Editing Anchoring effect (section)

==Causes==
The present literature does not reach a consensus as to the cause of anchoring.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Furnham |first1=Adrian |last2=Boo |first2=Hua Chu |date=February 2011 |title=A literature review of the anchoring effect |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053535710001411 |journal=The Journal of Socio-Economics |language=en |volume=40 |issue=1 |pages=35–42 |doi=10.1016/j.socec.2010.10.008|url-access=subscription }}</ref> However, scholars agree that anchoring is a phenomenon that can be easily demonstrated but is hard to explain.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last1=Strack |first1=Fritz |last2=Mussweiler |first2=Thomas |date=1997 |title=Explaining the enigmatic anchoring effect: Mechanisms of selective accessibility. |url=https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.73.3.437 |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |volume=73 |issue=3 |pages=437–446 |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.73.3.437 |issn=0022-3514|url-access=subscription }} {{doi|10.1037//0022-3514.73.3.437}}</ref> Some scholars suggest that anchoring is, in fact, caused by a combination of factors.

===Anchoring-and-adjusting ===
The most prevalent explanation of the anchoring effect is the argument originally made by Tversky and Kahneman, termed anchoring-as-adjusting.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Tversky |first1=Amos |last2=Kahneman |first2=Daniel |date=October 1992 |title=Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty |url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF00122574 |journal=Journal of Risk and Uncertainty |language=en |volume=5 |issue=4 |pages=297–323 |doi=10.1007/BF00122574 |issn=0895-5646|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Based on this theory, individuals set an anchor according to available information, whether it is provided or individuals already have an anchor in mind, and use this anchor as a point of reference to adjust their answers. This theory explains inaccuracy in guessing by suggesting that people adjust insufficiently, rendering their final guess closer to the anchors.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Epley |first1=Nicholas |last2=Gilovich |first2=Thomas |date=2004-04-01 |title=Are Adjustments Insufficient? |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0146167203261889 |journal=Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin |language=EN |volume=30 |issue=4 |pages=447–460 |doi=10.1177/0146167203261889 |pmid=15070474 |issn=0146-1672|url-access=subscription }}</ref> This phenomenon was further investigated in other studies and used as an explanation for biases such as hindsight bias and egocentric bias.<ref>{{Citation |last=Epley |first=Nicholas |title=A Tale of Tuned Decks? Anchoring as Accessibility and Anchoring as Adjustment |date=January 2004 |work=Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making |pages=240–257 |editor-last=Koehler |editor-first=Derek J. |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470752937.ch12 |access-date=2025-03-29 |edition=1 |publisher=Wiley |language=en |doi=10.1002/9780470752937.ch12 |isbn=978-1-4051-0746-4 |editor2-last=Harvey |editor2-first=Nigel|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

For instance, when asked to guess the price of a drink in a coffee shop, individuals often look for the price of other drinks or recall the price of similar drinks at other stores, and base their answer on the anchor that they set.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Tversky |first1=Amos |last2=Kahneman |first2=Daniel |date=October 1992 |title=Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty |url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF00122574 |journal=Journal of Risk and Uncertainty |language=en |volume=5 |issue=4 |pages=297–323 |doi=10.1007/BF00122574 |issn=0895-5646|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Specifically, the original study found that by simply providing an arbitrary anchor to each group, people provided significantly different responses, suggesting that their answers were generated through anchoring and adjusting. In addition, this finding suggests that individuals are gullible when setting an anchor, and almost automatically begin the anchoring-and-adjusting process.

On the other hand, Epley and Gilovich found that when anchors are self-generated, people will stop adjusting once they believe they have adjusted their answers to an acceptable range. Although this process does not guarantee insufficient adjustments, it does result in an answer that is as close to the anchor as possible in the acceptable range. However, insufficient adjustments are diminished when individuals are able and motivated by external factors, such as monetary compensation, to continue adjusting for a more accurate answer, thereby reducing the anchoring effect.<ref name=":03">{{Cite journal |last1=Epley |first1=Nicholas |last2=Gilovich |first2=Thomas |date=2006-04-01 |title=The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why the Adjustments Are Insufficient |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01704.x |journal=Psychological Science |language=EN |volume=17 |issue=4 |pages=311–318 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01704.x |pmid=16623688 |issn=0956-7976|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The anchoring effect is also reduced when individuals know which way to adjust from the anchor because it eliminates the possible answers by half.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |last1=Simmons |first1=Joseph P. |last2=LeBoeuf |first2=Robyn A. |last3=Nelson |first3=Leif D. |date=2010 |title=The effect of accuracy motivation on anchoring and adjustment: Do people adjust from provided anchors? |url=https://doi.apa.org/doi/10.1037/a0021540 |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |language=en |volume=99 |issue=6 |pages=917–932 |doi=10.1037/a0021540 |pmid=21114351 |issn=1939-1315}}</ref>

