Editing Behaviorism (section)

==In philosophy==
{{main|Logical behaviorism}}
Behaviorism is a psychological movement that can be contrasted with [[philosophy of mind]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Schlinger |first=Henry D. |date=2009-07-01 |title=Theory of Mind: An Overview and Behavioral Perspective |url=https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=tpr |journal=The Psychological Record |volume=59 |issue=3 |pages=435–448 |doi=10.1007/BF03395673 |issn=2163-3452 |s2cid=145671713|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>Moore, J. (2013). Mentalism as a Radical Behaviorist Views It — Part 1. The Journal of Mind and Behavior. Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 133-164.[https://www.jstor.org/stable/43854332?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents]</ref><ref>Moore, J. (2013). Mentalism as a Radical Behaviorist Views It — Part 2. The Journal of Mind and Behavior. Vol. 34, No. 3/4, pp. 205-232.[https://www.jstor.org/stable/43854394?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents]</ref> The basic premise of behaviorism is that the study of behavior should be a [[natural science]], such as [[chemistry]] or [[physics]].<ref name="Catania">[[A. Charles Catania|Catania, A. C.]] (2013). A natural science of behavior. ''Review of General Psychology, 17''(2), 133-139.[https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033026]</ref><ref name="Jackson">Jackson, M. (2009). The natural selection: behavior analysis as a natural science. European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 10:2, 103-118.[https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15021149.2009.11434313]</ref>  Initially behaviorism rejected any reference to hypothetical inner states of organisms as causes for their behavior, but B.F. Skinner's radical behaviorism reintroduced reference to inner states and also advocated for the study of thoughts and feelings as behaviors subject to the same mechanisms as external behavior.<ref name="Catania" /><ref name="Jackson" />  Behaviorism takes a functional view of behavior. According to [[Edmund Fantino]] and colleagues: "Behavior analysis has much to offer the study of phenomena normally dominated by cognitive and social psychologists. We hope that successful application of behavioral theory and methodology will not only shed light on central problems in judgment and choice but will also generate greater appreciation of the behavioral approach."<ref name="Fantino2003">{{Cite journal |last1=Fantino, E. |last2=Stolarz-Fantino, S. |last3=Navarro, A. |year=2003 |title=Logical fallacies: A behavioral approach to reasoning |journal=The Behavior Analyst Today |volume=4 |at=p.116 (pp.109–117) |doi=10.1037/h0100014}}</ref>

Behaviorist sentiments are not uncommon within [[philosophy of language]] and [[analytic philosophy]]. It is sometimes argued that [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] defended a [[Logical behaviorism|logical behaviorist]] position<ref name="SEP">{{cite SEP |url-id=behaviorism |title=Behaviorism}}</ref> (e.g., the ''[[Philosophical Investigations#Wittgenstein's beetle|beetle in a box]]'' argument). In [[logical positivism]] (as held, e.g., by [[Rudolf Carnap]]<ref name=SEP/> and [[Carl Hempel]]),<ref name=SEP/>  the meaning of psychological statements are their verification conditions, which consist of performed overt behavior. [[W. V. O. Quine]] made use of a type of behaviorism,<ref name=SEP/> influenced by some of Skinner's ideas, in his own work on language. Quine's work in semantics differed substantially from the empiricist semantics of Carnap which he attempted to create an alternative to, couching his semantic theory in references to physical objects rather than sensations. [[Gilbert Ryle]] defended a distinct strain of philosophical behaviorism, sketched in his book ''The Concept of Mind''.<ref name=SEP/>  Ryle's central claim was that instances of dualism frequently represented "[[category mistake]]s", and hence that they were really misunderstandings of the use of ordinary language. [[Daniel Dennett]] likewise acknowledges himself to be a type of behaviorist,<ref name="Ref-1">{{Cite web |last=Dennett |first=D.C. |author-link=Daniel Dennett |title=The Message is: There is no Medium |url=http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/msgisno.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080111100055/http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/msgisno.htm |archive-date=11 January 2008 |access-date=2008-01-10 |publisher=Tufts University}}</ref> though he offers extensive criticism of radical behaviorism and refutes Skinner's rejection of the value of intentional idioms and the possibility of free will.<ref name="Dennett1981">{{Cite book |last=Dennett |first=Daniel |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_xwObaAZEwoC&pg=PA53 |title=Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology |publisher=MIT Press |year=1981 |isbn=978-0-262-54037-7 |series=Bradford Books |page=53 |lccn=78013723}}</ref>
{{Blockquote|text=This is Dennett's main point in "Skinner Skinned". Dennett argues that there is a crucial difference between explaining and explaining away... If our explanation of apparently rational behavior turns out to be extremely simple, we may want to say that the behavior was not really rational after all. But if the explanation is very complex and intricate, we may want to say not that the behavior is not rational, but that we now have a better understanding of what rationality consists in. (Compare: if we find out how a computer program solves problems in linear algebra, we don't say it's not really solving them, we just say we know how it does it. On the other hand, in cases like [[Joseph Weizenbaum|Weizenbaum's]] [[ELIZA]] program, the explanation of how the computer carries on a conversation is so simple that the right thing to say seems to be that the machine isn't really carrying on a conversation, it's just a trick.)|author=Curtis Brown|title="Behaviorism: Skinner and Dennett"|source=''Philosophy of Mind''<ref>{{Cite web |last=Brown |first=Curtis |year=2001 |title=Behaviorism: Skinner and Dennett |url=http://www.trinity.edu/cbrown/mind/behaviorism.html |website=Philosophy of Mind |publisher=Trinity University |location=San Antonio, TX}}</ref>}}

