Editing Experience (section)

== Types of experience ==
=== Perception ===
[[Perception|Perceptual experience]] refers to "an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us".<ref name="Crane1">{{cite web |last1=Crane |first1=Tim |last2=French |first2=Craig |title=The Problem of Perception: 1. Our Ordinary Conception of Perceptual Experience |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/#OrdConPerExp |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Silins |first1=Nicholas |title=Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Justification |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-justification/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=13 October 2021 |date=2019}}</ref> This [[Mental representation|representation]] of the [[World#Philosophy of mind|external world]] happens through stimuli registered and transmitted by the senses.<ref name="Hirst">{{cite web |last1=Hirst |first1=R. |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Perception |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/psychology/psychology-and-psychiatry/perception}}</ref> Perceptual experience occurs in different modalities corresponding to the different senses, e.g. as [[visual perception]], [[auditory perception]] or [[haptic perception]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Stokes |first1=Dustin |last2=Matthen |first2=Mohan |last3=Biggs |first3=Stephen |title=Perception and Its Modalities |date=2014 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BIGPAI |chapter=Sorting the senses}}</ref> It is usually held that the objects perceived this way are ''ordinary material objects'', like stones, flowers, cats or airplanes that are presented as public objects existing independent of the mind perceiving them.<ref name="Hirst"/><ref name="Crane1"/> This stands in contrast, for example, to how objects are presented in imaginative experience. Another feature commonly ascribed to perceptual experience is that it seems to put us into ''direct touch'' with the object it presents. So the perceiver is normally not aware of the cognitive processes starting with the stimulation of the sense organs, continuing in the transmission of this information to the brain and ending in the information processing happening there.<ref name="Hirst"/><ref name="Crane1"/> While perception is usually a reliable source of information for the practical matters of our everyday affairs, it can also include ''false information'' in the form of [[illusion]] and [[hallucination]].<ref name="Hirst"/><ref name="Crane1"/> In some cases, the unreliability of a perception is already indicated within the experience itself, for example, when the perceiver fails to identify an object due to blurry vision.<ref name="Hirst"/> But such indications are not found in all misleading experiences, which may appear just as reliable as their accurate counterparts.<ref name="Crane1"/>

This is the source of the so-called "problem of perception". It consists in the fact that the features ascribed to perception so far seem to be incompatible with each other, making the so-characterized perception impossible: in the case of misleading perceptions, the perceiver may be presented with objects that do not exist, which would be impossible if they were in direct touch with the presented objects.<ref name="Crane1"/> Different solutions to this problem have been suggested. [[Sense datum theory|Sense datum theories]], for example, hold that we perceive sense data, like patches of color in visual perception, which do exist even in illusions.<ref name="Coates">{{cite web |last1=Coates |first1=Paul |title=Sense-Data |url=https://iep.utm.edu/sense-da/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 October 2021}}</ref> They thereby deny that ordinary material things are the objects of perception.<ref name="Crane3"/> [[Disjunctivism|Disjunctivists]], on the other hand, try to solve the problem by denying that veridical perceptions and illusions belong to the same kind of experience.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Fish |first1=William |title=Disjunctivism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/disjunct/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 October 2021}}</ref> Other approaches include adverbialism and intentionalism.<ref name="Crane3">{{cite web |last1=Crane |first1=Tim |last2=French |first2=Craig |title=The Problem of Perception: 3. Theories of Experience |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/#TheExp |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref name="Coates"/> The problem with these different approaches is that neither of them is fully satisfying since each one seems to contradict some kind of introspective evidence concerning the fundamental features of perceptual experience.<ref name="Hirst"/><ref name="Crane3"/>

