Editing Animal cognition (section)

== Research questions ==
[[File:Chimpanzee and stick.jpg|250px|thumb|right|The common chimpanzee can use tools. This individual is using a stick to get food.]]
Human and non-human animal cognition have much in common, and this is reflected in the research summarized below; most of the headings found here might also appear in an article on human cognition. Of course, research in the two also differs in important respects.  Notably, much research with humans either studies or involves language, and much research with animals is related directly or indirectly to behaviors important to survival in natural settings. Following are summaries of some of the major areas of research in animal cognition.

=== Perception ===
Animals process information from eyes, ears, and other sensory organs to perceive the environment.  Perceptual processes have been studied in many species, with results that are often similar to those in humans. Equally interesting are those perceptual processes that differ from, or go beyond those found in humans, such as [[Animal echolocation|echolocation]] in bats and dolphins, motion detection by [[Lateral line|skin receptors]] in fish, and extraordinary visual acuity, motion sensitivity and ability to see ultraviolet light in some [[Bird vision|birds]].<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Stebbins WC, Berkley MA | date = 1990 | title = Comparative Perception, Vol. I, Basic Mechanisms; Vol. II, Complex Signals | location = New York | publisher = Wiley}}</ref>

=== Attention ===
Much of what is happening in the world at any moment is irrelevant to current behavior. [[Attention]] refers to mental processes that select relevant information, inhibit irrelevant information, and switch among these as the situation demands.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Smith EE, Kosslyn SM | date = 2007 | title = Cognitive Psychology: Mind and Brain | publisher = Pearson Prentice Hall}}</ref>  Often the selective process is tuned before relevant information appears; such expectation makes for rapid selection of key stimuli when they become available. A large body of research has explored the way attention and expectation affect the behavior of non-human animals, and much of this work suggests that attention operates in birds, mammals and reptiles in much the same way that it does in humans.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Blough DS | date = 2006 | chapter = Reaction-time explorations of visual attention, perception, and decision in pigeons. | veditors = Wasserman EA, Zentall TR | title = Comparative Cognition: Experimental Explorations of Animal Intelligence' | pages = 89–105 | location = New York | publisher = Oxford University Press}}</ref>

==== Selective Learning ====
Animals trained to discriminate between two stimuli, say black versus white, can be said to attend to the "brightness dimension", but this says little about whether this dimension is selected in preference to others. More enlightenment comes from experiments that allow the animal to choose from several alternatives.  For example, several studies have shown that performance is better on, for example, a color discrimination (e.g. blue vs green) after the animal has learned another color discrimination (e.g. red vs orange) than it is after training on a different dimension such as an X shape versus an O shape. The reverse effect happens after training on forms. Thus, the earlier learning appears to affect which dimension, color or form, the animal will attend to.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Mackintosh NJ | date = 1983 | title = Conditioning and Associative Learning | location = New York | publisher = Oxford University Press}}</ref>

Other experiments have shown that after animals have learned to respond to one aspect of the environment responsiveness to other aspects is suppressed.  In "blocking", for example, an animal is conditioned to respond to one stimulus ("A") by pairing that stimulus with reward or punishment.  After the animal responds consistently to A, a second stimulus ("B") accompanies A on additional training trials.  Later tests with the B stimulus alone elicit little response, suggesting that learning about B has been blocked by prior learning about A.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Kamin LJ | date = 1969 | chapter = Predictability, surprise, attention, and conditioning | veditors = Campbell BA, Church RM | title = Punishment and Aversive Behavior | location = New York | publisher = Appleton-Century-Crofts | pages = 279–296}}</ref>   This result supports the hypothesis that stimuli are neglected if they fail to provide new information.  Thus, in the experiment just cited,  the animal failed to attend to B because B added no information to that supplied by A.  If true, this interpretation is an important insight into attentional processing, but this conclusion remains uncertain because blocking and several related phenomena can be explained by models of conditioning that do not invoke attention.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Mackintosh NJ | date = 1994 | title = Animal Learning and Cognition | location = San Diego | publisher = Academic Press}}</ref>

==== Divided attention ====
Attention is a limited resource and is not a none-or-all response:  the more attention devoted to one aspect of the environment, the less is available for others.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Zentall TR | title = Selective and divided attention in animals | journal = Behavioural Processes | volume = 69 | issue = 1 | pages = 1–15 | date = April 2005 | pmid = 15795066 | doi = 10.1016/j.beproc.2005.01.004 | s2cid = 24601938}}</ref>  A number of experiments have studied this in animals. In one experiment, a tone and a light are presented simultaneously to pigeons.  The pigeons gain a reward only by choosing the correct combination of the two stimuli (e.g. a high frequency tone together with a yellow light).  The birds perform well at this task, presumably by dividing attention between the two stimuli.  When only one of the stimuli varies and the other is presented at its rewarded value, discrimination improves on the variable stimulus but discrimination on the alternative stimulus worsens.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Blough DS | title = Attention shifts in a maintained discrimination | journal = Science | volume = 166 | issue = 3901 | pages = 125–6 | date = October 1969 | pmid = 5809588 | doi = 10.1126/science.166.3901.125 | bibcode = 1969Sci...166..125B | s2cid = 33256491}}</ref>  These outcomes are consistent with the notion that attention is a limited resource that can be more or less focused among incoming stimuli.

==== Visual search and attentional priming ====
As noted above, the function of attention is to select information that is of special use to the animal.  Visual search typically calls for this sort of selection, and search tasks have been used extensively in both humans and animals to determine the characteristics of attentional selection and the factors that control it.

Experimental research on visual search in animals was initially prompted by field observations published by Luc Tinbergen (1960).<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Tinbergen L | year = 1960 | title = The natural control of insects in pine woods: I. Factors influencing the intensity of predation by songbirds | journal = Archives Néerlandaises de Zoologie | volume = 13 | pages = 265–343 | doi = 10.1163/036551660X00053}}</ref> Tinbergen observed that birds are selective when foraging for insects. For example, he found that birds tended to catch the same type of insect repeatedly even though several types were available. Tinbergen suggested that this prey selection was caused by an attentional bias that improved detection of one type of insect while suppressing detection of others.  This "attentional priming" is commonly said to result from a pretrial activation of a mental representation of the attended object, which Tinbergen called a "searching image".

Tinbergen's field observations on priming have been supported by a number of experiments. For example, Pietrewicz and Kamil (1977, 1979)<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Pietrewicz AT, Kamil AC | title = Visual Detection of Cryptic Prey by Blue Jays (Cyanocitta cristata) | journal = Science | volume = 195 | issue = 4278 | pages = 580–2 | date = February 1977 | pmid = 17732294 | doi = 10.1126/science.195.4278.580 | url = http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=biosciaviancog | bibcode = 1977Sci...195..580P | s2cid = 10858793| url-access = subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Pietrewicz AT, Kamil AC | title = Search Image Formation in the Blue Jay (Cyanocitta cristata) | journal = Science | volume = 204 | issue = 4399 | pages = 1332–3 | date = June 1979 | pmid = 17813172 | doi = 10.1126/science.204.4399.1332 | url = http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=bioscibehavior | bibcode = 1979Sci...204.1332P | s2cid = 14809014| url-access = subscription }}</ref> presented blue jays with pictures of tree trunks upon which rested either a moth of species A, a moth of species B, or no moth at all.  The birds were rewarded for pecks at a picture showing a moth. Crucially, the probability with which a particular species of moth was detected was higher after repeated trials with that species  (e.g. A, A, A,...) than it was after a mixture of trials (e.g. A, B, B, A, B, A, A...).  These results suggest again that sequential encounters with an object can establish an attentional predisposition to see the object.

Another way to produce attentional priming in search is to provide an advance signal that is associated with the target.  For example, if a person hears a song sparrow he or she may be predisposed to detect a song sparrow in a shrub, or among other birds.  A number of experiments have reproduced this effect in animal subjects.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Blough PM | year = 1989 | title = Attentional priming and visual search in pigeons |journal=[[Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition]] | volume = 17 | issue = 4| pages = 292–298 | doi = 10.1037/0097-7403.17.3.292 | pmid = 2794871}}</ref><ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Kamil AC, Bond AB | date = 2006 | chapter = Selective attention, priming, and foraging behavior. | veditors = Wasserman EA, Zentall TR | title = Comparative Cognition: Experimental Exploration of Animal Intelligence | location = New York | publisher = Oxford University Press}}</ref>

Still other experiments have explored nature of stimulus factors that affect the speed and accuracy of visual search.  For example, the time taken to find a single target increases as the number of items in the visual field increases.  This rise in reaction time is steep if the distracters are similar to the target, less steep if they are dissimilar, and may not occur if the distracters are very different from the target in form or color.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Blough DS, Blough PM | date = 1990 | chapter = Reaction-time assessments of visual processes in pigeons. | veditors = Berkley M, Stebbins W | title = Comparative perception | pages = 245–276 | location = New York | publisher = Wiley}}</ref>

=== Concepts and categories ===
Fundamental but difficult to define, the [[concept]] of "concept" was discussed for hundreds of years by philosophers before it became a focus of psychological study.  Concepts enable humans and animals to organize the world into functional groups; the groups may be composed of perceptually similar objects or events, diverse things that have a common function, relationships such as same versus different,  or relations among relations such as analogies.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Smith EE, Medin DL | date = 1981 | title = Categories and Concepts | publisher = Harvard Univ. Press}}</ref> Extensive discussions on these matters together with many references may be found in Shettleworth (2010)<ref name="Shettleworth" />  Wasserman and Zentall (2006)<ref name="Wass" /> and in Zentall ''et al.'' (2008).  The latter is freely available online.<ref name="Zentall">{{cite journal | vauthors = Zentall TR, Wasserman EA, Lazareva OF, Thompson RK, Rattermann MJ | year = 2008 | title = Concept Learning in Animals | journal = Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews | volume = 3 | pages = 13–45 | doi = 10.3819/ccbr.2008.30002 | doi-access = free}}</ref>

