Editing Broken windows theory (section)

==Case studies==
{{see also|Graffiti in the United States#Government response|label 1=Government response to graffiti}}

===Precursor experiments===
Before the introduction of this theory by Wilson and Kelling, [[Philip Zimbardo]], a [[Stanford]] psychologist, arranged an experiment testing the broken-window theory in 1969. Zimbardo arranged for an automobile with no license plates and the hood up to be parked idle in a [[Bronx]] neighbourhood and a second automobile, in the same condition, to be set up in [[Palo Alto, California]]. The car in the Bronx was attacked within minutes of its abandonment. Zimbardo noted that the first "vandals" to arrive were a family—a father, mother, and a young son—who removed the radiator and battery. Within twenty-four hours of its abandonment, everything of value had been stripped from the vehicle. After that, the car's windows were smashed in, parts torn, upholstery ripped, and children were using the car as a playground. At the same time, the vehicle sitting idle in Palo Alto sat untouched for more than a week until Zimbardo himself went up to the vehicle and deliberately smashed it with a sledgehammer. Soon after, people joined in for the destruction, although criticism has been levelled at this claim as the destruction occurred after the car was moved to the campus of Stanford university and Zimbardo's own students were the first to join him. Zimbardo observed that a majority of the adult "vandals" in both cases were primarily well dressed, Caucasian, clean-cut and seemingly respectable individuals. It is believed that, in a neighborhood such as the Bronx where the history of abandoned property and theft is more prevalent, vandalism occurs much more quickly, as the community generally seems apathetic. Similar events can occur in any civilized community when communal barriers—the sense of mutual regard and obligations of civility—are lowered by actions that suggest apathy.<ref name="wilson_kelling" /><ref>{{Cite journal |url=https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/gk002bt7757/gk002bt7757.pdf |title=The human choice: Individuation, reason, and order versus deindividuation, impulse, and chaos |journal=Nebraska Symposium on Motivation |volume=17 |pages=237–307 |last=Zimbardo |first=P.G. |year=1969 |id=[[American Psychological Association|APA]] [https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1971-08069-001 1971-08069-001] |access-date=2020-02-19 |archive-date=2020-02-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200219140324/https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/gk002bt7757/gk002bt7757.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

===New York City===
{{See also|Crime in New York City}}
[[File:Seen bode ny.jpg|thumb|292x292px|Graffiti in the [[New York City Subway]] system in the early 1980s]]
In 1985, the [[New York City Transit Authority]] hired [[George L. Kelling]], the author of ''Broken Windows'', as a consultant.<ref name=FaganDavies2000>{{Cite journal |url=https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol28/iss2/2/ |title=Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City |journal=Fordham Urban Law Journal |volume=28 |issue=2 |pages=457 |date=2000 |last1=Fagan |first1=Jeffrey |last2=Davies |first2=Garth |ssrn=257813 |access-date=2020-02-19 |archive-date=2019-10-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191022224950/https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol28/iss2/2/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Kelling was later hired as a consultant to the [[Boston Police Department|Boston]] and the [[Los Angeles Police Department|Los Angeles]] police departments.

One of Kelling's adherents, [[David L. Gunn]], implemented policies and procedures based on the Broken Windows Theory, during his tenure as President of the New York City Transit Authority. One of his major efforts was to lead a campaign from 1984 to 1990 to rid [[graffiti]] from New York's subway system.

In 1990, [[William J. Bratton]] became head of the [[New York City Transit Police]]. Bratton was influenced by Kelling, describing him as his "intellectual mentor". In his role, he implemented a tougher stance on [[fare evasion]], faster [[arrest|arrestee processing]] methods, and [[background check]]s on all those arrested.

After being elected [[Mayor of New York City]] in 1993, as a [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican]], [[Rudy Giuliani]] hired Bratton as his [[police commissioner]] to implement similar policies and practices throughout the city. Giuliani heavily subscribed to Kelling and Wilson's theories. Such policies emphasized addressing crimes that negatively affect [[quality of life]]. In particular, Bratton directed the police to more strictly enforce laws against subway fare evasion, [[public drinking]], [[public urination]], and graffiti. Bratton also revived the [[New York City Cabaret Law]], a previously dormant Prohibition era ban on dancing in unlicensed establishments. Throughout the late 1990s, NYPD shut down many of the city's acclaimed night spots for illegal dancing.
[[File:NYPD Piaggio Beverly lineup.jpg|thumb|[[New York City Police Department]] officers {{Circa|2005}}]]
According to a 2001 study of crime trends in New York City by Kelling and William Sousa, rates of both petty and serious crime fell significantly after the aforementioned policies were implemented. Furthermore, crime continued to decline for the following ten years. Such declines suggested that policies based on the Broken Windows Theory were [[effective]].<ref>{{Cite journal |jstor=10.1086/425594 |title=Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows |journal=The Journal of Law and Economics |volume=48 |issue=1 |pages=235–266 |year=2005 |last1=Corman |first1=Hope |last2=Mocan |first2=Naci |s2cid=30448467 |citeseerx=10.1.1.486.9721 |doi=10.1086/425594}}</ref> Later, in 2016, Brian Jordan Jefferson used the precedent of Kelling and Sousa's study to conduct fieldwork in the 70th precinct of New York City, which it was corroborated that crime mitigation in the area were concerning "quality of life" issues, which included noise complaints and loitering.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Jefferson |first=Brian Jordan |date=16 October 2016 |title=Broken Windows Policing and Constructions of Space and Crime: Flatbush, Brooklyn |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/anti.12240 |journal=Antipode |language=en |volume=48 |issue=5 |pages=1270–1291 |doi=10.1111/anti.12240 |bibcode=2016Antip..48.1270J |issn=0066-4812|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The falling crime rates throughout New York City had built a mutual relationship between residents and law enforcement in vigilance of disorderly conduct.{{citation needed|date=December 2023}}