===Law of effect and trace conditioning===
* '''[[Law of effect]]''': Although [[Edward Thorndike]]'s methodology mainly dealt with reinforcing observable behavior, it viewed [[mentalism|cognitive]] antecedents as the causes of behavior,<ref name="BehaviorAnalysisLearning">{{Cite book |last1=W. David Pierce |url=https://routledgetextbooks.com/textbooks/9781138898585/ |title=Behavior analysis and learning: a biobehavioral approach |last2=Carl D. Cheney |date=2017 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-1138898585 |edition=sixth |location=New York |pages=1–622}}</ref> and was theoretically much more similar to the [[cognitive behavior therapy|cognitive-behavior therapies]] than classical (methodological) or modern-day (radical) behaviorism. Nevertheless, Skinner's [[operant conditioning]] was heavily influenced by the Law of Effect's principle of reinforcement.<ref name=BehaviorAnalysisLearning/>
* '''[[Classical conditioning#Forward conditioning|Trace conditioning]]''': Akin to B.F. Skinner's radical behaviorism, it is a [[classical conditioning|respondent conditioning]] technique based on [[Ivan Pavlov]]'s concept of a "memory trace" in which the observer recalls the [[conditioned stimulus]] (CS), with the memory or recall being the [[unconditioned response]] (UR). There is also a time delay between the CS and [[unconditioned stimulus]] (US), causing the [[conditioned response]] (CR)—particularly the [[reflex]]—to be faded over time.<ref name=BehaviorAnalysisLearning/> According to Marchand,<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Federighi |last2=Traina |first2=G. |last3=Bernardi |first3=R. |date=2018 |title=Contextual fear conditioning modulates the gene expression over time |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.12871/00039829201814 |journal=Archives Italiennes de Biologie |volume=156 |issue=1 |pages=40–47 |doi=10.12871/00039829201814 |doi-broken-date=14 December 2024 |issn=0003-9829 |pmid=30039834|url-access=subscription }}</ref> the hippocampus is a part of the cognitive processes during trace conditioning and other forms of classical conditioning in two ways: needing to overcome stimuli or due to mre activity from complex challenges. However, results may vary due to the nature of the task and the design of the experiment .

