Editing Walter Short (section)

=====Short's defense=====
In 1946 Short testified on his own behalf before Congress about the 1941 attack.<ref name="usmil"/> Unlike some of his predecessors in Hawaii, Short was more concerned with sabotage from Japanese-Americans on Oahu. This led to Army planes being parked outside of their hangars so they could be more easily guarded. However, this made them easy targets for aerial attack, and many were subsequently destroyed on the morning of the attack.<ref name="usmil"/><ref name="roberts"/> In explaining his reasons for his instituting an alert against sabotage only (local "Alert One" level),<ref name="afs">Arakaki, Leatrice R. and Kuborn, John R. (1991). [http://newpreview.afnews.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100917-040.pdf ''7 December 1941: The Air Force Story'']{{dead link|date=March 2025|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}, Pacific Air Forces Office of History. {{ISBN|0-912799-73-0}}, p. 19 (p. 5 in text)</ref> General Short stated:
* that the war warning message he received on November 27 contained nothing directing him to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack on Hawaii ("Alert Two" and "Three");<ref name="afs"/>
* that he received other messages after the November 27 dispatch emphasizing measures against sabotage and subversive activities;
* that the dispatch was a "do-don't" message which conveyed to him the impression that the avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Department was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii which Japan would regard as an overt act;
* that he was looking to the Navy to provide him adequate warning of the approach of a hostile force, particularly through distant reconnaissance which was a Navy responsibility; and
* that instituting higher level alerts would have seriously interfered with the training mission of the Hawaiian Department.<ref>CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_0.html INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK: REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK ] 79TH Congress SENATE DOCUMENT No. 244.</ref>

He also declared that he did not receive adequate warning and suffered from a lack of resources. He and his family attempted to get the Army to restore his rank of lieutenant general on the retired list, on the basis that warnings from the War Department prior to the attack were vague and in conflict.<ref name="day"/>  He requested, but did not receive, a formal court-martial.<ref name="day"/>