=== Episodic memory and imagination ===
The experience of [[episodic memory]] consists in a form of reliving a past event one experienced before.<ref name="Perrin"/><ref name="Gardiner">{{cite journal |last1=Gardiner |first1=J. M. |title=Episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness: a first-person approach |journal=Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences |date=29 September 2001 |volume=356 |issue=1413 |pages=1351–1361 |doi=10.1098/rstb.2001.0955 |pmid=11571027 |pmc=1088519 |issn=0962-8436}}</ref><ref name="Michaelian3">{{cite web |last1=Michaelian |first1=Kourken |last2=Sutton |first2=John |title=Memory: 3. Episodicity |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/memory/#Epis |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 October 2021 |date=2017}}</ref> This is different from [[semantic memory]], in which one has access to the knowledge of various facts concerning the event in question without any experiential component associated with this knowledge.<ref name="Michaelian3"/> In episodic memory, on the other hand, the past event is consciously re-experienced.<ref name="Perrin">{{cite journal |last1=Perrin |first1=Denis |last2=Michaelian |first2=Kourken |last3=Sant’Anna |first3=André |title=The Phenomenology of Remembering Is an Epistemic Feeling |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=2020 |volume=11 |pages=1531 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01531 |pmid=32719642 |pmc=7350950 |issn=1664-1078|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Gardiner"/> In this sense, it is a form of mental time travel that is not present in non-episodic memory.<ref name="Michaelian3"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Tulving |first1=Endel |title=Learning and Memory: Episodic Memory |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/psychology/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/episodic-memory}}</ref> But this re-experiencing is not an exact copy of the original experience since the experienced event is presented as something in the past seen from one's current perspective, which is associated with some kind of feeling of pastness or familiarity not present in the original experience.<ref name="Perrin"/><ref name="Michaelian3"/> In this context, it is often held that episodic memory provides two types of information: first-order information about the past event and second-order information about the role of this event in the subject's current memory.<ref name="Michaelian3"/> Episodic memory is different from merely imagining the experience of a past event. An important aspect of this difference is that it is part of the nature of episodic memory to try to represent how the original experience was, even if it sometimes fails to do so. Other suggested differences include the degree of vividness and the causal connection between the original experience and the episodic memory.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Michaelian |first1=Kourken |last2=Sutton |first2=John |title=Memory: 4. Mnemicity |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/memory/#Mnem |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 October 2021 |date=2017}}</ref>

[[Imagination|Imaginative]] experience involves a special form of representation in which objects are presented without aiming to show how things actually are.<ref name="Liao">{{cite web |last1=Liao |first1=Shen-yi |last2=Gendler |first2=Tamar |title=Imagination |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/imagination/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=3 October 2021 |date=2020}}</ref> Like memory and unlike perception, the associated mental images are normally not caused by the stimulation of sensory organs.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Russell |first1=Bertrand |title=Sensation and Imagination |journal=The Monist |date=1915 |volume=25 |issue=1 |pages=28–44 |doi=10.5840/monist191525136 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/RUSSAI|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name="Manser">{{cite web |last1=Manser |first1=A. R. |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Imagination |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/psychology/psychology-and-psychiatry/imagination |access-date=3 October 2021}}</ref> It is often held that both imagination and memory depend on previous perceptual acquaintance with the experienced contents.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Neville |first1=Robert Cummings |title=Encyclopedia of Science and Religion: Imagination |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/psychology/psychology-and-psychiatry/imagination |access-date=3 October 2021}}</ref> But unlike memory, more freedom is involved in most forms of imagination since the subject can freely vary, change and recombine various of the experienced contents while memory aims to preserve their original order.<ref name="Manser"/> Different theorists focus on different elements when trying to conceptualize the nature of imagination. The  impoverishment view holds that imagination is distinguished from perception and memory by being less vivid and clear. The will-dependence view, on the other hand, centers on the power of the will to actively shape the contents of imagination whereas the nonexistence view focuses on the impression of unreality or distance from reality belonging to imaginative experience.<ref name="Kind">{{cite journal |last1=Kind |first1=Amy |title=Imaginative Experience |journal=Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Consciousness |date=2020 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KINIE |publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref> Despite its freedom and its lack of relation to actuality, imaginative experience can serve certain epistemological functions by representing what is possible or conceivable.<ref name="Liao"/> This is the case, for example, when imaginatively speculating about an event that has happened or might happen.<ref name="Kind"/> Imagination can happen in various different forms. One difference concerns whether the imagined scenario is deliberately controlled or arises spontaneously by itself. Another concerns whether the subject imagines itself as experiencing the imagined event from the inside, as being one of the protagonists within this event, or from the outside.<ref name="Liao"/> Different imaginative experiences tend to have different degrees to which the imagined scenario is just a reconstruction of something experienced previously or a creative rearrangement.<ref name="Liao"/> Accounts of imaginative experience usually focus on the visual domain, but there are also other, less prominent forms, like auditory imagination or olfactory imagination.<ref name="Kind"/>