==== Methods ====
Most work on animal concepts has been done with visual stimuli, which can easily be constructed and presented in great variety, but auditory and other stimuli have been used as well.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Dooling RJ, Okanoya K | date = 1995 | chapter = Psychophysical methods for assessing perceptual categories. | veditors = Klump GM, Dooling RJ, Fay RR, Stebbins WC | title = Methods in Comparative Psychoacoustics | pages = 307–318 | location = Basel, Switzerland | publisher = Birkhäuser Verlag}}</ref> Pigeons have been widely used, for they have excellent vision and are readily conditioned to respond to visual targets; other birds and a number of other animals have been studied as well.<ref name="Shettleworth" />
In a typical experiment, a bird or other animal confronts a computer monitor on which a large number of pictures appear one by one, and the subject gets a reward for pecking or touching a picture of a category item and no reward for non-category items. Alternatively, a subject may be offered a choice between two or more pictures.  Many experiments end with the presentation of items never seen before; successful sorting of these items shows that the animal has not simply learned many specific stimulus-response associations. A related method, sometimes used to study relational concepts,  is matching-to-sample. In this task an animal sees one stimulus and then chooses between two or more alternatives, one of which is the same as the first;  the animal is then rewarded for choosing the matching stimulus.<ref name="Shettleworth" /><ref name="Wass" /><ref name="Zentall" />

==== Perceptual categories ====
Perceptual categorization is said to occur when a person or animal responds in a similar way to a range of stimuli that share common features.  For example, a squirrel climbs a tree when it sees Rex, Shep, or Trixie, which suggests that it categorizes all three as something to avoid.  This sorting of instances into groups is crucial to survival.  Among other things, an animal must categorize if it is to apply learning about one object (e.g. Rex bit me) to new instances of that category (dogs may bite).<ref name="Shettleworth" /><ref name="Wass" /><ref name="Zentall" />

==== Natural categories ====
Many animals readily classify objects by perceived differences in form or color.  For example, bees or pigeons quickly learn to choose any red object and reject any green object if red leads to reward and green does not.  Seemingly much more difficult is an animal's ability to categorize natural objects that vary a great deal in color and form even while belonging to the same group. In a classic study, [[Richard J. Herrnstein]] trained pigeons to respond to the presence or absence of human beings in photographs.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Herrnstein RJ, Loveland DH | title = Complex Visual Concept in the Pigeon | journal = Science | volume = 146 | issue = 3643 | pages = 549–51 | date = October 1964 | pmid = 14190250 | doi = 10.1126/science.146.3643.549 | bibcode = 1964Sci...146..549H | s2cid = 11940233}}</ref>  The birds readily learned to peck photos that contained partial or full views of humans and to avoid pecking photos with no human, despite great differences in the form, size, and color of both the humans displayed and in the non-human pictures.  In follow-up studies, pigeons categorized other natural objects (e.g. trees) and after training they were able without reward to sort photos they had not seen before .<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Herrnstein RJ | year = 1979 | title = Acquisition, Generalization, and Discrimination Reversal of a Natural Concept | journal = Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes | volume = 5 | issue = 2| pages = 116–129 | doi=10.1037/0097-7403.5.2.116| pmid = 528881}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Bhatt RS, Wasserman EA, Reynolds WF, Knauss KS | title = Conceptual behavior in pigeons: Categorization of both familiar and novel examples from four classes of natural and artificial stimuli. | journal = Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes | date = July 1988 | volume = 14 | issue = 3 | pages = 219–234 | doi = 10.1037/0097-7403.14.3.219}}</ref>  Similar work has been done with natural auditory categories, for example, bird songs.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Tu HW, Smith EW, Dooling RJ | title = Acoustic and perceptual categories of vocal elements in the warble song of budgerigars (Melopsittacus undulatus) | journal = Journal of Comparative Psychology | volume = 125 | issue = 4 | pages = 420–30 | date = November 2011 | pmid = 22142040 | pmc = 4497543 | doi = 10.1037/a0024396}}</ref>  Honeybees (''[[Apis mellifera]]'') are able to form concepts of "up" and "down".<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Avarguès-Weber A, Dyer AG, Giurfa M | title = Conceptualization of above and below relationships by an insect | journal = Proceedings. Biological Sciences | volume = 278 | issue = 1707 | pages = 898–905 | date = March 2011 | pmid = 21068040 | pmc = 3049051 | doi = 10.1098/rspb.2010.1891}}</ref>

==== Functional or associative categories ====
Perceptually unrelated stimuli may come to be responded to as members of a class if they have a common use or lead to common consequences. An oft-cited study by Vaughan (1988) provides an example.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Vaughan Jr W | year = 1988 | title = Formation of equivalence sets in pigeons | journal = Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes | volume = 14 | pages = 36–42 | doi=10.1037/0097-7403.14.1.36}}</ref>  Vaughan divided a large set of unrelated pictures into two arbitrary sets, A and B.  Pigeons got food for pecking at pictures in set A but not for pecks at pictures in set B.  After they had learned this task fairly well, the outcome was reversed: items in set B led to food and items in set A did not. Then the outcome was reversed again, and then again,  and so on. Vaughan found that after 20 or more reversals,  associating a reward with a few pictures in one set caused the birds to respond to the other pictures in that set without further reward as if they were thinking "if these pictures in set A bring food, the others in set A must also bring food."  That is, the birds now categorized the pictures in each set as functionally equivalent. Several other procedures have yielded similar results.<ref name="Shettleworth" /><ref name="Zentall" />

==== Relational or abstract categories ====
When tested in a simple stimulus matching-to-sample task (described above) many animals readily learn specific item combinations, such as "touch red if the sample is red, touch green if the sample is green."  But this does not demonstrate that they distinguish between "same" and "different" as general concepts.  Better evidence is provided if, after training, an animal successfully makes a choice that matches a novel sample that it has never seen before.  Monkeys and chimpanzees do learn to do this, as do pigeons if they are given a great deal of practice with many different stimuli. However,  because the sample is presented first, successful matching might mean that the animal is simply choosing the most recently seen "familiar" item rather than the conceptually "same" item. A number of studies have attempted to distinguish these possibilities, with mixed results.<ref name="Shettleworth" /><ref name="Zentall" />

==== Rule learning ====
The use of rules has sometimes been considered an ability restricted to humans, but a number of experiments have shown evidence of simple rule learning in primates<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = D'Amato MR, Colombo M | title = Representation of serial order in monkeys (Cebus apella) | journal = Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes | volume = 14 | issue = 2 | pages = 131–9 | date = April 1988 | doi = 10.1037/0097-7403.14.2.131 | pmid = 3367099}}</ref> and also in other animals.  Much of the evidence has come from studies of [[sequence learning]] in which the "rule" consists of the order in which a series of events occurs.  Rule use is shown if the animal learns to discriminate different orders of events and transfers this discrimination to new events arranged in the same order. For example,  Murphy ''et al.'' (2008)<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Murphy RA, Mondragón E, Murphy VA | title = Rule learning by rats | journal = Science | volume = 319 | issue = 5871 | pages = 1849–51 | date = March 2008 | pmid = 18369151 | doi = 10.1126/science.1151564 | url = http://www.cal-r.org/mondragon/home/Papers/MurphyMondragonMurphy-08.pdf | bibcode = 2008Sci...319.1849M | s2cid = 591112}}</ref> trained rats to discriminate between visual sequences.  For one group ABA and BAB were rewarded, where A="bright light" and B="dim light".  Other stimulus triplets were not rewarded.  The rats learned the visual sequence, although both bright and dim lights were equally associated with reward.  More importantly, in a second experiment with auditory stimuli, rats responded correctly to sequences of novel stimuli that were arranged in the same order as those previously learned.  Similar sequence learning has been demonstrated in birds and other animals as well.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Kundey SM, Strandell B, Mathis H, Rowan JD | year = 2010 | title = Learning of monotonic and nonmonotonic sequences in domesticated horses (''Equus callabus'') and chickens (''Gallus domesticus'') | journal = Learning and Motivation | volume = 14 | issue = 3| pages = 213–223 | doi = 10.1016/j.lmot.2010.04.006}}</ref>

=== Memory ===
The categories that have been developed to analyze [[memory|human memory]] ([[short term memory]], [[long term memory]], [[working memory]]) have been applied to the study of animal memory, and some of the phenomena characteristic of human short term memory (e.g. the [[serial position effect]]) have been detected in animals, particularly [[monkey]]s.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Wright AA, Santiago HC, Sands SF, Kendrick DF, Cook RG | title = Memory processing of serial lists by pigeons, monkeys, and people | journal = Science | volume = 229 | issue = 4710 | pages = 287–9 | date = July 1985 | pmid = 9304205 | doi = 10.1126/science.9304205 | bibcode = 1985Sci...229..287W}}</ref> However most progress has been made in the analysis of [[spatial memory]]; some of this work has sought to clarify the physiological basis of spatial memory and the role of the [[hippocampus]]; other work has explored the spatial memory of [[scatter-hoarder]] animals such as [[Clark's nutcracker]], certain [[jay]]s, [[tit (bird)|tits]] and certain [[squirrel]]s, whose ecological niches require them to remember the locations of thousands of caches,<ref name="Shettleworth" /><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Balda R, Kamil AC |year = 1992 |title = Long-term spatial memory in Clark's nutcracker, ''Nucifraga columbiana'' |journal = Animal Behaviour |volume = 44 |pages = 761–769 |doi = 10.1016/S0003-3472(05)80302-1 |issue = 4 |s2cid = 54277040}}</ref> often following radical changes in the environment.

