and riding roughshod over the representatives. These skeptics saw the proposal as a ploy to enhance Prussian power rather than a progressive agenda of reform.<ref>Sheehan, pp. 900–906.</ref>

==== Choosing sides ====
The debate over the proposed national constitution became moot when news of Italian troop movements in [[History of Tyrol|Tyrol]] and near the Venetian border reached Vienna in April 1866. The Austrian government ordered partial [[mobilization]] in the southern regions; the Italians responded by ordering full mobilization. Despite calls for rational thought and action, Italy, Prussia, and Austria continued to rush toward armed conflict. On 1 May, Wilhelm gave [[Helmuth Graf von Moltke|von Moltke]] command over the Prussian armed forces, and the next day he began full-scale mobilization.<ref>{{Harvnb|Sheehan|1989|p=96}}; {{Harvnb|Wawro|1996|pp=82–84}}.</ref>

In the Diet, the group of middle-sized states, known as ''Mittelstaaten'' ([[Bavaria]], [[Württemberg]], the grand duchies of [[Grand Duchy of Baden|Baden]] and [[Grand Duchy of Hesse|Hesse]], and the duchies of [[Saxe-Weimar|Saxony–Weimar]], [[Saxe-Meiningen|Saxony–Meiningen]], [[Saxe-Coburg|Saxony–Coburg]], and [[Nassau, Germany|Nassau]]), supported complete demobilization within the Confederation. These individual governments rejected the potent combination of enticing promises and subtle (or outright) threats Bismarck used to try to gain their support against the Habsburgs. The Prussian [[war cabinet]] understood that its only supporters among the German states against the Habsburgs were two small principalities bordering on [[Brandenburg]] that had little military strength or political clout: the Grand Duchies of [[Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin|Mecklenburg-Schwerin]] and [[Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Strelitz|Mecklenburg-Strelitz]]. They also understood that Prussia's only ally abroad was Italy.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|pp=905–906}}

Opposition to Prussia's strong-armed tactics surfaced in other social and political groups. Throughout the German states, city councils, liberal parliamentary members who favored a unified state, and chambers of commerce—which would see great benefits from unification—opposed any war between Prussia and Austria. They believed any such conflict would only serve the interests of royal dynasties. Their own interests, which they understood as "civil" or "bourgeois", seemed irrelevant. Public opinion also opposed Prussian domination. Catholic populations along the [[Rhine]]—especially in such cosmopolitan regions as [[Cologne]] and in the heavily populated [[Ruhr]] Valley—continued to support Austria. By late spring, most important states opposed Berlin's effort to reorganize the German states by force. The Prussian cabinet saw German unity as an issue of power and a question of who had the strength and will to wield that power. Meanwhile, the liberals in the Frankfurt assembly saw German unity as a process of negotiation that would lead to the distribution of power among the many parties.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|p=909}}

==== Austria isolated ====
[[File:1866 prinz-friedrich-karl-bei-koeniggraetz 1b-640x428.jpg|thumb|upright=1.3|alt=officer on horseback ordering his enthusiastic massed infantry into battle|Prussian Prince [[Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia|Friedrich Carl]] ordering his enthusiastic troops to attack at the [[Battle of Königgrätz]]]]

Although several German states initially sided with Austria, they stayed on the defensive and failed to take effective initiatives against Prussian troops. The Austrian army therefore faced the [[Needle gun#Dreyse needle gun|technologically superior]] Prussian army with support only from [[Saxony]]. France promised aid, but it came late and was insufficient.{{Sfn|Wawro|1996|pp=50–60, 75–79}} Complicating the situation for Austria, the Italian mobilization on Austria's southern border required a diversion of forces away from battle with Prussia to fight the [[Third Italian War of Independence]] on a second front in [[Venetia (region)|Venetia]] and on the Adriatic sea.{{Sfn|Wawro|1996|pp=57–75}}

[[File:Map-AustroPrussianWar-annexed.svg|thumb|upright=1.3|Aftermath of the war:
{{legend|#0062BD |Prussia}}
{{legend|#81ABDE |Territories annexed by Prussia}}
{{legend|#04C6FF |Prussia's allies}}
{{legend|#FF5850 |Austria}}
{{legend|#FFB1BD |Austria's allies}}
{{legend|#2DDDA0 |Neutral members of the German Confederation}}]]

A quick peace was essential to keep Russia from entering the conflict on Austria's side.{{Sfn|Taylor|1988|pp=87–88}} In the day-long [[Battle of Königgrätz]], near the village of [[Sadová]], [[Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia|Friedrich Carl]] and his troops arrived late, and in the wrong place. Once he arrived, however, he ordered his troops immediately into the fray. The battle was a decisive victory for Prussia and forced the Habsburgs to end the war with the unfavorable [[Peace of Prague (1866)|Peace of Prague]],{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|pp=908–909}} laying the groundwork for the ''Kleindeutschland'' (little Germany) solution, or "Germany without Austria."