=== Thinking ===
The term "[[thinking]]" is used to refer to a wide variety of cognitive experiences. They involve [[mental representation]]s and the processing of information.<ref name="Kazdin">{{cite book |editor1-last=Kazdin |editor1-first=Alan E. |title=Encyclopedia of Psychology |date=2000 |publisher=American Psychological Association |isbn=978-1-55798-187-5 |url=https://www.apa.org/pubs/books/4600100 |chapter=Thinking: An Overview}}</ref> This way, ideas or [[proposition]]s are entertained, judged or connected. It is similar to memory and imagination in that the experience of thinking can arise internally without any stimulation of the sensory organs, in contrast to perception.<ref name="Zajonc">{{cite web |last1=Zajonc |first1=Robert B. |title=International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences: Thinking |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/thinking |access-date=5 October 2021}}</ref> But thinking is still further removed from sensory contents than memory and imagination since its contents belong to a more abstract level. It is closely related to the phenomenon of speech, with some theorists claiming that all thinking is a form of inner speech expressed in language.<ref name="BorchertThinking">{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |chapter=Thinking}}</ref> But this claim is controversial since there seem to be thoughts that are not linguistically fully articulated.<ref name="HonderichThinking">{{cite book |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=Thinking}}</ref> But the more moderate claim is often accepted that thinking is associated with dispositions to perform speech acts. On this view, making a judgment in thought may happen non-linguistically but is associated with a disposition to linguistically affirm the judged proposition.<ref name="HonderichThinking"/> Various theories of the nature of the experience of thinking have been proposed. According to [[Platonism]], it is a spiritual activity in which [[Platonic form]]s and their interrelations are discerned and inspected.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/> Conceptualists, on the other hand, hold that thinking involves entertaining [[concept]]s.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/> On this view, judgments arise if two or more concepts are connected to each other and can further lead to [[inference]]s if these judgments are connected to other judgments.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Frauenstädt |first1=Julius |title=Ein philosophisches Wörterbuch, nach Arthur Schopenhauers sämmtlichen Schriften und handschriftlichem Nachlaß bearbeitet |date=1871 |publisher=Brockhaus |location=Leipzig |url=http://schopenhauers-kosmos.de/Urteil |chapter=Urteil}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Frauenstädt |first1=Julius |title=Ein philosophisches Wörterbuch, nach Arthur Schopenhauers sämmtlichen Schriften und handschriftlichem Nachlaß bearbeitet |date=1871 |publisher=Brockhaus |location=Leipzig |url=http://schopenhauers-kosmos.de/Schließen |chapter=Schließen}}</ref>

Various types of thinking are discussed in the academic literature.<ref name="BritannicaThought">{{cite web |title=Thought - Types of thinking |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/thought/Types-of-thinking |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=9 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref> They are sometimes divided into four categories: [[concept formation]], [[problem solving]], [[judgment]] and [[decision making]], and [[reasoning]].<ref name="Kazdin"/> In concept formation, the features common to the examples of a certain type are learned. This usually corresponds to understanding the meaning of the word associated with this type.<ref name="Kazdin"/><ref name="BritannicaThought"/> In the case of problem solving, thinking has as its goal to overcome certain obstacles by discovering a solution to a problem. This happens either by following an algorithm, which guarantees success if followed correctly, or by using heuristics, which are more informal methods that tend to bring the thinker closer to a solution.<ref name="Kazdin"/><ref name="BritannicaThought"/> Judgment and decision making involve choosing the best course of action among various alternatives.<ref name="Kazdin"/> In reasoning, the thinker starts from a certain set of premises and tries to draw conclusions from them.<ref name="Kazdin"/><ref name="BritannicaThought"/> A simpler categorization divides thinking into only two categories: theoretical contemplation and practical deliberation.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/>