Memory has been widely investigated in foraging honeybees, ''Apis mellifera'', which use both transient short-term working memory that is non-feeder specific and a feeder specific
long-term reference memory.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Greggers U, Menzel R |year = 1993 |title = Memory dynamics and foraging strategies of honeybees |journal = [[Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology]] |volume = 32 |issue = 1 |pages = 17–29 |doi = 10.1007/BF00172219 |bibcode = 1993BEcoS..32...17G |s2cid = 36624838}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Menzel R |year = 1993 |title = Associative learning in honey-bees |journal = Apidologie |volume = 24 |pages = 157–168 |doi = 10.1051/apido:19930301 |issue = 3 |doi-access = free}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Wüstenberg D, Gerber B, Menzel R | title = Short communication: long- but not medium-term retention of olfactory memories in honeybees is impaired by actinomycin D and anisomycin | journal = The European Journal of Neuroscience | volume = 10 | issue = 8 | pages = 2742–5 | date = August 1998 | pmid = 9767405 | doi = 10.1046/j.1460-9568.1998.00319.x | s2cid = 23691527}}</ref>  Memory induced in a free-flying honeybee by a single learning trial lasts for days and, by three learning trials, for a lifetime.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Hammer M, Menzel R | title = Learning and memory in the honeybee | journal = The Journal of Neuroscience | volume = 15 | issue = 3 Pt 1 | pages = 1617–30 | date = March 1995 | pmid = 7891123 | pmc = 6578179 | doi = 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.15-03-01617.1995}}</ref> ''[[Bombus terrestris]] audax'' workers vary in their effort investment towards memorising flower locations, with smaller workers less ''able'' to be selective and thus less ''interested'' in which flowers are richer sugar sources.<ref name="Frasnelli-et-al-2020-Exeter-Physorg" /><ref name="Frasnelli-et-al-2020" /> Meanwhile, bigger ''B. t. audax'' workers have more carrying capacity and thus more reason to memorise that information, and so they do.<ref name="Frasnelli-et-al-2020-Exeter-Physorg" /><ref name="Frasnelli-et-al-2020" /> Slugs, ''Limax flavus'', have a short-term memory of approximately 1 min and long-term memory of 1 month.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Yamada A, Sekiguchi T, Suzuki H, Mizukami A | title = Behavioral analysis of internal memory states using cooling-induced retrograde amnesia in Limax flavus | journal = The Journal of Neuroscience | volume = 12 | issue = 3 | pages = 729–35 | date = March 1992 | pmid = 1545237 | pmc = 6576046 | doi = 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.12-03-00729.1992}}</ref>

====Methods====
As in humans, research with animals distinguishes between "working" or "short-term" memory from "reference" or long-term memory.  Tests of working memory evaluate memory for events that happened in the recent past, usually within the last few seconds or minutes.  Tests of reference memory evaluate memory for regularities such as "pressing a lever brings food" or "children give me peanuts".

=====Habituation=====
{{main|Habituation}}
This is one of the simplest tests for memory spanning a short time interval. The test compares an animal's response to a stimulus or event on one occasion to its response on a previous occasion.  If the second response differs consistently from the first, the animal must have remembered something about the first, unless some other factor such as motivation, sensory sensitivity, or the test stimulus has changed.

=====Delayed response=====
Delayed response tasks are often used to study short-term memory in animals.  Introduced by Hunter (1913), a typical delayed response task presents an animal with a stimulus such as colored light, and after a short time interval the animal chooses among alternatives that match the stimulus, or are related to the stimulus in some other way. In Hunter's studies, for example, a light appeared briefly in one of three goal boxes and then later the animal chose among the boxes, finding food behind the one that had been lighted.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Hunter WS | date = 1913 | title = The delayed reaction in animals and children | series = Behavior Monographs | volume = 2}}</ref> Most research has been done with some variation of the "delayed matching-to-sample" task. For example, in the initial study with this task, a pigeon was presented with a flickering or steady light. Then, a few seconds later, two pecking keys were illuminated, one with a steady light and one with a flickering light. The bird got food if it pecked the key that matched the original stimulus.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Blough DS | title = Delayed matching in the pigeon | journal = Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior | volume = 2 | issue = 2 | pages = 151–60 | date = April 1959 | pmid = 13801643 | pmc = 1403892 | doi = 10.1901/jeab.1959.2-151}}</ref>

A commonly-used variation of the matching-to-sample task requires the animal to use the initial stimulus to control a later choice between different stimuli. For example, if the initial stimulus is a black circle, the animal learns to choose "red" after the delay; if it is a black square, the correct choice is "green".  Ingenious variations of this method have been used to explore many aspects of memory, including forgetting due to interference and memory for multiple items.<ref name="Shettleworth" />

=====Radial arm maze=====
{{main|Radial arm maze}}
The [[radial arm maze]] is used to test memory for spatial location and to determine the mental processes by which location is determined.  In a radial maze test, an animal is placed on a small platform from which paths lead in various directions to goal boxes; the animal finds food in one or more goal boxes. Having found food in a box, the animal must return to the central platform.  The maze may be used to test both reference and working memory.  Suppose, for example, that over a number of sessions the same 4 arms of an 8-arm maze always lead to food. If in a later test session the animal goes to a box that has never been baited, this indicates a failure of reference memory.  On the other hand, if the animal goes to a box that it has already emptied during the same test session, this indicates a failure of working memory.  Various confounding factors, such as odor [[Sensory cue|cue]]s, are carefully controlled in such experiments.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Shettleworth SJ | date = 2010 | title = Cognition, Evolution, and Behavior | edition = 2nd | location = New York | publisher = Oxford University Press | isbn = 978-0-19-971781-1}}</ref>

=====Water maze=====
{{main|Morris water navigation task}}
The [[Water maze (neuroscience)|water maze]] is used to test an animal's memory for spatial location and to discover how an animal is able to determine locations. Typically the maze is a circular tank filled with water that has been made milky so that it is opaque. Located somewhere in the maze is a small platform placed just below the surface of the water. When placed in the tank, the animal swims around until it finds and climbs up on the platform. With practice, the animal finds the platform more and more quickly. Reference memory is assessed by removing the platform and observing the relative amount of time the animal spends swimming in the area where the platform had been located.  Visual and other cues in and around the tank may be varied to assess the animal's reliance on landmarks and the geometric relations among them.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Vorhees CV, Williams MT | title = Morris water maze: procedures for assessing spatial and related forms of learning and memory | journal = Nature Protocols | volume = 1 | issue = 2 | pages = 848–58 | year = 2006 | pmid = 17406317 | pmc = 2895266 | doi = 10.1038/nprot.2006.116}}</ref>

=====Novel object recognition test=====
The novel object recognition (NOR) test is an animal behavior test that is primarily used to assess memory alterations in rodents. It is a simple behavioral test that is based on a rodents innate exploratory behavior. The test is divided into three phases: habituation, training/adaptation and test phase. During the habituation phase the animal is placed in an empty test arena. This is followed by the adaptation phase, where the animal is placed in the arena with two identical objects. In the third phase, the test phase, the animal is placed in the arena with one of the familiar objects from the previous phase and with one novel object. Based on the rodents innate curiosity, the animals that remember the familiar object will spend more time on investigating the novel object.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Antunes M, Biala G | title = The novel object recognition memory: neurobiology, test procedure, and its modifications | journal = Cognitive Processing | volume = 13 | issue = 2 | pages = 93–110 | date = May 2012 | pmid = 22160349 | pmc = 3332351 | doi = 10.1007/s10339-011-0430-z | url =}}</ref>

=== Spatial cognition ===
Whether an animal ranges over a territory measured in square kilometers or square meters, its survival typically depends on its ability to do such things as find a food source and then return to its nest. Sometimes such a task can be performed rather simply, for example by following a chemical trail. Typically, however, the animal must somehow acquire and use information about locations, directions, and distances. The following paragraphs outline some of the ways that animals do this.<ref name="Shettleworth" /><ref name="pigeon.psy.tufts.edu">{{cite book | veditors = Brown MF, Cook RG | date = 2006 | title = Animal Spatial Cognition: Comparative, Neural, and Computational Approaches. [On-line]. | url = https://www.pigeon.psy.tufts.edu/asc/ | access-date = 2020-09-29 | archive-date = 2022-03-02 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220302152409/http://www.pigeon.psy.tufts.edu/asc/ | url-status = dead}}</ref> 
*'''Beacons''' Animals often learn what their nest or other goal looks like, and if it is within sight they may simply move toward it; it is said to serve as a "beacon".
*'''Landmarks''' When an animal is unable to see its goal, it may learn the appearance of nearby objects and use these landmarks as guides.  Researchers working with birds and bees have demonstrated this by moving prominent objects in the vicinity of nest sites, causing returning foragers to hunt for their nest in a new location.<ref name="Shettleworth" />
*'''[[Dead reckoning]]''', also known as "path integration", is the process of computing one's position by starting from a known location and keeping track of the distances and directions subsequently traveled. Classic experiments have shown that the [[desert ant]] keeps track of its position in this way as it wanders for many meters searching for food. Though it travels in a randomly twisted path, it heads straight home when it finds food.  However, if the ant is picked up and released some meters to the east, for example, it heads for a location displaced by the same amount to the east of its home nest.
*'''Cognitive maps''' Some animals appear to construct a [[cognitive map]] of their surroundings, meaning that they acquire and use information that enables them to compute how far and in what direction to go to get from one location to another. Such a map-like representation is thought to be used, for example, when an animal goes directly from one food source to another even though its previous experience has involved only travel between each source and home.<ref name="Shettleworth" /><ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Lund N |title = Animal cognition |publisher = Psychology Press |year = 2002 |isbn = 978-0-415-25298-0 |page = 4 |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=Ti4cgStf6q8C&pg=PA4}}</ref> Research in this area<ref name="pigeon.psy.tufts.edu" /> has also explored such topics as the use of geometric properties of the environment by rats and pigeons, and the ability of [[rat]]s to represent a spatial pattern in either [[radial arm maze]]s or [[Morris water navigation task|water mazes]]. Spatial cognition is used in [[visual search]] when an animal or human searches their environment for specific objects to focus on among other objects in the environment.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Treisman AM, Gelade G | title = A feature-integration theory of attention | journal = Cognitive Psychology | volume = 12 | issue = 1 | pages = 97–136 | date = January 1980 | pmid = 7351125 | doi = 10.1016/0010-0285(80)90005-5 | s2cid = 353246}}</ref>
*'''Detour behaviour''' Some animals appear to have an advanced understanding of their spatial environment and will not take the most direct route if this confers an advantage to them.  Some jumping spiders take an indirect route to prey rather than the most direct route, thereby indicating flexibility in behaviour and route planning, and possibly insight learning.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Sherwin CM | date = 2001 | title = Can invertebrates suffer? Or, how robust is argument-by-analogy? | journal = Animal Welfare | volume = 10 | issue = supplement | pages = S103–S118 | doi = 10.1017/S0962728600023551 | s2cid = 54126137}}</ref>