Besides general knowledge, anchoring is also observed in social settings. The simulation theory of empathy suggests that people use their own mental state and reasoning to infer the actions of others. People assume that those who are similar to us will act in a similar way. Aligned with this idea, Tamir and Mitchell found that judgments of the attitude of others are made more quickly for those who are similar to the judge, and greater self-other discrepancy resulted in longer reaction time.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Tamir |first1=Diana I. |last2=Mitchell |first2=Jason P. |date=2013 |title=Anchoring and adjustment during social inferences. |url=https://doi.apa.org/doi/10.1037/a0028232 |journal=Journal of Experimental Psychology: General |language=en |volume=142 |issue=1 |pages=151–162 |doi=10.1037/a0028232 |pmid=22506753 |issn=1939-2222|url-access=subscription }}</ref> In this case, individuals use their own attitudes as an anchor and make adjustments to predict the attitude of others. Note that this process only takes place when the judge perceives great similarity between self and others.

Overall, this theory describes the process of anchoring and adjusting away from the anchor, as well as the phenomenon of inaccurate responses due to insufficient adjusting. However, proponents of alternative theories argued that adjusting is only possible when the original anchor lies outside the acceptable range. According to Epley and Gilovich, individuals will not adjust at all and give an answer that is identical to their anchor if the anchor is already within the acceptable range.<ref name=":03" /> Using the previous example, the actual price of the drink can be identical to other drinks served at that store, meaning that people should theoretically consider their anchor as a potential answer rather than adjusting. When a reasonable anchor is given, there will be no adjustment. Therefore, this theory does not explain all cases of anchoring.

===Selective accessibility===
An alternative explanation of the anchoring effect is the idea that the accessibility of anchor-consistent information is enhanced when individuals consider it as a potential answer. After determining that the initial anchor is not the correct answer, they move on to consider other possibilities. However, because the anchor was just made salient and accessible to them, they will take the anchor into consideration while evaluating other possibilities. As a result, this comparative assessment can result in answers that are disproportionally consistent with the anchor.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Mussweiler |first1=Thomas |last2=Strack |first2=Fritz |date=March 1999 |title=Hypothesis-Consistent Testing and Semantic Priming in the Anchoring Paradigm: A Selective Accessibility Model |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022103198913646 |journal=Journal of Experimental Social Psychology |language=en |volume=35 |issue=2 |pages=136–164 |doi=10.1006/jesp.1998.1364|url-access=subscription }}</ref> In this sense, anchoring is a special case of semantic priming, where the anchor acts as the prime.<ref name=":1" />

Unlike anchoring-and-adjusting, this theory suggests that people consider the relevant attributes of the initial anchor to determine if the anchor is plausible.<ref name=":1" /> Rather than accepting any plausible anchor as their answer and insufficiently adjusting anchors outside of the acceptable range, people will remain motivated to find a more accurate answer after rejecting the initial anchor.<ref name=":1" /> The preceding adjustments that individuals make are relevant to the anchor because people evaluate hypotheses through attempting to confirm them.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal |last1=Klayman |first1=Joshua |last2=Ha |first2=Young-won |date=April 1987 |title=Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing. |url=https://doi.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0033-295X.94.2.211 |journal=Psychological Review |language=en |volume=94 |issue=2 |pages=211–228 |doi=10.1037/0033-295X.94.2.211 |issn=1939-1471|url-access=subscription }}</ref> In line with this idea, when investigating whether the plausibility of an anchor affects comparative and absolute judgments, Strack and Mussweiler found that individuals take longer to provide an absolute judgment when the anchor is implausible.<ref name=":1" /> Comparative judgments refer to the process of using an anchor to determine the final answer. Most paradigms used in anchoring studies also ask participants to provide an absolute judgment (i.e., provide a concrete number as their answer) after comparative judgments. When plausible anchors were used in comparative judgments, the anchor became more accessible, shortening the response time for consequent absolute judgments. In contrast, implausible anchors result in longer response time because there is no relevant information that can be used as primes.