=== Pleasure, emotion and mood ===
[[Pleasure]] refers to experience that feels good.<ref name="Pallies">{{cite journal |last1=Pallies |first1=Daniel |title=An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2021 |volume=178 |issue=3 |pages=887–907 |doi=10.1007/s11098-020-01464-5 |issn=0031-8116  |s2cid=219440957 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PALAHL}}</ref><ref name="Lopez">{{cite book |last1=Lopez |first1=Shane J. |title=The Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LOPTEO-2 |chapter=Pleasure|year=2009 }}</ref> It involves the enjoyment of something, like eating a cake or having sex. When understood in the widest sense, this includes not just sensory pleasures but any form of pleasant experience, such as engaging in an intellectually satisfying activity or the joy of playing a game. Pleasure comes in degrees and exists in a dimension that includes negative degrees as well. These negative degrees are usually referred to as pain and suffering and stand in contrast to pleasure as forms of feeling bad.<ref name="Katz">{{cite web |last1=Katz |first1=Leonard D. |title=Pleasure |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pleasure/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=29 January 2021 |date=2016}}</ref> Discussions of this dimension often focus on its positive side but many of the theories and insights apply equally to its negative side. There is disagreement among philosophers and psychologists concerning what the nature of pleasure is. Some understand pleasure as a simple sensation. On this view, a pleasure experience is an experience that has a pleasure-sensation among its contents.<ref name="BorchertPleasure">{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |chapter=Pleasure}}</ref><ref name="Tomlinson"/> This account is rejected by attitude theories, which hold that pleasure consists not in a content but in a certain attitude towards a content. According to this perspective, the pleasure of eating a cake consists not in a taste sensation together with a pleasure sensation, as sensation-theorists claim. Instead, it consists in having a certain attitude, like desire, towards the taste sensation.<ref name="BorchertPleasure"/><ref name="Katz"/><ref name="Tomlinson"/> A third type of theory defines pleasure in terms of its representational properties. On this view, an experience is pleasurable if it presents its objects as being good for the experiencer.<ref name="Tomlinson">{{cite book |last1=Tomlinson |first1=Lucy |title=Pleasure Three Ways: Phenomenological, Attitudinal, Representational |date=2019 |publisher=University of Manchester |url=https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/184626773/FULL_TEXT.PDF |language=en |chapter=0. Introduction: Problems of Pleasure and Contemporary Theories of Pleasure}}</ref>

[[Emotion]]al experiences come in many forms, like fear, anger, excitement, surprise, grief or disgust.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Johnson |first1=Gregory |title=Theories of Emotion |url=https://iep.utm.edu/emotion/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=4 October 2021}}</ref> They usually include either ''pleasurable or unpleasurable aspects''.<ref name="Scarantino">{{cite web |last1=Scarantino |first1=Andrea |last2=de Sousa |first2=Ronald |title=Emotion: 2. Three Traditions in the Study of Emotions: Emotions as Feelings, Evaluations, and Motivations |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion/#ThreTradStudEmotEmotFeelEvalMoti |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=4 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref name="Scherer"/> But they normally involve various other components as well, which are not present in every experience of pleasure or pain. It is often held that they also comprise ''evaluative components'', which ascribe a positive or negative value to their object, ''physiological components'', which involve bodily changes, and ''behavioral components'' in the form of a reaction to the presented object.<ref name="Scarantino"/><ref name="Scherer">{{cite journal |vauthors=Scherer KR |s2cid=145575751 |title=What are emotions? And how can they be measured? |journal=Social Science Information |year=2005 |volume=44 |issue=4 |pages=693–727 |doi=10.1177/0539018405058216}}</ref> For example, suddenly encountering a grizzly bear while hiking may evoke an emotional experience of fear in the hiker, which is experienced as unpleasant, which represents the bear as dangerous, which leads to an increase in the heart rate and which may provoke a fleeing reaction.<ref name="Scarantino"/> These and other types of components are often used to categorize emotions into different types. But there is disagreement concerning which of them is the essential component determining the relevant category. The dominant approaches categorize according to how the emotion feels, how it evaluates its object or what behavior it motivates.<ref name="Scarantino"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Scarantino |first1=Andrea |title=Handbook of Emotions |date=2018 |edition=4th |url=https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxhbmRyZWFzY2FyYW50aW5vc3dlYnNpdGV8Z3g6NzNkYWVhNTMwODg1M2ZhNg |chapter=The Philosophy of Emotions and Its Impact on Affective Science}}</ref>

While the experience of positive emotions is, to some extent, its own justification, and it is by these experiences or the desire for them that individuals tend to be motivated, the experience of [[negative emotion]]s is sometimes claimed to cause personal growth; and, hence, to be either necessary for, or at least beneficial in, creating more productive and resilient people<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ackerman |first=Courtney |date=27 April 2019 |title=What are Positive and Negative Emotions and Do We Need Both? |url=https://positivepsychology.com/positive-negative-emotions/#:~:text=Positive%20emotions%20are%20emotions%20that,pleasant%20or%20desirable%20situational%20responses%E2%80%A6 |access-date=28 March 2023}}</ref>—though the necessity of resilience in the first place, or of negative experiences ''in re'' growth, has been questioned by others.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Hedonist Imperative {{!}} WorldCat.org |url=https://search.worldcat.org/title/44325836 |access-date=2024-08-27 |website=search.worldcat.org |language=en}}</ref>