====Long-distance navigation; homing====

{{main|Animal navigation}}
Many animals travel hundreds or thousands of miles in seasonal migrations or returns to breeding grounds. They may be guided by the Sun, the stars, the polarization of light, magnetic cues, olfactory cues, winds, or a combination of these.<ref>{{cite book | last = Gauthreaux | first = Sidney A. | name-list-style = vanc | date = 1980 | title = Animal Migration, Orientation, and Navigation | publisher = Academic Press}}</ref> 

It has been hypothesized that animals such as apes and wolves are good at spatial cognition because this skill is necessary for survival. Some researchers argue that this ability may have diminished somewhat in dogs because humans have provided necessities such as food and shelter during some 15,000 years of domestication.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Savolainen P, Zhang YP, Luo J, Lundeberg J, Leitner T | title = Genetic evidence for an East Asian origin of domestic dogs | journal = Science | volume = 298 | issue = 5598 | pages = 1610–3 | date = November 2002 | pmid = 12446907 | doi = 10.1126/science.1073906 | bibcode = 2002Sci...298.1610S | s2cid = 32583311}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Fiset S, Plourde V | title = Object permanence in domestic dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) and gray wolves (Canis lupus) | journal = Journal of Comparative Psychology | volume = 127 | issue = 2 | pages = 115–27 | date = May 2013 | pmid = 23106804 | doi = 10.1037/a0030595}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Bräuer J, Kaminski J, Riedel J, Call J, Tomasello M | title = Making inferences about the location of hidden food: social dog, causal ape | journal = Journal of Comparative Psychology | volume = 120 | issue = 1 | pages = 38–47 | date = February 2006 | pmid = 16551163 | doi = 10.1037/0735-7036.120.1.38 | s2cid = 10162449}}</ref>

=== Timing ===
{{further|Time perception}}

==== Time of day: circadian rhythms ====
{{main|Circadian rhythms}}
The behavior of most animals is synchronized with the earth's daily light-dark cycle.  Thus, many animals are active during the day, others are active at night, still others near dawn and dusk. Though one might think that these "circadian rhythms" are controlled simply by the presence or absence of light, nearly every animal that has been studied has been shown to have a "biological clock" that yields cycles of activity even when the animal is in constant illumination or darkness.<ref name="Shettleworth" /> Circadian rhythms are so automatic and fundamental to living things&nbsp;– they occur even in plants<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Webb AR |s2cid = 15688409 |year = 2003 |title = The physiology of circadian rhythms in plants |journal = New Phytologist |volume = 160 |pages = 281–303 |doi = 10.1046/j.1469-8137.2003.00895.x |issue = 2 |pmid = 33832173 |doi-access = free|bibcode = 2003NewPh.160..281W }}</ref> – that they are usually discussed separately from cognitive processes, and the reader is referred to the main article ([[Circadian rhythms]]) for further information.<ref>{{cite book | veditors = Call JE, Burghardt GM, Pepperberg IM, Snowdon CT, Zentall TE | title = APA handbook of comparative psychology: Perception, learning, and cognition | date = 2017 | volume = 2 | chapter = Chapter 23 : Timing in Animals | publisher = APA | location = Washington D.C.}}</ref>

==== Interval timing ====
Survival often depends on an animal's ability to time intervals. For example, rufous hummingbirds feed on the nectar of flowers, and they often return to the same flower, but only after the flower has had enough time to replenish its supply of nectar. In one experiment hummingbirds fed on artificial flowers that quickly emptied of nectar but were refilled at some fixed time (e.g. twenty minutes) later. The birds learned to come back to the flowers at about the right time, learning the refill rates of up to eight separate flowers and remembering how long ago they had visited each one.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Henderson J, Hurly TA, Bateson M, Healy SD | title = Timing in free-living rufous hummingbirds, Selasphorus rufus | journal = Current Biology | volume = 16 | issue = 5 | pages = 512–5 | date = March 2006 | pmid = 16527747 | doi = 10.1016/j.cub.2006.01.054 | doi-access = free | bibcode = 2006CBio...16..512H}}</ref>

The details of interval timing have been studied in a number of species.  One of the most common methods is the "peak procedure". In a typical experiment, a rat in an [[operant chamber]] presses a lever for food.  A light comes on, a lever-press brings a food pellet at a fixed later time, say 10 seconds, and then the light goes off. Timing is measured during occasional test trials on which no food is presented and the light stays on.  On these test trials, the rat presses the lever more and more until about 10 sec and then, when no food comes, gradually stops pressing.  The time at which the rat presses most on these test trials is taken to be its estimate of the payoff time.

Experiments using the peak procedure and other methods have shown that animals can time short intervals quite exactly, can time more than one event at once, and can integrate time with spatial and other cues. Such tests have also been used for quantitative tests of theories of animal timing, such as Gibbon's [[Scalar expectancy|Scalar Expectancy Theory]] ("SET"),<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Gibbon J | year = 1977 | title = Scalar expectancy theory and Weber's law in animal timing | journal = Psychological Review | volume = 84 | issue = 3| pages = 279–325 | doi=10.1037/0033-295x.84.3.279}}</ref> Killeen's Behavioral Theory of Timing,<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Killeen PR | date = 1991 | chapter = Behavior’s time. | veditors = Bower G | title = The psychology of learning and motivation | volume = 27 | pages = 294–334 | location = New York | publisher = Academic Press}}</ref> and Machado's Learning to Time model.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Machado A, Pata P | date = 2005 | title = Testing the Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET) and the Learning to Time model (LeT) in a double bisection task. | journal = Animal Learning & Behavior | volume = 33 | issue = 1 | pages = 111–122 | doi = 10.3758/BF03196055 | pmid = 15971498 | s2cid = 16623835 | doi-access = free}}</ref> No one theory has yet gained unanimous agreement.<ref name="Shettleworth" />

=== Tool and weapon use ===
{{Main|Tool use by animals}}
Although tool use was long assumed to be a uniquely human trait, there is now much evidence that many animals use tools, including mammals, birds, fish, cephalopods and insects. Discussions of tool use often involve a debate about what constitutes a "tool", and they often consider the relation of tool use to the animal's intelligence and brain size.

====Mammals====
{{Multiple image
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| header = Series of photographs showing a bonobo fishing for termites
| width1 = 200| image1 = BonoboFishing01.jpeg
| caption1 = A bonobo inserting a stick into a termite mound
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| image2 = BonoboFishing04.jpeg
| caption2 = The bonobo starts "fishing" for the termites.
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| caption3 = The bonobo withdraws the stick and begins eating the termites.
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| image4 = A Bonobo at the San Diego Zoo "fishing" for termites.jpg
| caption4 = The bonobo eats the termites extracted with the tool.
}}
Tool use has been reported many times in both wild and captive [[primate]]s, particularly the great apes. The use of tools by primates is varied and includes hunting (mammals, invertebrates, fish), collecting honey, processing food (nuts, fruits, vegetables and seeds), collecting water, weapons and shelter.  Research in 2007 shows that chimpanzees in the [[Fongoli]] [[savannah]] sharpen sticks to use as [[spear]]s when hunting, considered the first evidence of systematic use of weapons in a species other than humans.<ref>{{cite web | url = http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/02/070222-chimps-spears.html | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070224111514/http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/02/070222-chimps-spears.html | url-status = dead | archive-date = February 24, 2007 | title = Chimps Use "Spears" to Hunt Mammals, Study Says | first = John | last = Roach | name-list-style = vanc | work = National Geographic News | date = February 22, 2007 | access-date = June 12, 2010}}</ref>  Other mammals that spontaneously use tools in the wild or in captivity include [[elephant]]s, [[bear]]s, [[cetacean]]s, [[sea otter]]s and [[mongoose]]s.

