Editing Channel Dash (section)

===={{lang|de|Unternehmen Donnerkeil}}====

{{see also|Operation Donnerkeil}}

Hans Jeschonnek, {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} chief of staff, refused to guarantee the success of Cerberus or to reinforce the fighter forces in the west. [[Adolf Galland]] was given command of the air operation, to be called {{lang|de|Unternehmen Donnerkeil}} (Operation Thunderbolt).{{sfn|Hooton|1994|p=114}} Details of the plan were arranged with {{lang|de|[[Oberst]]}} ([[Colonel]]) [[Karl Koller (general)|Karl Koller]], chief of staff of {{lang|de|[[Luftflotte 3]]}} (Air Fleet 3 {{lang|de|[[Generalfeldmarschall]]}} [[Hugo Sperrle]]).{{sfn|Hooton|2010|p=121}} Some training units were mobilised to make up for the bulk of the {{lang|de|[[Jagdwaffe]]}} being absent in the [[Soviet Union]]. The {{lang|de|Funkhorchdienst}} (signals intelligence service, General [[Wolfgang Martini]]) attempted to jam British radio-telephone frequencies by using a technique to increase atmospheric interference and reduced the performance of British coastal radars by slowly increasing their jamming. [[Dornier Do 217]]s of {{lang|de|[[Kampfgeschwader 2]]}} (Bomber Wing 2) were to fly electronic deception sorties over the western Channel to divert British aircraft. {{lang|de|[[9th Air Corps (Germany)|Fliegerkorps IX]]}} ({{lang|de|[[General der Flieger]]}} [Air Force General] [[Joachim Coeler]]) prepared to bomb RAF bases in south-western England and to attack British naval forces attempting to intercept the Brest Group. [[Aufklärungsgruppe 123|''Fernaufklärungsgruppe'' 123]] (Long-range Reconnaissance Wing 123) was to keep watch on both ends of the Channel and support {{lang|de|Fliegerkorps IX}}.{{sfn|Hooton|1994|pp=114–115}}

The convoy route was divided into three sectors using the {{lang|de|Jafü}} (Fighter Sector) boundaries but to ensure local control [[Max Ibel]], the former commander of {{lang|de|[[Jagdgeschwader 27]]}} (Fighter Group 27) was appointed {{lang|de|Jagdfliegerführer Schiff}} ({{lang|de|Jafü Schiff}}, Fighter Controller: Ship) and embarked on ''Scharnhorst'' as a signals officer to communicate with {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} units during the operation. Eight rehearsals, involving around {{nowrap|450 sorties,}} were made from 22 January to 10 February. The {{lang|de|[[Jagdgeschwader]]}} (day fighter wings) and the night fighters of {{lang|de|[[Nachtjagdgeschwader 1]]}} (Night Fighter Wing 1), were swiftly to prepare aircraft for the next sortie by rearming and refuelling in no more than thirty minutes.{{sfn|Hooton|1994|pp=114–115}} Galland decided that the aircraft should fly high and low cover, the low groups flying under British coastal radar. A standing patrol of least {{nowrap|16 fighters}} was to be maintained, in two formations of eight aircraft for their patrol altitudes, with each formation in two {{lang|de|Schwärme}} of four aircraft. One {{lang|de|Schwarm}} was to fly out to sea and one towards land in a zigzag and all {{lang|de|Schwärme}} were to fly back and forth along the line of ships in wide figures of eight, in radio silence. Every sortie was timed to allow the fighters {{nowrap|30 minutes}} over the ships, just enough time for relieved units to refuel, rearm and return. During {{lang|de|Donnerkeil}}, the relieving sortie arrived after only 20 minutes which meant that fighter cover for half the dash would be {{nowrap|32 fighters.}}{{sfn|Weal|1996|p=16}}