[[Mood (psychology)|Mood]]s are closely related to emotions, but not identical to them. Like emotions, they can usually be categorized as either positive or negative depending on how it feels to have them.<ref name="Robinson">{{cite web |last1=Robinson |first1=Jorgianne Civey |title=International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences: Mood |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/literature-and-arts/language-linguistics-and-literary-terms/language-and-linguistics/mood |access-date=5 October 2021}}</ref> One core difference is that emotional experiences usually have a very specific object, like the fear of a bear. Mood experiences, on the other hand, often either have no object or their object is rather diffuse, like when a person is anxious that ''something bad'' might happen without being able to clearly articulate the source of their anxiety.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Scarantino |first1=Andrea |last2=de Sousa |first2=Ronald |title=Emotion: 4. Emotions and Intentional Objects |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion/#EmotInteObje |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=5 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Siemer |first1=Matthias |title=Mood Experience: Implications of a Dispositional Theory of Moods |journal=Emotion Review |date=2009 |volume=1 |issue=3 |pages=256–263 |doi=10.1177/1754073909103594 |s2cid=145737449 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/SIEMEI|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Fish |first1=William |title=Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173) |date=2005 |publisher=Rodopi NY |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FISEM |chapter=Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality}}</ref> Other differences include that emotions tend to be caused by specific events, whereas moods often lack a clearly identifiable cause, and that emotions are usually intensive, whereas moods tend to last longer.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lane |first1=Andrew M. |last2=Beedie |first2=Christopher |last3=Terry |first3=Peter C. |title=Distinctions Between Emotion and Mood |journal=Cognition and Emotion |date=2005 |volume=19 |issue=6 |pages=847–878 |doi=10.1080/02699930541000057 |hdl=2436/12841 |s2cid=18437088 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LANDBE|hdl-access=free }}</ref> Examples of moods include anxiety, depression, euphoria, irritability, melancholy and giddiness.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kriegel |first1=Uriah |title=The Intentional Structure of Moods |journal=Philosophers' Imprint |date=2019 |volume=19 |pages=1–19 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KRITIS-2}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gallegos |first1=Francisco |title=Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods |journal=Philosophia |date=2017 |volume=45 |issue=4 |pages=1497–1513 |doi=10.1007/s11406-017-9820-5 |s2cid=151524606 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GALMAN-2}}</ref>

=== Desire and agency ===
[[Desire]]s comprise a wide class of [[mental state]]s. They include unconscious desires, but only their conscious forms are directly relevant to experience.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Strandberg |first1=Caj |title=Expressivism and Dispositional Desires: 2. a distinction in mind |journal=American Philosophical Quarterly |date=2012 |volume=49 |issue=1 |pages=81–91 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/STREAD}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Bartlett |first1=Gary |title=Occurrent States |journal=Canadian Journal of Philosophy |date=2018 |volume=48 |issue=1 |pages=1–17 |doi=10.1080/00455091.2017.1323531 |s2cid=220316213 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BAROS-4|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Kriegel |first1=Uriah |title=The Varieties of Consciousness |date=2015 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KRITVO-5 |chapter=2. Conative Phenomenology}}</ref> Conscious desires involve the experience of wanting or wishing something. This is often understood in a very wide sense, in which phenomena like love, intention, and thirst are seen as forms of desire.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Parmisano |first1=S. F. |title=New Catholic Encyclopedia: Desire |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/desire |access-date=5 October 2021}}</ref> They are usually understood as attitudes toward conceivable [[states of affairs]].<ref>{{cite web |last1=Pettit |first1=Philip |title=Desire - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/desire/v-1 |website=www.rep.routledge.com |access-date=4 May 2021 |language=en}}</ref> They represent their objects as being valuable in some sense and aim to realize them by changing the world correspondingly. This can either happen in a positive or a negative sense. In the positive sense, the object is experienced as good and the aim is to create or maintain it. In the negative sense, the object is experienced as bad and the aim is to destroy it or to hinder it from coming into existence.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Sandkühler |first1=Hans Jörg |title=Enzyklopädie Philosophie |date=2010 |publisher=Meiner |url=https://meiner.de/enzyklopadie-philosophie-14071.html |chapter=Begehren/Begierde}}</ref> In intrinsic desires, the object is desired for its own sake, whereas in extrinsic desires, the object is desired because of the positive consequences associated with it.<ref name="HonderichDesire"/> Desires come in different degrees of intensity and their satisfaction is usually experienced as pleasurable.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Mele |first1=Alfred R. |title=Motivation and Agency |date=2003 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MELMAA-2 |chapter=7. Motivational Strength}}</ref><ref name="HonderichDesire">{{cite book |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=desire}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Schroeder |first1=Timothy |title=Desire: philosophical issues |journal=WIREs Cognitive Science |date=2010 |volume=1 |issue=3 |pages=363–370 |doi=10.1002/wcs.3 |pmid=26271376 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/wcs.3 |language=en |issn=1939-5086|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