====Birds====
{{Main article|Bird intelligence}}
Several species of birds have been observed to use tools in the wild, including warblers, parrots, Egyptian vultures, brown-headed nuthatches, gulls and owls.  Some species, such as the [[woodpecker finch]] of the [[Galapagos Islands]], use particular tools as an essential part of their [[foraging]] behavior. However, these behaviors are often quite inflexible and cannot be applied effectively in new situations. A great many species of birds build nests with a wide range of complexities, but although nest-building behaviour fulfills the criteria of some definitions of "tool-use", this is not the case with other definitions.

Several species of [[corvid]]s have been trained to use tools in controlled experiments. One species examined extensively under laboratory conditions is the [[New Caledonian crow]]. One individual called "Betty" spontaneously made a wire tool to solve a novel problem. She was being tested to see whether she would select a wire hook rather than a straight wire to pull a little bucket of meat out of a well. Betty tried poking the straight wire at the meat. After a series of failures with this direct approach, she withdrew the wire and began directing it at the bottom of the well, which was secured to its base with duct tape. The wire soon became stuck, whereupon Betty pulled it sideways, bending it and unsticking it. She then inserted the hook into the well and extracted the meat. In all but one of 10 subsequent trials with only straight wire provided, she also made and used a hook in the same manner, but not before trying the straight wire first.<ref>{{cite journal| vauthors = Hunt GR |title=Manufacture and use of hook-tools by New Caledonian crows |journal=Nature |volume=379 |pages=249–251 |doi=10.1038/379249a0 |year=1996 |issue=6562 |bibcode = 1996Natur.379..249H |s2cid=4352835}}</ref><ref name="psycnet">{{cite journal | vauthors = Shettleworth SJ | title = Do animals have insight, and what is insight anyway? | journal = Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology | volume = 66 | issue = 4 | pages = 217–26 | date = December 2012 | pmid = 23231629 | doi = 10.1037/a0030674}}</ref>

Another bird that is highly studied for its intelligence is the African Gray Parrot. American animal behaviorist and psychologist Irene Pepperberg vindicated that African Grays possess cognitive abilities. Pepperberg used a bird named "Alex" in her trials and was able to prove that parrots could associate sound and meaning, demolishing long-held theories that birds were only capable of mimicking human voices. Studies by other researchers have determined that African Grays can use deductive reasoning to correctly choose between pairs of boxes containing food and boxes that are empty.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Pallardy|first=R|date=May 28, 2020|title=African gray parrot|url=https://www.britannica.com/animal/African-gray-parrot|journal=Encyclopedia Britannica}}</ref> Until Pepperberg began this research in the 1970s, few scientists had studied intelligence in parrots, and few do today. Most inquiries have instead focused on monkeys, chimpanzees, gorillas, and dolphins, all of which are much more difficult to raise, feed, and handle.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Caldwell|first=M|date=January 2000|title=Polly Wanna PhD?|journal=Discover|volume=21}}</ref> By the late 1980s, Alex had learned the names of more than 50 different objects, five shapes, and seven colors. He'd also learned what "same" and "different" mean—a step crucial in human intellectual development<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Partal|first=Y|title=Animal intelligence: The Smartest Animal Species in the World|journal=Zoo Portraits}}</ref>

====Fish====
{{Main|Fish intelligence}}
Several species of [[wrasses]] have been observed using rocks as anvils to crack [[bivalve]] (scallops, urchins and clams) shells. This behavior was first filmed<ref>{{cite news | url = http://scienceblog.com/48078/video-show-tool-use-by-a-fish/ | title = Video shows first tool use by a fish | work = ScienceBlog.com | date = 28 September 2011| last1 = Com | first1 = Scienceblog}}</ref> in an orange-dotted tuskfish (''Choerodon anchorago'') in 2009 by Giacomo Bernardi. The fish fans sand to unearth the bivalve, takes it into its mouth, swims several meters to a rock, which it then uses as an anvil by smashing the mollusc apart with sideward thrashes of the head.  This behaviour has also been recorded in a [[blackspot tuskfish]] (''Choerodon schoenleinii'') on Australia's Great Barrier Reef, yellowhead wrasse (''[[Halichoeres garnoti]]'') in Florida and a six-bar wrasse (''[[Thalassoma hardwicke]]'') in an aquarium setting.  These species are at opposite ends of the phylogenetic tree in this [[Family (biology)|family]], so this behaviour may be a deep-seated trait in all wrasses.<ref>{{Cite journal |title=The use of tools by wrasses (Labridae). |journal=Coral Reefs |volume=31 |pages=39 |doi=10.1007/s00338-011-0823-6 |vauthors=Bernardi G |year=2011 |s2cid=37924172 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

====Invertebrates====
{{main|Cephalopod intelligence}}
[[File:Octopus_shell.jpg|thumb|An [[octopus]] traveling with shells collected for protection. Despite evolving independently from humans for over 600 million years, octopuses  demonstrate [[Problem solving|problem-solving]] abilities, adaptive learning, and likely [[sentience]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Henriques |first=Martha |date=25 July 2022 |title=The mysterious inner life of the octopus |url=https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20220720-do-octopuses-feel-pain |access-date=2024-06-29 |website=BBC |language=en-GB}}</ref>]]
[[Cephalopod]]s are capable of complex tasks, thus earning them the reputation of being among the smartest of invertebrates. For example, octopuses can open jars to get the contents inside and have remarkable ability to learn new skills from the moment they are born.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Piero|first=Amodio|date=2020|title=Bipedal locomotion in Octopus vulgaris: A complementary observation and some preliminary considerations|journal=Ecology and Evolution|volume=11|issue=9 |pages=3679–3684|doi=10.1002/ece3.7328 |pmid=33976767 |pmc=8093653 |bibcode=2021EcoEv..11.3679A}}</ref> Some cephalopods are known to use [[coconut]] shells for protection or [[camouflage]].<ref name="Defensive tool use in a coconut-car">{{cite journal | vauthors = Finn JK, Tregenza T, Norman MD | title = Defensive tool use in a coconut-carrying octopus | journal = Current Biology | volume = 19 | issue = 23 | pages = R1069-70 | date = December 2009 | pmid = 20064403 | doi = 10.1016/j.cub.2009.10.052 | s2cid = 26835945 | doi-access = free | bibcode = 2009CBio...19R1069F}}</ref> Cephalopod cognitive evolution is hypothesized to have been shaped primarily by predatory and foraging pressures, but a challenging mating context may also have played a role.<ref name=":1" />

Ants of the species ''[[Conomyrma bicolor]]'' pick up stones and other small objects with their mandibles and drop them down the vertical entrances of rival colonies, allowing workers to forage for food without competition.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Möglich MH, Alpert GD |year=1979 |title=Stone dropping by Conomyrma bicolor (Hymenoptera: Formicidae): A new technique of interference competition |journal=[[Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology]] |volume=2 |issue=6 |pages=105–113 |jstor=4599265 |doi=10.1007/bf00292556|bibcode=1979BEcoS...6..105M |s2cid=27266459}}</ref>

=== Reasoning and problem solving ===

It is clear that animals of quite a range of species are capable of solving problems that appear to require abstract reasoning;<ref>For chimpanzees, see for example {{cite book | first1 = David | last1 = Premack | first2 = Ann James | last2 = Premack | name-list-style = vanc | author-link1 = David Premack | title = [[The Mind of an Ape#Other concepts|The Mind of an Ape]] | oclc = 152413818 | isbn = 978-0-393-30160-1 | date = 1983 | location = New York | publisher = Norton}}</ref>  Wolfgang Köhler's (1917) work with chimpanzees is a famous early example. He observed that chimpanzees did not use trial and error to solve problems such as retrieving bananas hung out of reach. Instead, they behaved in a manner that was "unwaveringly purposeful", spontaneously placing boxes so that they could climb to reach the fruit.<ref name="Köhler_1917" /> Modern research has identified similar behavior in animals usually thought of as much less intelligent, if appropriate pre-training is given.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Pepperberg IM | date = 1999 | title = The Alex Studies: Cognitive and Communicative Abilities of Grey Parrots. | location = Cambridge MA | publisher = Harvard University Press}}</ref> [[Causal Reasoning (Psychology)|Causal reasoning]] has also been observed in rooks and New Caledonian crows.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Tebbich S, Seed AM, Emery NJ, Clayton NS | title = Non-tool-using rooks, Corvus frugilegus, solve the trap-tube problem | journal = Animal Cognition | volume = 10 | issue = 2 | pages = 225–31 | date = April 2007 | pmid = 17171360 | doi = 10.1007/s10071-006-0061-4 | s2cid = 13611664}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Taylor AH, Hunt GR, Medina FS, Gray RD | title = Do new caledonian crows solve physical problems through causal reasoning? | journal = Proceedings. Biological Sciences | volume = 276 | issue = 1655 | pages = 247–54 | date = January 2009 | pmid = 18796393 | pmc = 2674354 | doi = 10.1098/rspb.2008.1107}}</ref>

It has been shown that [[Barbados bullfinch]]es (''Loxigilla barbadensis'') from urbanized areas are better at innovative problem-solving tasks than bullfinches from rural environments, but that they did not differ in colour discrimination learning.<ref>{{cite journal| vauthors = Audet JN, Ducatez S, Lefebvre L |year=2015 |title=The town bird and the country bird: problem solving and immunocompetence vary with urbanization |journal=Behavioral Ecology |volume=27 |issue=2 |doi=10.1093/beheco/arv201 |pages=637–644 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

===Cognitive bias===
{{main|Cognitive bias}}
[[File:Glass-of-water.jpg|thumb|150px|Is the glass half empty or half full?]]
A '''cognitive bias''' refers to a systematic pattern of deviation from norm or rationality in judgment, whereby inferences about other individuals or situations may be drawn in an illogical fashion.