However, other studies do not find a [[cause and effect]] relationship between the adoption of such policies and decreases in crime.<ref name="pbs-frontline"/><ref name=HarcourtLudwig2006/> The decrease may have been part of a broader trend across the United States. The rates of most crimes, including all categories of violent crime, made consecutive declines from their peak in 1990, under Giuliani's predecessor, [[David Dinkins]]. Other cities also experienced less crime, even though they had different police policies. Other factors, such as the 39% drop in New York City's [[unemployment rate]] between 1992 and 1999,<ref name="businessinsider"/> could also explain the decrease reported by Kelling and Sousa.<ref name="businessinsider">{{Citation |title=Criticism for Giuliani's broken windows theory |date=Aug 2013 |url=http://www.businessinsider.com/criticism-for-giulianis-broken-windows-theory-2013-8 |newspaper=Business insider |access-date=2013-11-24 |archive-date=2021-04-23 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210423010610/http://www.businessinsider.com/criticism-for-giulianis-broken-windows-theory-2013-8 |url-status=live }}.</ref>

A 2017 study found that when the New York Police Department (NYPD) stopped aggressively enforcing minor legal statutes in late 2014 and early 2015 that civilian complaints of three major crimes (burglary, felony assault, and grand larceny) decreased (slightly with large error bars) during and shortly after sharp reductions in [[proactive policing]]. There was no statistically significant effect on other major crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, or grand theft auto. These results are touted as challenging prevailing scholarship as well as conventional wisdom on authority and legal compliance by implying that aggressively enforcing minor legal statutes incites more severe criminal acts.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Sullivan |first1=Christopher M. |last2=O'Keeffe |first2=Zachary P. |s2cid=19223955 |date=2017-09-25 |title=Evidence that curtailing proactive policing can reduce major crime |journal=Nature Human Behaviour |language=En |doi=10.1038/s41562-017-0211-5 |pmid=31024103 |issn=2397-3374 |volume=1 |issue=10 |pages=730–737}}</ref>

===Albuquerque===
[[Albuquerque]], [[New Mexico]], instituted the Safe Streets Program in the late 1990s based on the Broken Windows Theory. The Safe Streets Program sought to deter and reduce unsafe driving and incidence of crime by saturating areas where high crime and crash rates were prevalent with law enforcement officers. Operating under the theory that American [[Western United States|Westerners]] use roadways much in the same way that American [[Eastern United States|Easterners]] use subways, the developers of the program reasoned that lawlessness on the roadways had much the same effect as it did on the [[New York City Subway]]. Effects of the program were reviewed by the US [[National Highway Traffic Safety Administration]] (NHTSA) and were published in a case study.<ref>{{Citation |url=http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/enforce/SafeStreets/ |place=US |publisher=Department of Transportation – NHTSA |title=Albuquerque Police Department's Safe streets program |id=DOT HS 809 278 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150403093901/http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/enforce/SafeStreets/ |archive-date=2015-04-03}}.</ref> The methodology behind the program demonstrates the use of [[Deterrence (penology)|deterrence theory]] in preventing crime.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/enforce/SafeStreets/call_for_action.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150328025518/http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/enforce/SafeStreets/call_for_action.htm |url-status=dead |archive-date=2015-03-28 |title=U.S. Department of Transportation – NHTSA – Albuquerque Police Department's Safe Street Program |date=2015-03-28 |access-date=2019-10-22}}</ref>

===Lowell, Massachusetts===
In 2005, [[Harvard University]] and [[Suffolk University]] researchers worked with local police to identify 34 "crime hot spots" in [[Lowell, Massachusetts]]. In half of the spots, authorities cleared trash, fixed streetlights, enforced building codes, discouraged [[loitering|loiterers]], made more [[misdemeanor]] arrests, and expanded [[community mental health service|mental health services]] and aid for the [[homeless]]. In the other half of the identified locations, there was no change to routine police service.

