Editing Cairo Conference (section)

=== November 23 ===
On Tuesday, November 23, the conference officially began.<ref name=":6"/> Chiang, together with Soong and the other Chinese generals, paid an early morning visit to Roosevelt. He then met with the president's representative Patrick Hurley to discuss the Tehran Conference and other issues. At 11:00&nbsp;a.m., the preliminary session was held with Chiang, Roosevelt, Churchill, and the three men's aides. It was here that Chiang insisted on "strong and powerful naval operations" and that "Burma is the key to the entire Asian campaign." That afternoon, a meeting of the British and American Joint Chiefs of Staff was held to discuss plans for an offensive on Burma. Chiang eventually decided not to attend that meeting and was represented by his generals. He arrived at 3:30&nbsp;p.m. the British and American officials had believed that the Chinese would show up only while the Chiefs of Staff were discussing issues of interest to them. Marshall criticised Chiang for being too keen to acquire US transports. However, he could neither guarantee a stronger ground force, which prevented Chinese troops from being trained at Langga in India, nor agree to equip the army in Yunnan. Stilwell presented a memorandum proposing alternative actions: aid northern Burma; fight for overland lines of communication to China; train and increase the combat power of the Chinese Army; intensify bombing of Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines; prevent Japanese control of the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea; and recover Canton and Hong Kong. He suggested increasing the strength of three Army divisions, moving US troops in India to China after the occupation of northern Burma, and attacking Shanghai and Taiwan if necessary.<ref name=":7"/>

[[File:Chindit column, Operation Longcloth.jpg|alt=British Chindit Special Forces carrying their weapons and gears advance on a river in Burma.|thumb|British Chindit Special Forces Advancing in Burma]]
At the conference, Commander-in-Chief of the Southeast Asia Command Lord Louis Mountbatten presented an outline of a land campaign for Burma<ref name=":2"/> by proposing three plans of action: Operation Tarzan, an attack on Burma by British and Chinese forces; Operation Musket, the capture of Cape Sumatra; and Operation Buccaneer, an amphibious operation to seize the Andaman Islands located 300 miles south of Rangoon in the Bay of Bengal since the Andaman Islands would threaten Japanese Burma, Thailand, and Malaya and cut off the Japanese supply lines. Of the three options, Churchill was particularly fond of Operation Musket<ref name=":1"/> since he hoped to send troops to Achab Island and seize Sumatra in an attempt to recapture Singapore.<ref name=":8"/>

Operation Tarzan called for four Indian divisions of the British [[Fourteenth Army (United Kingdom)|Fourteenth Army]]'s [[XV Corps (United Kingdom)|XV Corps]] to concentrate their men in Chittagong and cross the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line in mid-January and, the following year, to capture the Burmese coast in order to defend Chittagong and occupy Sittwe on the Burmese coast. Three divisions of [[IV Corps (United Kingdom)|IV Corps]], assembled at Imphal, would then move east with the objective of destroying Japanese lines of communication<ref name=":1"/> and advancing to Arak and various parts of Sidon in northern Burma.<ref name=":2"/> In March, the British long-range infiltration force "Chindit" Special Forces would be parachuted into Burma, behind the Japanese lines. The Chinese Expeditionary Force (CEF) in India would cross the Ho Kang Valley and advance eastward into Myitkyina. The Chindit special forces would then support the Chinese forces and occupy Bhamo in April, while the Yunnan Army would begin operations on 15 March and advance to Lashio in April to join the British forces at Lashio and Bhamo. In the Bay of Bengal, a massive amphibious offensive would be launched, with 3,000 British and American long-range infiltration troops participating.<ref name=":1"/>

Lord Mountbatten pointed out that overland communications to China depended on the army in Yunnan operating in conjunction with the British. Stilwell, on the other hand, was optimistic and insisted that they could compensate for the Chinese Army's personnel shortage.<ref name=":7"/> The Chinese generals present did not comment on Mountbatten's plans but repeatedly stressed the need to plan for an early counteroffensive against the Japanese in Burma and the reopening of Chinese supply lines.<ref name=":2"/> Chiang believed that any offensive on land should be timed with naval operations, because the Japanese were very motivated to defend and reinforce their important position in Burma and would also benefit from the new infrastructure and supply lines that they had been building. The British, however, believed that land and naval operations could run separately from each other, citing the long distances separating inland Burma from its seas and the time it would take for the British Navy to prepare due to its existing engagements in the Atlantic.<ref>{{cite book |author=U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Historical Office |date=1961 |title=Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943 |url=https://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/DFRXSHIYSKS2S8Z |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=United States Government Printing Office}}</ref>

That evening, Roosevelt held a banquet for Chiang and Soong. The two spoke of the establishment of a coalition government in China as well as issues such as British interests in Shanghai and Canton, the use of American warships rather than British warships in subsequent military operations, and the future status of Malaya, Burma, and India.<ref name=":7"/>