Cognitive bias is sometimes illustrated by using answers to the question "[[Is the glass half empty or half full?]]". Choosing "half empty" is supposed to indicate pessimism whereas choosing "half full" indicates optimism. To test this in animals, an individual is trained to anticipate that stimulus A, e.g. a 100&nbsp;Hz tone, precedes a positive event, e.g. highly desired food is delivered when a lever is pressed by the animal.  The same individual is trained to anticipate that stimulus B, e.g. a 900&nbsp;Hz tone, precedes a negative event, e.g. bland food is delivered when the animal presses a lever. The animal is then tested by being given an intermediate stimulus C, e.g. a 500&nbsp;Hz tone, and observing whether the animal presses the lever associated with the positive or negative reward. This has been suggested to indicate whether the animal is in a positive or negative mood.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Harding EJ, Paul ES, Mendl M | title = Animal behaviour: cognitive bias and affective state | journal = Nature | volume = 427 | issue = 6972 | pages = 312 | date = January 2004 | pmid = 14737158 | doi = 10.1038/427312a | bibcode = 2004Natur.427..312H | s2cid = 4411418 | doi-access = free}}</ref>

In a study that used this approach, rats that were playfully tickled responded differently than rats that were simply handled. The rats that had been tickled were more optimistic than the handled rats.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Rygula R, Pluta H, Popik P | title = Laughing rats are optimistic | journal = PLOS ONE | volume = 7 | issue = 12 | pages = e51959 | year = 2012 | pmid = 23300582 | pmc = 3530570 | doi = 10.1371/journal.pone.0051959 | bibcode = 2012PLoSO...751959R | doi-access = free}}</ref> The authors suggested that they had demonstrated "...for the first time a link between the directly measured positive affective state and decision making under uncertainty in an animal model".

There is some evidence for cognitive bias in a number of species, including rats, dogs, rhesus macaques, sheep, chicks, starlings and honeybees.<ref>{{cite book| vauthors = Haselton MG, Nettle D, Andrews PW | chapter = The evolution of cognitive bias |year=2005| location = Hoboken, NJ, US | publisher = John Wiley & Sons Inc.| veditors = Buss DM | title = The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology |pages=724–746}}</ref>

=== Language ===
{{main|Animal language|Human-animal communication}}
{{further|Talking animal}}
The modeling of human language in animals is known as [[animal language]] research.  In addition to the ape-language experiments mentioned above, there have also been more or less successful attempts to teach language or language-like behavior to some non-primate species, including [[parrots]] and [[great spotted woodpecker]]s. Arguing from his own results with the animal [[Nim Chimpsky]] and his analysis of others results, Herbert Terrace criticized the idea that chimps can produce new sentences.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Terrace HS, Petitto LA, Sanders RJ, Bever TG | title = Can an ape create a sentence? | journal = Science | location = New York, N.Y. | volume = 206 | issue = 4421 | pages = 891–902 | date = November 1979 | pmid = 504995 | doi = 10.1126/science.504995 | bibcode = 1979Sci...206..891T}}</ref> Shortly thereafter [[Louis Herman]] published research on artificial language comprehension in the bottlenose dolphin.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Herman |first1=L. M. |last2=Richards |first2=D. G. |last3=Wolz |first3=J. P. |date=1984 |title=Comprehension of sentences by bottlenosed dolphins. |url=https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1985-13754-001 |journal=Cognition|volume=16 |issue=2 |pages=129–219 |doi=10.1016/0010-0277(84)90003-9 |pmid=6540652|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Though this sort of research has been controversial, especially among [[cognitive linguistics|cognitive linguists]], many researchers agree that many animals can understand the meaning of individual words, and that some may understand simple sentences and syntactic variations. Elephants can remember tone, melody, and recognise more than 20 words.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lim |first=Teckwyn |url=https://www.editions.ird.fr/produit/696/9782709929943/composing-worlds-with-elephants |title=Composing Worlds with Elephants: Interdisciplinary Dialogues |publisher=IRD Éditions |year=2023 |isbn=978-2-7099-2993-6 |editor-last=Lainé |editor-first=De Nicolas |location=Marseille |pages=137–155 |chapter=From the mouth of the mahout: a review of elephant command words |editor-last2=Keil |editor-first2=P. G. |editor-last3=Khatijah Rahmat |chapter-url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/387795167}}</ref> Nevertheless, there is little evidence that any animal can produce new strings of symbols that correspond to new sentences.<ref name="Shettleworth" />

=== Insight ===
{{See also|Reason}}
[[Wolfgang Köhler]] is usually credited with introducing the concept of insight into experimental psychology.<ref name="psycnet" />  Working with chimpanzees, Köhler came to dispute [[Edward Thorndike]]'s theory that animals must solve problems gradually, by trial and error. He said that Thorndike's animals could only use trial and error because the situation precluded other forms of problem solving. He provided chimps with a relatively unstructured situation, and he observed [[Eureka effect|sudden "ah-ha!"]] insightful changes of behavior, as, for example, when a chimp suddenly moved a box into position so that it could retrieve a banana.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Köhler W | title = Mentality of Apes | date = 1917}}</ref> More recently, Asian elephants (''Elephas maximus'') were shown to exhibit similar insightful problem solving. A male was observed moving a box to a position where it could be stood upon to reach food that had been deliberately hung out of reach.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Foerder P, Galloway M, Barthel T, Moore DE, Reiss D | title = Insightful problem solving in an Asian elephant | journal = PLOS ONE | volume = 6 | issue = 8 | pages = e23251 | year = 2011 | pmid = 21876741 | pmc = 3158079 | doi = 10.1371/journal.pone.0023251 | veditors = Samuel A | bibcode = 2011PLoSO...623251F | doi-access = free}}</ref>

=== Numeracy ===
{{Main|Number sense in animals}}
A variety of studies indicates that animals are able to use and communicate quantitative information, and that some can count in a rudimentary way.  Some examples of this research follow.

In one study, rhesus monkeys viewed visual displays containing, for example, 1, 2, 3, or 4 items of different sorts. They were trained to respond to them in several ways involving numerical ordering, for example touching "1" first, "2" second and so on.  When tested with displays containing items they had never seen before, they continued to respond to them in order. The authors conclude that monkeys can represent the numerosities 1 to 9 at least on an ordinal scale.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Brannon EM, Terrace HS | title = Representation of the numerosities 1-9 by rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) | journal = Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes | volume = 26 | issue = 1 | pages = 31–49 | date = January 2000 | pmid = 10650542 | doi = 10.1037/0097-7403.26.1.31 | url = http://www.columbia.edu/cu/psychology/primatecognitionlab/References/BrannonTerrace2000.pdf}}</ref>

[[Ants]] are able to use quantitative values and transmit this information.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Reznikova | first1 = Zhanna | last2 = Ryabko | first2 = Boris | name-list-style = vanc | year = 2001 | title = A Study of Ants' Numerical Competence | journal = [[Electronic Transactions on Artificial Intelligence]] | volume = 5 | pages = 111–126}}</ref><ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Reznikova ZI | date = 2007 | title = Animal Intelligence: From Individual to Social Cognition | publisher = Cambridge University Press}}</ref> For instance, ants of several species are able to estimate quite precisely numbers of encounters with members of other colonies on their feeding territories.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Reznikova ZI | year = 1999 | title = Ethological mechanisms of population dynamic in species ant communities | journal = Russian Journal of Ecology | volume = 30 | issue = 3| pages = 187–197}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Brown MJ, Gordon DM |year = 2000 |title = How resources and encounters affect the distribution of foraging activity in a seed-harvesting ants |journal = Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology |volume = 47 |pages = 195–203 |doi = 10.1007/s002650050011 |issue = 3 |bibcode = 2000BEcoS..47..195B |s2cid = 15454830}}</ref> 
Moreover, ants of some species can count up to 20 and add and subtract numbers within 5.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Reznikova |first1=Zhanna |author2=Ryabko, Boris |title=Numerical competence in animals, with an insight from ants |journal=Behaviour |date=2011 |volume=148 |issue=4 |pages=405–434 |doi=10.1163/000579511X568562 |citeseerx=10.1.1.303.1824}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Reznikova |first1=Zhanna |title=Studying Animal Language Without Translation: An Insight From Ants |date=2017 |publisher=Springer |location=Switzerland |isbn=978-3-319-44916-6 |doi=10.1007/978-3-319-44918-0}}</ref> 
This has been demonstrated using carefully crafted experiments based on measuring the time it takes for a scouting ant to pass the information to its team about the branch of an experimental maze on which food can be found.

