Editing Universal pragmatics (section)

===Ideal presuppositions of communication===

When individuals pursue actions oriented towards reaching an understanding, the speech acts they exchange take on the weight of a mutually recognized validity. This means each actor involved in communication takes the other as [[accountable]] for what they have said, which implies that good reasons could be given by all to justify the validity of the understanding that is being achieved. Again, in most situations, the redemption of validity claims is not an explicit undertaking (except in ''discourses'', see below). Instead, each actor issues a ''"warranty"'' of accountability to the other, which only needs to be redeemed if certain validity claims are thrown into question. This suggests that the validity claims raised in every communicative interaction implicitly tie communication to argumentation.

It is here that the idealized presuppositions of communication arise. Habermas claims that all forms of argumentation, even implicit and rudimentary ones, rest upon certain "idealizing suppositions," which are rooted in the very structures of action-oriented towards understanding. These "strong idealizations" are always understood as at least approximately satisfied by participants in situations where argumentation (and communication) is thought to be taking place. Thus, when during communication it is discovered that the belief that these presuppositions are satisfied is not justified it is always taken as problematic. As a result, steps are usually taken to reestablish and maintain the belief that they are approximately satisfied, or communication is simply called off.

# The most basic of these idealized presuppositions is the presupposition that ''participants in communicative exchange are using the same linguistic expressions in the same way''. This is an obvious but interesting point, which clearly illustrates what an idealized presupposition is. It is a presupposition because communication would not proceed if those involved did not think it was at least approximately satisfied (in this case that a shared language was being used). It is idealized because no matter how closely it is approximated it is always [[counterfactual thinking|counterfactual]] (because, in this case, the fact is that all meanings are to some degree personally defined).
# Another, basic idealized presupposition of argumentation is the presupposition that ''no relevant argument is [[self-censorship|suppressed]] or excluded by the participants''.
# Another is the presupposition that ''no [[persuasion|persuasive]] force except that of the better argument is exerted''.
# There is also the presupposition that ''all the participants are motivated only by a concern for the better argument''.
# There is the presupposition of attributing a ''context-transcending significance to validity claims''. This presupposition is controversial but important (and becomes expanded and clarified in the presuppositions of discourse, see below). The idea is that participants in communication instill their claims with a validity that is understood to have significance beyond the specific context of their agreement.
# The presupposition that ''no validity claim is exempt in principle from critical evaluation in argumentation'';
# The presupposition that ''everyone capable of speech and action is entitled to participate'', and everyone is equally entitled to introduce new topics or express attitudes needs or desires.

In sum, all these presuppositions must be assumed to be approximately satisfied in any situation of communication, despite their being necessarily counterfactual. Habermas refers to the positing of these idealized presuppositions as the "simultaneously unavoidable and trivial accomplishments that sustain communicative action and argumentation".

Habermas calls ''discourses'' those forms of communication that come sufficiently close to actually satisfying these presuppositions. Discourses often occur within [[institutional]]ized forms of argumentation that self-reflectively refine their procedures of communication, and as a result, have a more rigorous set of presuppositions in addition to the ones listed above.

A striking feature of discourse is that validity claims tend to be explicitly thematized and there is the presupposition that all possible [[interlocutor (linguistics)|interlocutor]]s would agree to the universal validity of the conclusions reached. Habermas especially highlights this in what he calls ''theoretical discourses'' and ''practical discourses''. These are tied directly to two of the three dimensions of validity discussed above: theoretical discourse being concerned with validity claims thematized regarding objective states of affairs (IT); practical discourse being concerned with validity claims thematized concerning the rightness of norms governing social interactions (WE).

Habermas understands presupposition (5) to be responsible for generating the self-understanding and continuation of theoretical and practical discourses. Presupposition (5) points out that the validity of an understanding reached in theoretical or practical discourse, concerning some factual knowledge or normative principle, is always expanded beyond the immediate context in which it is achieved. The idea is that participants in discourses such as these presuppose that any understanding reached could attain universal [[Consensus decision-making|agreement]] concerning its universal validity if these discourses could be relieved of the constraints of time and space. This idealized presupposition directs discourses concerning truth and normative certainty beyond the contingencies of specific communicative situations and towards the idealized achievements of universal consensus and universal validity. It is a rational reconstruction of the conditions for the possibility of earnest discourses concerning facts and norms. Recall that, for Habermas, rational reconstructions aim at offering the most acceptable account of what allows for the competencies already mastered by a wide range of subjects. In order for discourse to proceed, the existence of [[fact]]s and [[Norm (philosophy)|norms]] must be presupposed, yet the certainty of an absolute [[knowledge]] of them must be, in a sense, postponed.

Striking a Piagetian and [[Charles Sanders Peirce|Peirce]]an chord, Habermas understands the deep structures of collective inquiry as [[Developmental psychology|development]]al. Thus, the presupposition shared by individuals involved in discourse is taken to reflect this. The pursuit of truth and normative certainty is taken to be motivated and grounded, not in some objective or social world that is treated as a "given", but rather in a learning process. Indeed, Habermas himself is always careful to formulate his work as a [[research project]], open to refinement.

In any case, reconstructing the presuppositions and validity dimensions inherent to communication is valuable because it brings into relief the inescapable foundations of everyday practices. Communicative action and the rudimentary forms of argumentation that orient the greater part of human interaction cannot be left behind. By reconstructing the deep structures of these Habermas has discovered a seed of rationality planted in the very heart of the lifeworld. Everyday practices, which are common enough to be trivial, such as reaching an understanding with another, or contesting the reasons for pursuing a course of action, contain an implicit and idealized rationality.

In other words, communication is always somewhat rational. Communication could not occur if the participants thought that the speech acts exchanged did not carry the weight of validity for which those participating could be held accountable. Nor would anyone feel that a conclusion was justified if it was achieved by any other means than the uncoerced force of the better argument. Nor could the specialized discourses of [[law]], science and [[morality]] continue if the progress of knowledge and insight was denied in favor of [[relativism]].

====Criticism====
It is a question of how appropriate it is to speak of "communication" without tense, and of "everyday practices" as though they cut across all times and cultures. That they do cannot be assumed, and [[anthropology]] provides evidence of significant difference. It is possible to ignore these facts by limiting the scope of universal pragmatics to current forms of discourse, but this runs the risk of contradicting Habermas's own demand for (5). Moreover, the initial unease with the classical and [[Liberalism|liberal]] views of rationality had to do precisely with their ahistorical character and refusal, or perhaps inability, to acknowledge their own origins in circumstances of the day. Their veneer of false universality torn off by the likes of [[Michel Foucault|Foucault]], it remains to be seen whether "universal" pragmatics can stand up to the same challenges posed by [[deconstruction]] and [[skepticism]].