[[Agency (philosophy)|Agency]] refers to the capacity to [[Action (philosophy)|act]] and the manifestation of this capacity.<ref name="Schlosser">{{cite web |last1=Schlosser |first1=Markus |title=Agency |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/agency/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=9 October 2021 |date=2019}}</ref><ref name="Mylopoulos">{{cite book |last1=Mylopoulos |first1=Myrto |last2=Shepherd |first2=Joshua |title=The Experience of Agency |date=9 July 2020 |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.8 |isbn=978-0-19-874967-7 |url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198749677-e-8 |language=en}}</ref> Its experience involves various different aspects, including the formation of [[intention]]s, when planning possible courses of action, the decision between different alternatives, and the effort when trying to realize the intended course of action.<ref name="Mylopoulos"/><ref name="Schlosser"/> It is often held that desires provide the [[motivation]]al force behind agency.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Mele AR |title=Motivation: Essentially Motivation-Constituting Attitudes |journal=Philosophical Review |date=1995 |volume=104 |issue=3 |pages=387–423 |doi=10.2307/2185634 |jstor=2185634 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MELMEM|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Miller C |title=Motivation in Agents |journal=Noûs |date=2008 |volume=42 |issue=2 |pages=222–266 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00679.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MILMIA-2|url-access=subscription }}</ref> But not all experiences of desire are accompanied by the experience of agency. This is the case, for example, when a desire is fulfilled without the agent trying to do so or when no possible course of action is available to the agent to fulfill the desire.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Wall |first1=David |title=Are There Passive Desires? |journal=Dialectica |date=2009 |volume=63 |issue=2 |pages=133–155 |doi=10.1111/dltc.2009.63.issue-2 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/WALATP-8|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

In a more restricted sense, the term "[[sense of agency]]" refers to the impression of being in control and being the owner of one's action.<ref name="Schlosser"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Moore |first1=James W. |title=What Is the Sense of Agency and Why Does it Matter? |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=29 August 2016 |volume=7 |pages=1272 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01272 |pmid=27621713 |pmc=5002400 |issn=1664-1078|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kawabe |first1=Takahiro |last2=Roseboom |first2=Warrick |last3=Nishida |first3=Shin'ya |title=The sense of agency is action–effect causality perception based on cross-modal grouping |journal=Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences |date=22 July 2013 |volume=280 |issue=1763 |pages=20130991 |doi=10.1098/rspb.2013.0991 |pmid=23740784 |pmc=3774240 |issn=0962-8452}}</ref> It is often held that two components are the central sources of the sense of agency. On the one hand, the agent constantly makes predictions about how their intentions will influence their bodily movement and compares these predictions to the sensory feedback. On this view, a positive match generates a sense of agency while a negative match disrupts the sense of agency.<ref name="Schlosser"/><ref name="Moore"/> On the other hand, when looking backward, the agent interprets their intention as the cause of the action. In the successful case, the intention precedes the action and the action is consistent with the intention.<ref name="Schlosser"/><ref name="Moore">{{cite journal |last1=Moore |first1=James W. |title=What Is the Sense of Agency and Why Does it Matter? |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=2016 |volume=7 |pages=1272 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01272 |pmid=27621713 |pmc=5002400 |issn=1664-1078|doi-access=free }}</ref>