Numeracy has been described in the yellow mealworm beetle (''[[Tenebrio molitor]]'')<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Carazo P, Font E, Forteza-Behrendt E, Desfilis E | title = Quantity discrimination in Tenebrio molitor: evidence of numerosity discrimination in an invertebrate? | journal = Animal Cognition | volume = 12 | issue = 3 | pages = 463–70 | date = May 2009 | pmid = 19118405 | doi = 10.1007/s10071-008-0207-7 | s2cid = 14502342}}</ref> and the honeybee.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Dacke M, Srinivasan MV | title = Evidence for counting in insects | journal = Animal Cognition | volume = 11 | issue = 4 | pages = 683–9 | date = October 2008 | pmid = 18504627 | doi = 10.1007/s10071-008-0159-y | s2cid = 22273226}}</ref>

[[Western lowland gorilla]]s given the choice between two food trays demonstrated the ability to choose the tray with more food items at a rate higher than chance after training.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Anderson US, Stoinski TS, Bloomsmith MA, Marr MJ, Smith AD, Maple TL | title = Relative numerousness judgment and summation in young and old Western lowland gorillas | journal = Journal of Comparative Psychology | volume = 119 | issue = 3 | pages = 285–95 | date = August 2005 | pmid = 16131257 | doi = 10.1037/0735-7036.119.3.285}}</ref> In a similar task, [[Common chimpanzee|chimpanzee]]s chose the option with the larger amount of food.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Boysen ST, Berntson GG, Mukobi KL | title = Size matters: impact of item size and quantity on array choice by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) | journal = Journal of Comparative Psychology | volume = 115 | issue = 1 | pages = 106–10 | date = March 2001 | pmid = 11334213 | doi = 10.1037/0735-7036.115.1.106 | url = https://animalstudiesrepository.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1147&context=acwp_asie| url-access = subscription }}</ref> [[Salamander]]s given a choice between two displays with differing amounts of fruit flies, used as a food reward, reliably choose the display with more flies, as shown in a particular experiment.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Uller C, Jaeger R, Guidry G, Martin C | title = Salamanders ( Plethodon cinereus) go for more: rudiments of number in an amphibian | journal = Animal Cognition | volume = 6 | issue = 2 | pages = 105–12 | date = June 2003 | pmid = 12709845 | doi = 10.1007/s10071-003-0167-x | s2cid = 147018}}</ref>

Other experiments have been conducted that show animals' abilities to differentiate between non-food quantities. [[American black bear]]s demonstrated quantity differentiation abilities in a task with a computer screen.  The bears were trained to touch a computer monitor with a paw or nose to choose a quantity of dots in one of two boxes on the screen.  Each bear was trained with [[reinforcement]] to pick a larger or smaller amount.  During training, the bears were rewarded with food for a correct response.  All bears performed better than what random error predicted on the trials with static, non-moving dots, indicating that they could differentiate between the two quantities.  The bears choosing correctly in congruent (number of dots coincided with area of the dots) and incongruent (number of dots did not coincide with area of the dots) trials suggests that they were indeed choosing between quantities that appeared on the screen, not just a larger or smaller [[retina|retinal image]], which would indicate they are only judging size.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Vonk J, Beran MJ | title = Bears "Count" Too: Quantity Estimation and Comparison in Black Bears (Ursus Americanus) | journal = Animal Behaviour | volume = 84 | issue = 1 | pages = 231–238 | date = July 2012 | pmid = 22822244 | pmc = 3398692 | doi = 10.1016/j.anbehav.2012.05.001}}</ref>

[[Bottlenose dolphin]]s have shown the ability to choose an array with fewer dots compared to one with more dots.  Experimenters set up two boards showing various numbers of dots in a poolside setup.  The dolphins were initially trained to choose the board with the fewer number of dots. This was done by rewarding the dolphin when it chose the board with the fewer number of dots.  In the experimental trials, two boards were set up, and the dolphin would emerge from the water and point to one board.  The dolphins chose the arrays with fewer dots at a rate much larger than chance, indicating they can differentiate between quantities.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Jaakkola K, Fellner W, Erb L, Rodriguez M, Guarino E | title = Understanding of the concept of numerically "less" by bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) | journal = Journal of Comparative Psychology | volume = 119 | issue = 3 | pages = 296–303 | date = August 2005 | pmid = 16131258 | doi = 10.1037/0735-7036.119.3.296}}</ref>
A particular [[grey parrot]], after training, has shown the ability to differentiate between the numbers zero through six using [[Talking bird|vocalizations]].  After number and vocalization training, this was done by asking the parrot how many objects there were in a display.  The parrot was able to identify the correct amount at a rate higher than chance.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Pepperberg IM | title = Grey parrot numerical competence: a review | journal = Animal Cognition | volume = 9 | issue = 4 | pages = 377–91 | date = October 2006 | pmid = 16909236 | doi = 10.1007/s10071-006-0034-7 | s2cid = 30689821}}</ref>
[[Pterophyllum|Angelfish]], when put in an unfamiliar environment will group together with conspecifics, an action named [[Shoaling and schooling|shoaling]].  Given the choice between two groups of differing size, the angelfish will choose the larger of the two groups.  This can be seen with a discrimination ratio of 2:1 or greater, such that, as long as one group has at least twice the fish as another group, it will join the larger one.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Gómez-Laplaza LM, Gerlai R | title = Can angelfish (Pterophyllum scalare) count? Discrimination between different shoal sizes follows Weber's law | journal = Animal Cognition | volume = 14 | issue = 1 | pages = 1–9 | date = January 2011 | pmid = 20607574 | doi = 10.1007/s10071-010-0337-6 | s2cid = 26488837}}</ref>

[[Monitor lizard]]s have been shown to be capable of numeracy, and some species can distinguish among numbers up to six.<ref>{{cite book | last1 = King | first1 = Dennis | last2 = Green | first2 = Brian | name-list-style = vanc | date = 1999 | title = Goannas: The Biology of Varanid Lizards | publisher = University of New South Wales Press | isbn = 0-86840-456-X | page = 43}}</ref>

===Sapience===

{{main|g factor in non-humans}}

As the [[cognitive ability]] and [[intelligence]] in non-human animals cannot be measured with verbal scales, it has been measured using a variety of methods that involve such things as [[habit]] reversal, [[social learning theory|social learning]], and responses to [[novelty]]. [[Principal component analysis]] and [[factor analysis|factor analytic]] studies have shown that a single factor of intelligence is responsible for 47% of the individual variance in cognitive ability measures in [[primates]]<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Reader SM, Hager Y, Laland KN | title = The evolution of primate general and cultural intelligence | journal = Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences | volume = 366 | issue = 1567 | pages = 1017–27 | date = April 2011 | pmid = 21357224 | pmc = 3049098 | doi = 10.1098/rstb.2010.0342}}</ref> and between 55% and 60% of the variance in [[mus musculus|mice]].<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Locurto C, Durkin E | title = Problem-solving and individual differences in mice (Mus musculus) using water reinforcement | journal = J Comp Psychol}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Locurto C, Scanlon C | year = 1998 | title = Individual differences and a spatial learning factor in two strains of mice (Mus musculus) | journal = J. Comp. Psychol. | volume = 112 | issue = 4| pages = 344–352 | doi=10.1037/0735-7036.112.4.344}}</ref> These values are similar to the accepted variance in [[IQ]] explained by a similar single factor known as the [[g factor (psychometrics)|general factor of intelligence]] in humans (40-50%).<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Kamphaus RW | date = 2005 | title = Clinical assessment of child and adolescent intelligence. | publisher = Springer Science & Business Media | isbn = 978-0-387-29149-9}}</ref> However, results from a recent meta-analysis suggest that the average correlation between performance scores on various cognitive tasks is only 0.18.<ref name="Dovid Y 2020">{{Cite journal|last1=Poirier|first1=Marc-Antoine|last2=Kozlovsky|first2=Dovid Y.|last3=Morand-Ferron|first3=Julie|last4=Careau|first4=Vincent|date=2020-12-09|title=How general is cognitive ability in non-human animals? A meta-analytical and multi-level reanalysis approach|journal=Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences|language=en|volume=287|issue=1940|pages=20201853|doi=10.1098/rspb.2020.1853|pmid=33290683|pmc=7739923|issn=0962-8452|doi-access=free}}</ref> Results from this study suggest that current evidence for general intelligence is weak in non-human animals.<ref name="Dovid Y 2020" />

The general factor of intelligence, or [[g factor (psychometrics)|''g'' factor]], is a [[psychometric]] construct that summarizes the correlations observed between an individual's scores on various measures of [[cognitive abilities]]. It has been suggested that ''g'' is related to evolutionary [[life history theory|life histories]] and the [[evolution of intelligence]]<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Rushton JP | year = 2004 | title = Placing intelligence into an evolutionary framework or how g fits into the r–K matrix of life-history traits including longevity | journal = Intelligence | volume = 32 | issue = 4| pages = 321–328 | doi=10.1016/j.intell.2004.06.003}}</ref> as well as to [[social learning theory|social learning]] and [[cultural intelligence]].<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = van Schaik CP, Burkart JM | title = Social learning and evolution: the cultural intelligence hypothesis | journal = Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences | volume = 366 | issue = 1567 | pages = 1008–16 | date = April 2011 | pmid = 21357223 | pmc = 3049085 | doi = 10.1098/rstb.2010.0304}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Herrmann E, Call J, Hernàndez-Lloreda MV, Hare B, Tomasello M | title = Humans have evolved specialized skills of social cognition: the cultural intelligence hypothesis | journal = Science | volume = 317 | issue = 5843 | pages = 1360–6 | date = September 2007 | pmid = 17823346 | doi = 10.1126/science.1146282 | doi-access = | bibcode = 2007Sci...317.1360H | s2cid = 686663}}</ref> Non-human [[Conceptual model|models]] of ''g'' have been used in [[genetics|genetic]]<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Plomin R | title = The genetics of g in human and mouse | journal = Nature Reviews. Neuroscience | volume = 2 | issue = 2 | pages = 136–41 | date = February 2001 | pmid = 11252993 | doi = 10.1038/35053584 | s2cid = 205013267}}</ref> and [[neurological]]<ref>{{cite book |vauthors=Anderson B |title=The Nature of Intelligence: Novartis Foundation Symposium 233 |chapter=Chapter 5: The ''g'' Factor in Non-Human Animals |series=Novartis Foundation Symposia |volume=233 | pages=79–90; discussion 90–5 |date=2000 |publisher=[[Wiley (publisher)|Wiley]] |doi=10.1002/0470870850.ch5 |pmid=11276911 |isbn=978-0-471-49434-8 |veditors=Bock GR, Goode JA, Webb K}}</ref> research on intelligence to help understand the mechanisms behind variation in ''g''.

