Editing Deconstruction (section)

=== {{Lang|fr|Différance}} ===
{{Main|Différance}}
{{Lang|fr|Différance}} is the observation that the meanings of words come from their [[Synchrony and diachrony|synchrony]] with other words within the language and their [[Synchrony and diachrony|diachrony]] between contemporary and historical definitions of a word. Understanding language, according to Derrida, requires an understanding of both viewpoints of linguistic analysis. The focus on diachrony has led to accusations against Derrida of engaging in the [[etymological fallacy]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Soskice|first1=Janet Martin|title=Metaphor and Religious Language|date=1987|publisher=Clarendon|location=Oxford|isbn=9780198249825|pages=[https://archive.org/details/metaphorreligiou0000sosk/page/80 80–82]|edition=Paperback|url=https://archive.org/details/metaphorreligiou0000sosk/page/80}}</ref>

There is one statement by Derrida—in an essay on [[Jean-Jacques Rousseau|Rousseau]] in ''[[Of Grammatology]]''—which has been of great interest to his opponents.<ref name="Derrida"/>{{rp|158}} It is the assertion that "there is no outside-text" ({{Lang|fr|il n'y a pas de hors-texte}}),<ref name="Derrida"/>{{rp|158–59, 163}} which is often mistranslated as "there is nothing outside of the text". The mistranslation is often used to suggest Derrida believes that nothing exists but words. [[Michel Foucault]], for instance, famously misattributed to Derrida the very different phrase {{Lang|fr|Il n'y a rien en dehors du texte}} for this purpose.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Foucault|first1=Michel|last2=Howard|first2=Richard|last3=Cooper|first3=David|title=Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason|date=2001|publisher=Routledge|location=London|isbn=978-0415253857|page=602|edition=Reprint}}</ref> According to Derrida, his statement simply refers to the unavoidability of context that is at the heart of {{Lang|fr|différance}}.<ref name="Limited">{{cite book|last1=Derrida|first1=Jacques|title=Limited Inc|date=1995|publisher=Northwestern University Press|location=Evanston|isbn=978-0810107885|edition=4th|title-link=Limited Inc}}</ref>{{rp|133}}

For example, the word ''house'' derives its meaning more as a function of how it differs from ''shed'', ''mansion'', ''hotel'', ''building'', etc. (form of content, which [[Louis Hjelmslev]] distinguished from form of expression) than how the word ''house'' may be tied to a certain image of a traditional house (i.e., the relationship between [[signified and signifier]]), with each term being established in reciprocal determination with the other terms than by an ostensive description or definition: when can one talk about a ''house'' or a ''mansion'' or a ''shed''? The same can be said about verbs in all languages: when should one stop saying ''walk'' and start saying ''run''? The same happens, of course, with adjectives: when must one stop saying ''yellow'' and start saying ''orange'', or exchange ''past'' for ''present''? Not only are the topological differences between the words relevant here, but the differentials between what is signified is also covered by {{Lang|fr|différance}}.

Thus, complete meaning is always "differential" and ''postponed'' in language; there is never a moment when meaning is complete and total. A simple example would consist of looking up a given word in a dictionary, then proceeding to look up the words found in that word's definition, etc., also comparing with older dictionaries. Such a process would never end.