=== Non-ordinary experience ===
The terms "non-ordinary experience", "anomalous experience" or "[[altered state of consciousness]]" are used to describe a wide variety of rare experiences that significantly differ from the experience in the ordinary waking state.<ref name="Facco">{{cite journal | last1=Facco | first1=Enrico | last2=Pederzoli | first2=Luciano | last3=Tressoldi | first3=Patrizio E. | title=Non-Ordinary Experiences of Consciousness: Expressions of Our True Nature | journal=[[SSRN Electronic Journal]] | publisher=Elsevier BV | year=2019 | issn=1556-5068 | doi=10.2139/ssrn.3510213 | ssrn=3510213}}</ref><ref name="Revonsuo">{{cite journal |last1=Revonsuo |first1=Antti |last2=Kallio |first2=Sakari |last3=Sikka |first3=Pilleriin |title=What is an Altered State of Consciousness? |journal=Philosophical Psychology |date=2009 |volume=22 |issue=2 |pages=187–204 |doi=10.1080/09515080902802850 |s2cid=55819447 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/REVWIA|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Examples of non-ordinary experiences are [[religious experience]]s, which are closely related to spiritual or [[mystical experience]]s, [[out-of-body experience]]s, [[near-death experience]]s, [[psychotic episode]]s, and [[psychedelic experience]]s.<ref name="Facco"/><ref name="Revonsuo"/>

Religious experiences are non-ordinary experiences that carry religious significance for the experiencer.<ref name="Facco"/><ref name="Webb">{{cite web |last1=Webb |first1=Mark |title=Religious Experience |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religious-experience/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=8 October 2021 |date=2017}}</ref> They often involve some kind of encounter with a divine person, for example, in the form of seeing God or hearing God's command. But they can also involve having an intensive feeling one believes to be caused by God or recognizing the divine in nature or in oneself. Some religious experiences are said to be [[ineffable]], meaning that they are so far away from the ordinary that they cannot be described in words.<ref name="Webb"/><ref name="Wynn">{{cite web |last1=Wynn |first1=Mark |title=Phenomenology of Religion: 1. The phenomenology of religious experience |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology-religion/#PheRelExp |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=8 October 2021 |date=2016}}</ref><ref name="Clark">{{cite web |last1=Clark |first1=Kelly James |title=Religious Epistemology: 3e. Religious Experience |url=https://iep.utm.edu/relig-ep/#SH3e |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=8 October 2021}}</ref> Out-of-body experiences involve the impression of being detached from one's material body and perceiving the external world from this different perspective.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Hayward |first1=Rhodri |title=The Oxford Companion to the Body: Out-of-body experiences |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/out-body-experiences |access-date=8 October 2021}}</ref> In them, it often seems to the person that they are floating above their own body while seeing it from the outside. They can have various different causes, including [[traumatic brain injuries]], [[psychedelic drugs]], or [[sleep paralysis]]. They can also take the form of near-death experiences, which are usually provoked by life-threatening situations and include contents such as flying through a tunnel towards a light, talking to deceased relatives, or a [[life review]], in which a person sees their whole life flash before their eyes.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Fischer |first1=John Martin |last2=Mitchell-Yellin |first2=Benjamin |title=Near-Death Experiences: Understanding Visions of the Afterlife |date=2016 |publisher=Oxford University Press USA |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FISNEU |chapter=1. Introduction}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Near-death experience |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/near-death-experience |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=8 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref>