===Theory of mind===
{{Main|Theory of mind in animals}}
[[Theory of mind]] is the ability to attribute mental states, e.g. [[intention|intents]], [[desire (emotion)|desires]], [[role-playing|pretending]], [[knowledge]], to oneself and others and to understand that others have desires, intentions, and perspectives that are different from one's own.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Premack |first1=David |last2=Woodruff |first2=Guy | name-list-style = vanc |year=1978 |title=Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? |journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences |volume=1 |issue=4 |pages=515–526 |doi=10.1017/S0140525X00076512|doi-access=free}}</ref>

Some research with [[raven]]s provides an example of evidence for theory of mind in a non-human species. Ravens are members of the family [[Corvidae]], which is widely regarded as having high cognitive abilities. These birds have been observed to hide their food when dominant ravens are visible and audible at the same time. Based on this observation, ravens were tested for their understanding of "seeing" as a mental state.  In a first step, the birds protected their [[Hoarding (animal behavior)|cache]] when dominants were visible but not when they could only be heard from an adjacent room. In the next step, they had access to a small peephole which allowed them to see into the adjacent room.  With the peephole open, the ravens guarded their caches against discovery when they could hear dominants in the adjacent room, even when the dominant's sounds were playbacks of recordings.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Bugnyar T, Reber SA, Buckner C | title = Ravens attribute visual access to unseen competitors | journal = Nature Communications | volume = 7 | pages = 10506 | date = February 2016 | pmid = 26835849 | pmc = 4740864 | doi = 10.1038/ncomms10506 | bibcode = 2016NatCo...710506B}}</ref>

=== Consciousness ===
{{main|Animal consciousness}}
[[File:Mirror test with a Baboon.JPG|thumb|Mirror test with a baboon]]

The sense in which animals can be said to have self-[[consciousness]] or a [[self-concept]] has been hotly debated. The best known research technique in this area is the [[mirror test]] devised by [[Gordon G. Gallup]], in which an animal's skin is marked in some way while it is asleep or sedated, and it is then allowed to see its reflection in a mirror; if the animal spontaneously directs grooming behavior towards the mark, that is taken as an indication that it is aware of itself.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Bischof-Köhler D | date = 1991 | chapter = The development of empathy in infants | veditors = Lamb ME, Keller H | title = Infant Development. Perspectives from German speaking countries | pages = 245–273 | publisher = Routledge | isbn = 978-1-317-72827-6}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Prior H, Schwarz A, Güntürkün O | title = Mirror-induced behavior in the magpie (Pica pica): evidence of self-recognition | journal = PLOS Biology | volume = 6 | issue = 8 | pages = e202 | date = August 2008 | pmid = 18715117 | pmc = 2517622 | doi = 10.1371/journal.pbio.0060202 | doi-access = free}}</ref> Self-awareness, by this criterion, has been reported for chimpanzees<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Gallop GG | title = Chimpanzees: self-recognition | journal = Science | volume = 167 | issue = 3914 | pages = 86–7 | date = January 1970 | pmid = 4982211 | doi = 10.1126/science.167.3914.86 | bibcode = 1970Sci...167...86G | s2cid = 145295899}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Walraven V, van Elsacker L, Verheyen R | year = 1995 | title = Reactions of a group of pygmy chimpanzees (Pan paniscus) to their mirror images: evidence of self-recognition | journal = Primates | volume = 36 | pages = 145–150 | doi=10.1007/bf02381922| s2cid = 38985498}}</ref> and also for other great apes,<ref>{{cite book |vauthors=Patterson FG, Cohn RH |year=1994 |chapter=Self-recognition and self-awareness in lowland gorillas |veditors=Parker ST, Mitchell R, Boccia M |title=Self-awareness in animals and humans: developmental perspectives |location=New York |publisher=Cambridge University Press |pages=273–290}}</ref> the [[European magpie]],<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Prior H, Schwarz A, Güntürkün O | title = Mirror-induced behavior in the magpie (Pica pica): evidence of self-recognition | journal = PLOS Biology | volume = 6 | issue = 8 | pages = e202 | date = August 2008 | pmid = 18715117 | pmc = 2517622 | doi = 10.1371/journal.pbio.0060202 | veditors = De Waal F | doi-access = free}}</ref> some [[cetaceans]]<ref>{{cite book|title=Self-awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives | vauthors = Marten K, Psarakos S |chapter=Evidence of self-awareness in the bottlenose dolphin (''Tursiops truncatus'') | veditors = Parker ST, Mitchell R, Boccia M |pages=361–379 |year=1995 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |chapter-url=http://earthtrust.org/delbook.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081013081149/http://earthtrust.org/delbook.html |archive-date=13 October 2008}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Reiss D, Marino L | title = Mirror self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: a case of cognitive convergence | journal = Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America | volume = 98 | issue = 10 | pages = 5937–42 | date = May 2001 | pmid = 11331768 | pmc = 33317 | doi = 10.1073/pnas.101086398 | bibcode = 2001PNAS...98.5937R | doi-access = free}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Delfour F, Marten K | title = Mirror image processing in three marine mammal species: killer whales (Orcinus orca), false killer whales (Pseudorca crassidens) and California sea lions (Zalophus californianus) | journal = Behavioural Processes | volume = 53 | issue = 3 | pages = 181–190 | date = April 2001 | pmid = 11334706 | doi = 10.1016/s0376-6357(01)00134-6 | s2cid = 31124804}}</ref> and an [[Asian elephant]],<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Plotnik JM, de Waal FB, Reiss D | title = Self-recognition in an Asian elephant | journal = Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America | volume = 103 | issue = 45 | pages = 17053–7 | date = November 2006 | pmid = 17075063 | pmc = 1636577 | doi = 10.1073/pnas.0608062103 | bibcode = 2006PNAS..10317053P | doi-access = free}}</ref> but not for monkeys. The mirror test has been criticized by researchers because it is entirely focused on vision, the primary sense in humans, while other species rely more heavily on other senses such as the [[olfactory|sense of smell]] in dogs.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Lea SE | date = 2010 | chapter-url = https://books.google.com/books?id=GDijCnSs57gC&pg=PA173 | chapter = Concept learning in nonprimate mammals: In search of evidence | veditors = Mareschal D, Quinn PC, Lea SE | title = The Making of Human Concepts | pages = 173–199 | publisher = Oxford University Press | isbn = 978-0-19-954922-1}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | first = Jenia | last = Meng | name-list-style = vanc | url = http://thesuperiorhuman.ultraventus.info/movie/about/transcription/ | title = The Superior Human? | department = Documentary. Transcription on the official website | work = The Superior Human | date = 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last= Gatti |first=Roberto Cazzolla | name-list-style = vanc |date=2015|title=Self-consciousness: beyond the looking-glass and what dogs found there |journal=Ethology Ecology & Evolution |volume=28 |issue=2 |pages=232–240 |doi=10.1080/03949370.2015.1102777 |s2cid=217507938}}</ref> 

It has been suggested that [[metacognition]] in some animals provides some evidence for cognitive self-awareness.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Couchman JJ, Coutinho MV, Beran MJ, Smith JD | title = Beyond stimulus cues and reinforcement signals: a new approach to animal metacognition | journal = Journal of Comparative Psychology | volume = 124 | issue = 4 | pages = 356–68 | date = November 2010 | pmid = 20836592 | pmc = 2991470 | doi = 10.1037/a0020129 | url = http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/features/com-124-4-356.pdf}}</ref> The great apes, dolphins, and [[rhesus monkeys]] have demonstrated the ability to monitor their own mental states and use an "I don't know" response to avoid answering difficult questions. Unlike the mirror test, which reveals awareness of the condition of one's own body, this uncertainty monitoring is thought to reveal awareness of one's internal mental state. A 2007 study has provided some evidence for metacognition in [[rat]]s,<ref>{{cite web | url = https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/03/070308121856.htm | title = Rats Capable Of Reflecting On Mental Processes | work = ScienceDaily | date = 9 March 2007}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Foote AL, Crystal JD | title = Metacognition in the rat | journal = Current Biology | volume = 17 | issue = 6 | pages = 551–5 | date = March 2007 | pmid = 17346969 | pmc = 1861845 | doi = 10.1016/j.cub.2007.01.061 | bibcode = 2007CBio...17..551F}}</ref> although this interpretation has been questioned.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Smith JD, Beran MJ, Couchman JJ, Coutinho MV | title = The comparative study of metacognition: sharper paradigms, safer inferences | journal = Psychonomic Bulletin & Review | volume = 15 | issue = 4 | pages = 679–91 | date = August 2008 | pmid = 18792496 | pmc = 4607312 | doi = 10.3758/PBR.15.4.679}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| vauthors = Jozefowiez J, Staddon JE, Cerutti DT | title = Metacognition in animals: how do we know that they know? | journal = Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews | volume = 4 | pages = 29–39 | year = 2009 | doi = 10.3819/ccbr.2009.40003| doi-access = free}}</ref>  These species might also be aware of the strength of their memories.

Some researchers propose that animal calls and other vocal behaviors provide evidence of consciousness. This idea arose from research on children's [[crib talk]] by Weir (1962) and in investigations of early speech in children by Greenfield and others (1976). Some such research has been done with a macaw (see [[Talking Birds#Arielle|Arielle]]).

In July, 2012 during the "Consciousness in Human and Nonhuman Animals" conference in Cambridge a group of scientists announced and signed a declaration with the following conclusions:
{{quotation|Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.<ref>{{cite web |title=The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness |url= http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf |access-date=12 August 2012}}</ref>}}