The areas that received additional attention experienced a 20% reduction in calls to the police. The study concluded that cleaning up the physical environment was more effective than misdemeanor arrests.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.suffolk.edu/34417.html |publisher=Suffolk University |title=Research Boosts Broken Windows |access-date=2009-02-20 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090629171649/http://www.suffolk.edu/34417.html |archive-date=2009-06-29}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/02/08/breakthrough_on_broken_windows/ |title=Breakthrough on 'broken windows' |access-date=2009-02-20 |work=The Boston Globe |first=Carolyn Y |last=Johnson |date=2009-02-08 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090211072903/http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/02/08/breakthrough_on_broken_windows/ |archive-date=2009-02-11}}</ref>

===Netherlands===
In 2007 and 2008, Kees Keizer and colleagues from the [[University of Groningen]] conducted a series of controlled experiments to determine if the effect of existing visible disorder (such as litter or graffiti) increased other crime such as theft, littering, or other [[antisocial behavior]]. They selected several urban locations, which they arranged in two different ways, at different times. In each experiment, there was a "disorder" condition in which violations of social norms as prescribed by signage or national custom, such as graffiti and littering, were clearly visible as well as a control condition where no violations of norms had taken place. The researchers then secretly monitored the locations to observe if people behaved differently when the environment was "disordered". Their observations supported the theory. The conclusion was published in the journal [[Science (journal)|''Science'']]: "One example of disorder, like graffiti or littering, can indeed encourage another, like stealing."<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1126/science.1161405 |last1=Keizer |first1=K |last2=Lindenberg |first2=S |last3=Steg |first3=L |s2cid=7881039 |title=The Spreading of Disorder |journal=Science |volume=322 |issue=5908 |pages=1681–1685 |year=2008 |pmid=19023045 |url=https://pure.rug.nl/ws/files/10429297/KeizerK-Spreading-2008.pdf |bibcode=2008Sci...322.1681K |access-date=2019-08-16 |archive-date=2019-04-29 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190429002522/https://pure.rug.nl/ws/files/10429297/KeizerK-Spreading-2008.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.economist.com/science/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12630201 |title=Can the can |access-date=2008-11-24 |newspaper=The Economist |date=2008-11-20 |archive-date=2008-12-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081202013436/http://www.economist.com/science/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12630201 |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Mexico City ===
An 18-month study by Carlos Vilalta in Mexico City showed that framework of Broken Windows Theory on homicide in suburban neighborhoods was not a direct correlation, but a "concentrated disadvantage" in the perception of fear and modes of crime prevention.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Vilalta |first1=Carlos J. |last2=Lopez |first2=Pablo |last3=Fondevila |first3=Gustavo |last4=Siordia |first4=Oscar |date=23 December 2019 |title=Testing Broken Windows Theory in Mexico City |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ssqu.12760 |journal=Social Science Quarterly |language=en |volume=101 |issue=2 |pages=558–572 |doi=10.1111/ssqu.12760 |s2cid=213569444 |issn=0038-4941|url-access=subscription }}</ref> In areas with more social disorder (such as public intoxication), an increased perception of law-abiding citizens to feel unsafe amplified the impact of homicide occurring in the neighborhood. It was also found that it was more effective in preventing instances of violent crime among people living in areas with less physical structural decay (such as [[graffiti]]), lending credence to the Broken Windows Theory basis that law enforcement is trusted more among those in areas with less disorder.

Furthering this data, a 2023 study conducted by Ricardo Massa on residency near clandestine [[Landfill|dumpsites]] associated economic disenfranchisement with high physical disorder.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Massa |first1=Ricardo |last2=Fondevila |first2=Gustavo |last3=Gutiérrez-Meave |first3=Raúl |last4=Bonilla Alguera |first4=Gerardo |date=2023-07-21 |title=Clandestine Dumpsites and Crime in Mexico City: Revisiting the Broken Windows Theory |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00111287231186083 |journal=Crime & Delinquency |language=en |doi=10.1177/00111287231186083 |s2cid=260071521 |issn=0011-1287|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The neighborhoods that had high concentrations of landfill waste were correlated with crimes (such as vehicle theft and robbery), and most significantly crimes related to property. In a space where property damage and neglect is normalized, a person's response to this type of environment can also greatly be affected by their perception of their surroundings. It was also concluded that non-residents of these high-concentration areas tended to fear and avoid these locations, seeing as there was typically less surveillance and lack of community efficacy surrounding clandestine dumpsites. However, despite this fear, Massa also notes that, in this case, individual targets for crime (such as homicide or rape) were unlikely compared to the vandalism of public and private property.