Editing Existence (section)

== Modes and degrees of existence ==
Closely related to the problem of different types of entities is the question of whether their modes of existence also vary. This is the case according to ontological pluralism, which states entities belonging to different types differ in both their essential features and in the ways they exist.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §3. How Many Ways of Being Existent?}} |2={{harvnb|McDaniel|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8F0vDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT89 77]}} }}</ref> This position is sometimes found in theology; it states God is radically different from his creation and emphasizes his uniqueness by saying the difference affects both God's features and God's mode of existence.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §3. How Many Ways of Being Existent?}} |2={{harvnb|McDaniel|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8F0vDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT17 5–6]}} }}</ref>

Another form of ontological pluralism distinguishes the existence of material objects from the existence of [[space-time]]. According to this view, material objects have relative existence because they exist in space-time; the existence of space-time itself is not relative in this sense because it just exists without existing within another space-time.<ref>{{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§3. How Many Ways of Being Existent?}}</ref>

The topic of degrees of existence is closely related to the problem of modes of existence. This topic is based on the idea that some entities exist to a higher degree or have more being than other entities, similar to the way some properties, such as heat and mass, have degrees. According to philosopher Plato (428/427–348/347 BCE), for example, unchangeable [[Platonic form]]s have a higher degree of existence than physical objects.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Daly|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Bt99AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA227 227–228]}} |2={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2023}} }}</ref>

The view that there are different types of entities is common in metaphysics but the idea that they differ from each other in their modes or degrees of existence is often rejected, implying that a thing either exists or does not exist without in-between alternatives.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§3. How Many Ways of Being Existent?}} |2={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=5–8}} }}</ref> Metaphysician [[Peter van Inwagen]] (1942–present) uses the idea that there is an intimate relationship between existence and quantification to argue against different modes of existence. [[Quantification (science)|Quantification]] is related to the counting of objects; according to Inwagen, if there were different modes of entities, people would need different types of numbers to count them. Because the same numbers can be used to count different types of entities, he concludes all entities have the same mode of existence.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§3. How Many Ways of Being Existent?}} |2={{harvnb|Berto|Plebani|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Jy3bBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA60 60]}} }}</ref>