Editing Dictator game (section)

== The effect of anonymity ==
Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) examined how anonymity affects giving by conducting two versions of the dictator game:

# In one version, dictators sat next to each other and publicly circled the amount they chose to give. Payments were also made in front of everyone.
# In another version, the decision was made in a private room.

The results showed that public payments decreased the average level of giving.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Dufwenberg |first1=Martin |last2=Muren |first2=Astri |date=2006-09-01 |title=Generosity, anonymity, gender |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0167268105001599 |journal=Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |volume=61 |issue=1 |pages=42–49 |doi=10.1016/j.jebo.2004.11.007 |issn=0167-2681|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Similarly, Charness and Gneezy (2008) compared a completely anonymous dictator game (where neither party knew each other’s identity) to one where each dictator knew the recipient's last name. Removing full anonymity increased giving from 18.3% to 27.2%.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Charness |first1=Gary |last2=Gneezy |first2=Uri |date=2008-10-01 |title=What's in a name? Anonymity and social distance in dictator and ultimatum games |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0167268108000437 |journal=Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |volume=68 |issue=1 |pages=29–35 |doi=10.1016/j.jebo.2008.03.001 |issn=0167-2681}}</ref> Bechler et al. (2015) found that this effect persisted even when the available sum was increased.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Bechler |first1=Christopher |last2=Green |first2=Leonard |last3=Myerson |first3=Joel |date=2015-06-01 |title=Proportion offered in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games decreases with amount and social distance |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0376635715001011 |journal=Behavioural Processes |volume=115 |pages=149–155 |doi=10.1016/j.beproc.2015.04.003 |pmid=25862989 |issn=0376-6357|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Goeree et al. (2010) conducted a study mapping students' social networks in a [[California]] high school. He finds that the closer the social ties between the dictator and the recipient, the higher the level of giving.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Goeree |first1=Jacob K. |last2=McConnell |first2=Margaret A. |last3=Mitchell |first3=Tiffany |last4=Tromp |first4=Tracey |last5=Yariv |first5=Leeat |date=February 2010 |title=The 1/d Law of Giving |url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.2.1.183 |journal=American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |language=en |volume=2 |issue=1 |pages=183–203 |doi=10.1257/mic.2.1.183 |issn=1945-7669}}</ref>

Andreoni and Rao (2011) found that giving increased significantly when the recipient could directly ask the dictator for a donation.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Andreoni |first1=James |last2=Rao |first2=Justin M. |date=2011-08-01 |title=The power of asking: How communication affects selfishness, empathy, and altruism |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S004727271100003X |journal=Journal of Public Economics |volume=95 |issue=7 |pages=513–520 |doi=10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.12.008 |issn=0047-2727|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Engel’s (2011) meta-analysis of 20,813 observations showed that familiarity increased giving by an average of 0.658 percentage points.<ref name="Engel-2011" /> 

To control for the possibility that participants might give more out of shame in front of the experimenter, Hoffman et al. (1994) conducted an experiment where even the experimenter did not know who the dictator was and who the recipient was.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Hoffman |first1=Elizabeth |last2=McCabe |first2=Kevin |last3=Shachat |first3=Keith |last4=Smith |first4=Vernon |date=1994-11-01 |title=Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0899825684710566 |journal=Games and Economic Behavior |volume=7 |issue=3 |pages=346–380 |doi=10.1006/game.1994.1056 |hdl=10535/5743 |issn=0899-8256|hdl-access=free }}</ref> In this setup, the number of participants choosing to keep all the money significantly increased. In a follow-up study (Hoffman et al., 1996), the researchers manipulated anonymity levels and found that giving decreased as anonymity increased.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Hoffman |first1=Elizabeth |last2=McCabe |first2=Kevin |last3=Smith |first3=Vernon L. |date=1996 |title=Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118218 |journal=The American Economic Review |volume=86 |issue=3 |pages=653–660 |jstor=2118218 |issn=0002-8282}}</ref>