Editing Divine command theory (section)

==Objections==
===Semantic objections===
Philosopher William Wainwright considered a challenge to the theory on semantic grounds, arguing that "being commanded by God" and "being obligatory" do not mean the same thing, contrary to what the theory suggests. He used the example of water not having an identical meaning to {{H2O}} to propose that "being commanded by God" does not have an identical meaning to "being obligatory". This was not an objection to the truth of divine command theory, but Wainwright believed it demonstrated that the theory should not be used to formulate assertions about the meaning of obligation.<ref>{{harvnb|Wainwright|2005|p=106}}</ref> Wainwright also noted that divine command theory might imply that one can only have moral knowledge if one has knowledge of God; Edward Wierenga argued that, if this is the case, the theory seems to deny atheists and agnostics moral knowledge.<ref>{{harvnb|Wainwright|2005|pp=106–107}}</ref> Hugh Storer Chandler has challenged the theory based on [[modal logic|modal]] ideas of what might exist in different worlds. He suggested that, even if one accepts that being commanded by God and being morally right are the same, they may not be synonyms because they might be different in other possible worlds.<ref>{{harvnb|Chandler|2007|p=185}}</ref>

===Moral motivation===
Michael Austin has noted that divine command theory could be criticised for prompting people to be moral with impure motivations. He writes of the objection that a moral life should be sought because morality is valued, rather than to avoid punishment or receive a reward. This punishment and reward system of motivation could be seen as inadequate.<ref name=austin />

===Euthyphro dilemma===
{{Main|Euthyphro dilemma}}
[[File:Plato Silanion Musei Capitolini MC1377.jpg|thumb|Plato presents the Euthyphro dilemma in one of his dialogues.]]

The [[Euthyphro dilemma]] was proposed in [[Plato|Plato's]] dialogue between [[Socrates]] and [[Euthyphro]]. In the scene, Socrates and Euthyphro are discussing the nature of [[piety]] when Socrates presents the dilemma, which can be presented as the question "Is X good because God commands it, or does God command X because it is good?".<ref name=austin/>

{{Quote|Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?|Plato|Euthyphro<ref name=austin/>}}

The Euthyphro dilemma can elicit the response that an action is good because God commands the action, or that God commands an action because it is good. If the first is chosen, it would imply that whatever God commands must be good: even if he commanded someone to inflict suffering, then inflicting suffering must be moral. If the latter is chosen, then morality is no longer dependent on God, defeating the divine command theory. Additionally, if God is subject to an external law, he is not sovereign or [[omnipotent]], which would challenge the orthodox conception of God. Proponents of the Euthyphro dilemma might claim that divine command theory is obviously wrong because either answer challenges the ability of God to give moral laws.<ref name=austin/>

[[William of Ockham]] responded to the Euthyphro Dilemma by '[[bite the bullet|biting the bullet]]'. He argued that, if God did command people to be cruel, then that would be morally obligatory, proposing that the only limitation to what God can make obligatory is the [[principle of non-contradiction]].<ref>{{cite book | title=Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Thought: From Gratian to Aquinas | publisher=Cambridge University Press | author=Dougherty, M. V. | year=2011 | pages=163–164 | isbn=978-1-107-00707-9}}</ref> [[Robert Merrihew Adams|Robert Adams]] defended Ockham's view, noting that it is only a logical possibility that God would command what mankind considers to be immoral, not an actuality. Even if God could logically command these actions, he would not because that is not his character.<ref name=austin/> Eleonore Stump and [[Norman Kretzmann]] have responded to the Euthyphro dilemma by appealing to the doctrine of [[divine simplicity]], a concept associated with Aquinas and [[Aristotle]] which suggests that the substance and attributes of God are identical. They propose that God and goodness are identical and that this is what makes his commands good.<ref>{{cite book | title=God, Goodness and Philosophy | publisher=Ashgate Publishing | author=Harris, Harriet | year=2011 | pages=101 | isbn=978-1-4094-2852-7}}</ref>

American philosopher [[William Alston]] responded to the [[Euthyphro dilemma]] by considering what it means for God to be morally good. If divine command theory is accepted, it implies that God is good because he obeys his own commands; Alston argued that this is not the case and that God's goodness is distinct from abiding by moral obligations. He suggested that a moral obligation implies that there is some possibility that the agent may not honour their obligation; Alston argued that this possibility does not exist for God, so his morality must be distinct from simply obeying his own commands. Alston contended that God is the supreme standard of morality and acts according to his character, which is necessarily good. There is no more arbitrariness in this view than accepting another moral standard.<ref name=austin/>

===Omnibenevolence===
[[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]], and some more recent philosophers,{{who|date=April 2022}} challenged the theory of divine command because it seems to entail that God's goodness consists of his following his own commands. It is argued that, if divine command theory is accepted, God's obligations would be what he commanded himself to do; the concept of God commanding himself is seen as incoherent. Neither could God hold any virtues, as a virtue would be the disposition to follow his own commands – if he cannot logically command himself, then he cannot logically have any virtues. Edward Wierenga counters this by claiming that whatever God chooses to do is good, but that his nature means that his actions would always be praiseworthy. William Wainwright argues that, although God does not act because of his commands, it is still logical to say that God has reasons for his actions. He proposes that God is motivated by what is morally good and, when he commands what is morally good, it becomes morally obligatory.<ref name=austin>{{cite web | url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/divine-c | title=Divine Command Theory | publisher=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date=21 August 2006 | access-date=18 August 2012 | last=Austin |first= Michael W.}}</ref>

===Autonomy===
Michael Austin draws attention to an objection from autonomy, which argues that morality requires an agent to freely choose which principles they live by. This challenges the view of divine command theory that God's will determines what is good because humans are no longer autonomous, but followers of an imposed moral law, making autonomy incompatible with divine command theory. Robert Adams challenges this criticism, arguing that humans must still choose to accept or reject God's commands and rely on their independent judgement about whether or not to follow them.<ref name=austin/>

===Pluralism===
Austin considers the view that, in a world of [[religious pluralism]], it is impossible to know which god's or religion's commands should be followed, especially because some religions contradict others, leaving it impossible to accept all of them. Within religions there are also various interpretations of what is commanded. Austin notes that some of the responses to the autonomy objection may be relevant, as an agent must choose whichever [[religion and morality]] they judge to be correct. He argues that divine command theory is also consistent with the view that [[Ethics in religion|moral truths can be found in all religions]] and that moral revelation can be found [[Morality without religion|apart from religion]].<ref name=austin/> Heimir Geirsson and Margaret Holmgren argue against the view that different religions can lead to the same God because some religions are incompatible with each other (monotheistic and polytheistic religions have contrasting views of divinity, for example, and some Greek or Norse gods magnified human weaknesses). They argue that determining which god should be listened to remains a problem and that, even within a religion, contrasting views of God exist – the commands of God in the [[Old Testament|Old]] and [[New Testament]]s could seem to contradict each other.<ref>{{harvnb|Geirsson|Holmgren|2010|pp=37–38}}</ref>