Editing Absurdism (section)

=== Against ===
The most common criticism of absurdism is to argue that life in fact has meaning. [[Supernatural]]ist arguments to this effect are based on the claim that God exists and acts as the source of meaning. Naturalist arguments, on the other hand, contend that various sources of meaning can be found in the natural world without recourse to a supernatural realm. Some of them hold that meaning is subjective. On this view, whether a given thing is meaningful varies from person to person based on their subjective attitude toward this thing. Others find meaning in external values, for example, in [[morality]], knowledge, or [[beauty]]. All these different positions have in common that they affirm the existence of meaning, in contrast to absurdism.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Seachris |first1=Joshua |title=Meaning of Life: Contemporary Analytic Perspectives |url=https://iep.utm.edu/mean-ana/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=27 April 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Metz |first1=Thaddeus |title=The Meaning of Life |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life-meaning/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=27 April 2022 |date=2021}}</ref><ref name="Hiekel2021"/>

Another criticism of absurdism focuses on its negative attitude toward moral values. In the absurdist literature, the moral dimension is sometimes outright denied, for example, by holding that value judgments are to be discarded or that the rejection of God implies the rejection of moral values.<ref name="Pölzler2014"/> On this view, absurdism brings with it a highly controversial form of [[moral nihilism]]. This means that there is a lack, not just of a higher purpose in life, but also of moral values. These two sides can be linked by the idea that without a higher purpose, nothing is worth pursuing that could give one's life meaning. This worthlessness seems to apply to morally relevant actions equally as to other issues.<ref name="Pölzler2014"/><ref name="Bertman1971"/> In this sense, "[b]elief in the meaning of life always implies a scale of values" while "[b]elief in the absurd ... teaches the contrary".<ref>{{cite book |last1=Camus |first1=Albert |title=The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays |date=1991 |publisher=Knopf |page=21 |url=https://www2.hawaii.edu/~freeman/courses/phil360/16.%20Myth%20of%20Sisyphus.pdf}}</ref> Various objections to such a position have been presented, for example, that it violates [[common sense]] or that it leads to numerous radical consequences, like that no one is ever guilty of any blameworthy behavior or that there are no ethical rules.<ref name="Pölzler2014">{{cite journal |last1=Pölzler |first1=Thomas |title=Absurdism as Self-Help: Resolving an Essential Inconsistency in Camus? Early Philosophy |journal=Journal of Camus Studies |date=2014 |volume=2014 |pages=91–102 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PLZAAS}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Sinnott-Armstrong |first1=Walter |date=2019 |title=Moral Skepticism: 2. A Presumption Against Moral Skepticism? |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/#PreAgaMorSke |access-date=26 April 2022 |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref>

But this negative attitude toward moral values is not always consistently maintained by absurdists and some of the suggested responses on how to deal with the absurd seem to explicitly defend the existence of moral values.<ref name="Pölzler2014"/><ref name="Aronson2011"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Denton |first1=David E. |title=Albert Camus: Philosopher of Moral Concern |journal=Educational Theory |date=April 1964 |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=99–127 |doi=10.1111/j.1741-5446.1964.tb00163.x |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1741-5446.1964.tb00163.x |language=en |issn=0013-2004|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Due to this ambiguity, other critics of absurdism have objected to it based on its inconsistency.<ref name="Pölzler2014"/> The moral values defended by absurdists often overlap with the ethical outlook of [[existentialism]] and include traits like [[sincerity]], [[Authenticity (philosophy)|authenticity]], and [[courage]] as [[virtue]]s.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Burnham |first1=Douglas |title=Existentialism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/existent/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=26 April 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Crowell |first1=Steven |title=Existentialism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=26 April 2022 |date=2020}}</ref> In this sense, absurdists often argue that it matters how the agent faces the absurdity of their situation and that the response should exemplify these virtues. This aspect is particularly prominent in the idea that the agent should rebel against the absurd and live their life authentically as a form of passionate revolt.<ref name="Pölzler2014"/><ref name="Baltzer-Jaray2014"/><ref name="Blomme2013"/>

Some see the latter position as inconsistent with the idea that there is no meaning in life: if nothing matters then it should also not matter how we respond to this fact.<ref name="Pölzler2014"/><ref name="Nagel2012"/><ref name="Gordon1984"/><ref name="Fox2019"/> So absurdists seem to be committed both to the claim that moral values exist and that they do not exist. Defenders of absurdism have tried to resist this line of argument by contending that, in contrast to other responses, it remains true to the basic insight of absurdism and the "logic of the absurd" by acknowledging the existence of the absurd instead of denying it.<ref name="Pölzler2014"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Pölzler |first1=Thomas |title=Camus' Early Logic of the Absurd |journal=Journal of Camus Studies 2011 |date=2011 |pages=98–117 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PLZCEL}}</ref> But this defense is not always accepted. One of its shortcomings seems to be that it commits the [[is-ought fallacy]]: absurdism presents itself as a descriptive claim about the existence and nature of the absurd but then goes on to posit various normative claims.<ref name="Pölzler2014"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sagi |first1=Avi |title=Is the Absurd the Problem or the Solution?: The Myth of Sisyphus Reconsidered |journal=Philosophy Today |date=1994 |volume=38 |issue=3 |pages=278–284 |doi=10.5840/philtoday199438315}}</ref> Another defense of absurdism consists in weakening the claims about how one should respond to the absurd and which virtues such a response should exemplify. On this view, absurdism may be understood as a form of [[self-help]] that merely provides prudential advice. Such prudential advice may be helpful to certain people without pretending to have the status of universally valid moral values or categorical normative judgments. So the value of the prudential advice may merely be relative to the interests of some people but not valuable in a more general sense. This way, absurdists have tried to resolve the apparent inconsistency in their position.<ref name="Pölzler2014"/>