Although selective accessibility and anchoring-and-adjusting provide conflicting explanations for the anchoring effect, some scholars have argued that anchoring is influenced by multiple factors, and these theories complement each other in explaining the anchoring effect. For instance, Simmons and colleagues proposed an integrative theory suggesting that an anchor can result in selective reliance on anchor-consistent information, rendering the range of plausible answers closer to the anchor. On the other hand, people adjust away from (or possibly back toward) anchors before settling on their final estimate. This integrative theory is more parsimonious because it suggests that neither the source of the anchor (self-generated or provided) nor the plausibility of the anchor has a significant effect on judgments.<ref name=":2" />

=== Attitude change ===
On the contrary of the two previous theories, the attitude change view suggests that individuals' attitude towards an anchor, specifically provided anchors, can heavily affect the extent of the anchoring effect. Recall that individuals often seek to confirm their hypothesis rather than objectively evaluating all information.<ref name=":3" /> When individuals disagree with the provided anchor, they will selectively seek evidence that supports their own attitudes instead of the provided anchor, resulting in an unobserved anchoring effect.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Wegener |first1=Duane T. |last2=Petty |first2=Richard E. |last3=Detweiler-Bedell |first3=Brian T. |last4=Jarvis |first4=W.Blair G. |date=January 2001 |title=Implications of Attitude Change Theories for Numerical Anchoring: Anchor Plausibility and the Limits of Anchor Effectiveness |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022103100914318 |journal=Journal of Experimental Social Psychology |language=en |volume=37 |issue=1 |pages=62–69 |doi=10.1006/jesp.2000.1431|url-access=subscription }}</ref> This theory highlights the idea that the distinct anchoring effect observed with self-generated and provided anchors roots from individual attitude (i.e., does the individual believe in the anchor) rather than the anchors themselves, supporting the integrative theory proposed by Simmons and colleagues.<ref name=":2" /> Furthermore, supporters of this view have argued that attitude change is an alternative explanation of the anchoring effect. Providing an anchor generates favorable attitudes in individuals toward the anchor, biasing consequent judgments.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Wegener |first1=Duane T. |last2=Petty |first2=Richard E. |last3=Detweiler-Bedell |first3=Brian T. |last4=Jarvis |first4=W.Blair G. |date=January 2001 |title=Implications of Attitude Change Theories for Numerical Anchoring: Anchor Plausibility and the Limits of Anchor Effectiveness |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022103100914318 |journal=Journal of Experimental Social Psychology |language=en |volume=37 |issue=1 |pages=62–69 |doi=10.1006/jesp.2000.1431|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

=== Extremeness aversion ===
Extremeness aversion is a robust phenomenon where people try to avoid the extremes during decision-making, such as selecting the middle options more often than other extreme options and avoiding reporting the maximum or minimum on a Likert scale.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Neumann |first1=Nico |last2=Böckenholt |first2=Ulf |last3=Sinha |first3=Ashish |date=2016 |title=A meta-analysis of extremeness aversion |url=https://myscp.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1016/j.jcps.2015.05.005 |journal=Journal of Consumer Psychology |language=en |volume=26 |issue=2 |pages=193–212 |doi=10.1016/j.jcps.2015.05.005 |issn=1532-7663|url-access=subscription }}</ref> This desire to avoid extremes is at least partially responsible for the anchoring effect. For instance, upon setting an anchor, participants who were told they could adjust up to 6 units made significantly smaller adjustments compared to those who were told that they could adjust up to 15 units, suggesting that people avoid extremes when making decisions.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Lewis |first1=Joshua |last2=Gaertig |first2=Celia |last3=Simmons |first3=Joseph P. |date=2018-12-18 |title=Extremeness Aversion Is a Cause of Anchoring |url=https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797618799305 |journal=Psychological Science |volume=30 |issue=2 |pages=159–173 |doi=10.1177/0956797618799305 |pmid=30561244 |issn=0956-7976|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Importantly, the maximum allowable adjustment  acted as an anchor that affected the final judgment, highlighting the prevalent aversion to extremes. As a result, the final judgment is close to the anchor because people do not want to adjust too close to the extremes.