Editing Counterintelligence (section)

=== Counterintelligence force protection source operations ===
Attacks against military, diplomatic, and related facilities are a very real threat, as demonstrated by the 1983 attacks against French and US peacekeepers in Beirut, the 1996 attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, 1998 attacks on Colombian bases and on U.S. embassies (and local buildings) in Kenya and Tanzania the 2000 attack on the ''USS Cole'', and many others. The U.S. military force protection measures are the set of actions taken against military personnel and family members, resources, facilities and critical information, and most countries have a similar doctrine for protecting those facilities and conserving the potential of the forces. Force protection is defined to be a defense against deliberate attack, not accidents or natural disasters.

Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO) are human source operations, normally clandestine in nature, conducted abroad that are intended to fill the existing gap in national level coverage, as well as satisfying the combatant commander's intelligence requirements.<ref name=FM34-60>{{cite web
 | author = US Department of the Army
 | title = Field Manual 34–60: Counterintelligence
 | date = 1995-10-03
 | url = https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-60/
 | access-date = 2007-11-04
}}</ref> Military police and other patrols that mingle with local people may indeed be valuable HUMINT sources for counterintelligence awareness, but are not themselves likely to be CFSOs. Gleghorn distinguishes between the protection of national intelligence services, and the intelligence needed to provide combatant commands with the information they need for force protection. There are other HUMINT sources, such as military reconnaissance patrols that avoid mixing with foreign personnel, that indeed may provide HUMINT, but not HUMINT especially relevant to counterintelligence.<ref name=Gleghorn>{{cite web
 | last = Gleghorn
 | first = Todd E.
 | title = Exposing the Seams: the Impetus for Reforming US Counterintelligence
 |date=September 2003
 | url = http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/nsa/publicationsandresearch/studenttheses/theses/gleghorn03.pdf
 | access-date = 2007-11-02
}}</ref> Active countermeasures, whether for force protection, protection of intelligence services, or protection of national security interests, are apt to involve [[HUMINT#Basic HUMINT operations|HUMINT disciplines]], for the purpose of detecting FIS agents, involving screening and debriefing of non-tasked human sources, also called casual or incidental sources. such as:
* walk-ins and write-ins (individuals who volunteer information)
* unwitting sources (any individual providing useful information to counterintelligence, who in the process of divulging such information may not know they are aiding an investigation)
* defectors and enemy prisoners of war (EPW)
* refugee populations and expatriates
* interviewees (individuals contacted in the course of an investigation)
* official liaison sources.

{{blockquote|Physical security is important, but it does not override the role of force protection intelligence... Although all intelligence disciplines can be used to gather force protection intelligence, HUMINT collected by intelligence and CI agencies plays a key role in providing indications and warning of terrorist and other force protection threats.<ref>{{cite web
 |last=US Department of Defense 
 |author-link=United States Department of Defense 
 |title=Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
 |date=2007-07-12 
 |url=http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf 
 |access-date=2007-10-01 
 |url-status=dead 
 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081123014953/http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf 
 |archive-date=2008-11-23 
}}</ref>}}

Force protection, for forces deployed in host countries, occupation duty, and even at home, may not be supported sufficiently by a national-level counterterrorism organization alone. In a country, colocating FPCI personnel, of all services, with military assistance and advisory units, allows agents to build relationships with host nation law enforcement and intelligence agencies, get to know the local environments, and improve their language skills. FPCI needs a legal domestic capability to deal with domestic terrorism threats.

As an example of terrorist planning cycles, the [[Khobar Towers]] attack shows the need for long-term FPCI. "The Hizballah operatives believed to have conducted this attack began intelligence collection and planning activities in 1993. They recognized American military personnel were billeted at Khobar Towers in the fall of 1994 and began surveillance of the facility, and continued to plan, in June 1995. In March 1996, Saudi Arabian border guards arrested a Hizballah member attempting plastic explosive into the country, leading to the arrest of two more Hizballah members. Hizballah leaders recruited replacements for those arrested, and continued planning for the attack."<ref>{{Cite web
  | last = Imbus
  | first = Michael T
  | title = Identifying Threats: Improving Intelligence and Counterintelligence Support to Force Protection
  | date = April 2002
  | id = USAFCSC-Imbus-2002
  | url = http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/02-059.pdf
  | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20040302065734/http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/02-059.pdf
  | url-status = dead
  | archive-date = March 2, 2004
  | access-date = 2007-11-03
  }}</ref>