===Molecular versus molar behaviorism===
Skinner's view of behavior is most often characterized as a "molecular" view of behavior; that is, behavior can be decomposed into atomistic parts or molecules. This view is inconsistent with Skinner's complete description of behavior as delineated in other works, including his 1981 article "Selection by Consequences".<ref name="Skinner1981">{{Cite journal |last=Skinner, B.F |date=31 July 1981 |title=Selection by Consequences |url=http://www.psychology.uiowa.edu/Classes/31174/Documents/Selection%20by%20Consequences.pdf |url-status=dead |journal=[[Science (journal)|Science]] |volume=213 |issue=4507 |pages=501–4 |bibcode=1981Sci...213..501S |doi=10.1126/science.7244649 |pmid=7244649 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100702230825/http://www.psychology.uiowa.edu/Classes/31174/Documents/Selection%20by%20Consequences.pdf |archive-date=2 July 2010 |access-date=14 August 2010}}</ref> Skinner proposed that a complete account of behavior requires understanding of selection history at three levels: [[biology]] (the [[natural selection]] or [[phylogeny]] of the animal); behavior (the reinforcement history or ontogeny of the behavioral repertoire of the animal); and for some species, [[culture]] (the cultural practices of the social group to which the animal belongs). This whole organism then interacts with its environment. Molecular behaviorists use notions from [[melioration theory]], [[hyperbolic discounting|negative power function discounting]] or additive versions of negative power function discounting.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Fantino, E. |year=2000 |title=Delay-reduction theory—the case for temporal context: comment on Grace and Savastano (2000) |journal=J Exp Psychol Gen |volume=129 |issue=4 |pages=444–6 |doi=10.1037/0096-3445.129.4.444 |pmid=11142857}}</ref> According to Moore,<ref>{{Cite web |title=San Jose State University Library |url=https://login.libaccess.sjlibrary.org/login?qurl=https://link.gale.com%2fapps%2fdoc%2fA265302082%2fAONE%3fu%3dcsusj%26sid%3dbookmark-AONE%26xid%3dba1ccbfb |access-date=2023-12-08 |website=login.libaccess.sjlibrary.org}}</ref> the perseverance in a molecular examination of behavior may be sign of a desire for an in-depth understanding, maybe to identify any underlying mechanism or components that contribute to comples actions. This strategy might involve elements, procedure, or variables that contribute to behaviorism.

Molar behaviorists, such as [[Howard Rachlin]], [[Richard Herrnstein]], and William Baum, argue that behavior cannot be understood by focusing on events in the moment. That is, they argue that behavior is best understood as the ultimate product of an organism's history and that molecular behaviorists are committing a fallacy by inventing fictitious proximal causes for behavior. Molar behaviorists argue that standard molecular constructs, such as "associative strength", are better replaced by molar variables such as [[rate of reinforcement]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Baum, W.M. |year=2003 |title=The molar view of behavior and its usefulness in behavior analysis |url=http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=abstract&id=206927 |url-status=dead |journal=Behavior Analyst Today |volume=4 |pages=78–81 |doi=10.1037/h0100009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090904101644/http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=abstract&id=206927 |archive-date=2009-09-04 |access-date=2008-01-10|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Thus, a molar behaviorist would describe "loving someone" as a pattern of [[love|loving behavior]] over time; there is no isolated, proximal cause of loving behavior, only a history of behaviors (of which the current behavior might be an example) that can be summarized as "love".

===Theoretical behaviorism===
{{main|Theoretical behaviorism}}

Skinner's radical behaviorism has been highly successful experimentally, revealing new phenomena with new methods, but Skinner's dismissal of theory limited its development. [[Theoretical behaviorism]]<ref name="Staddon2014" /> recognized that a historical system, an organism, has a state as well as sensitivity to stimuli and the ability to emit responses.  Indeed, Skinner himself acknowledged the possibility of what he called "latent" responses in humans, even though he neglected to extend this idea to rats and pigeons.<ref>Staddon, J. Theoretical behaviorism. Philosophy and Behavior. (45) in press.</ref>  Latent responses constitute a repertoire, from which operant reinforcement can select.  Theoretical behaviorism links between the brain and the behavior that provides a real understanding of the behavior, rather than a mental presumption of how brain-behavior relates.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Roback |first=A. A. |title=Behaviorism at twenty-five |date=1937 |publisher=Sci-Art Publishers |oclc=881361266}}</ref>  The theoretical concept of behaviorism are blended with knowledge of mental structure such as memory and expectancies associated with inflexable behaviorist stances that have traditionally forbidden the examination of the mental state.<ref>{{cite book |date=2016-12-30 |chapter=Behaviorism as Philosophy of Science |chapter-url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119143673.ch2 |title=Understanding Behaviorism |pages=19–32 |doi=10.1002/9781119143673.ch2 |isbn=9781119143642}}</ref> Because of its flexibility, theoretical behaviorism permits the cognitive process to have an impact on behavior.