It is uncontroversial that these experiences occur sometimes for some people. In one study, for example, about 10% report having had at least one out-of-body experience in their life.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Blackmore |first1=Susan |title=A postal survey of OBEs and other experiences |journal=The Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research |date=1984 |volume=52 |issue=796 |pages=225–244 |url=http://www.susanblackmore.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/JP-1984.pdf}}</ref> But it is highly controversial how reliable these experiences are at accurately representing aspects of reality not accessible to ordinary experience.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Fischer |first1=John Martin |last2=Mitchell-Yellin |first2=Benjamin |title=Near-Death Experiences: Understanding Visions of the Afterlife |date=2016 |publisher=Oxford University Press USA |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FISNEU |chapter=12. Confirmation Bias}}</ref> This is due to the fact that various wide-reaching claims are made based on non-ordinary experiences. Many of these claims cannot be verified by regular perception and frequently seem to contradict it or each other. Based on religious experience, for example, it has been claimed that a divine creator distinct from nature exists or that the divine exists in nature.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jäger |first1=Christoph |title=Religious experience and the probability of theism: comments on Swinburne |journal=Religious Studies |date=September 2017 |volume=53 |issue=3 |pages=353–370 |doi=10.1017/S0034412517000191 |s2cid=171523193 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/abs/religious-experience-and-the-probability-of-theism-comments-on-swinburne/4FB6BFE12560DC9D93D28110A3DE5B58 |language=en |issn=0034-4125}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Byerly |first1=T. Ryan |title=The Awe-Some Argument for Pantheism |journal=European Journal for Philosophy of Religion |date=2019 |volume=11 |issue=2 |pages=1–21 |doi=10.24204/ejpr.v11i2.2968 |s2cid=197708001 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BYETAA}}</ref><ref name="Clark"/><ref name="Wynn"/> Out-of-body experiences and near-death experiences, on the other hand, are often used to argue for a [[mind–body dualism]] by holding that the soul can exist without the body and continues to exist after the death of the body.<ref>{{cite web |title=Philosophy of mind - The soul and personal identity |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind/The-soul-and-personal-identity |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=8 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Fischer |first1=John Martin |last2=Mitchell-Yellin |first2=Benjamin |title=Near-Death Experiences: Understanding Visions of the Afterlife |date=2016 |publisher=Oxford University Press USA |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FISNEU |chapter=10. Near-Death Experiences, Transformation, and the Afterlife}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lommel |first1=Pim van |title=Near-Death Experience, Consciousness, and the Brain: A New Concept About the Continuity of Our Consciousness Based on Recent Scientific Research on Near-Death Experience in Survivors of Cardiac Arrest |journal=World Futures |date=2006 |volume=62 |issue=1 & 2 |pages=134–151 |doi=10.1080/02604020500412808 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/VANNEC|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Dell’Olio |first1=Andrew J. |title=Do Near-Death Experiences Provide a Rational Basis for Belief in Life After Death? |journal=Sophia |date=2010 |volume=49 |issue=1 |pages=113–128 |doi=10.1007/s11841-009-0154-z |s2cid=145057993 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/DELDNE|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Defenders of such claims often contend that we have no decisive reason to deny the reliability of such experiences, for example, because they are in important ways similar to regular sensory experience or because there is an additional cognitive faculty that provides us access to knowledge beyond the regular senses.<ref name="Webb"/><ref name="Clark"/>

=== Others ===
A great variety of experiences is discussed in the academic literature besides the types mentioned so far. The term "[[Flow (psychology)|flow]]", for example, refers to experiences in which the agent is fully immersed in a certain activity. This type of experience has various characteristic features, including a clear sense of the activity's goal, immediate feedback on how one is doing and a good balance between one's skills and the difficulty of the task.<ref name="KazdinFlow"/><ref name="LopezFlow"/> A diverse group of activities can lead to flow experiences, like art, sports and computer games.<ref name="KazdinFlow">{{cite book |editor1-last=Kazdin |editor1-first=Alan E. |title=Encyclopedia of Psychology |date=2000 |publisher=American Psychological Association |isbn=978-1-55798-187-5 |url=https://www.apa.org/pubs/books/4600100 |chapter=Flow}}</ref> Flow is of particular interest to [[positive psychology]] because its experience is pleasurable.<ref name="LopezFlow">{{cite book |last1=Lopez |first1=Shane J. |title=The Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LOPTEO-2 |chapter=Flow|year=2009 }}</ref>

Aesthetic experience is a central concept in the [[psychology of art]] and [[experimental aesthetics]].<ref name="Marković">{{cite journal |last1=Marković |first1=Slobodan |title=Components of aesthetic experience: aesthetic fascination, aesthetic appraisal, and aesthetic emotion |journal=i-Perception |date=12 January 2012 |volume=3 |issue=1 |pages=1–17 |doi=10.1068/i0450aap |pmid=23145263 |pmc=3485814 |issn=2041-6695}}</ref> It refers to the experience of [[aesthetic]] objects, in particular, concerning [[beauty]] and [[art]].<ref>{{cite web |last1=Eaton |first1=Marcia Muelder |title=Aesthetic Experience |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/aesthetic-experience |website=www.encyclopedia.com |access-date=12 October 2021}}</ref> There is no general agreement on the fundamental features common to all aesthetic experiences. Some accounts focus on features like a fascination with an aesthetic object, a feeling of unity and intensity, whereas others emphasize a certain psychological distance from the aesthetic object in the sense that the aesthetic experience is disconnected from practical concerns.<ref name="Marković"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Shelley |first1=James |title=The Concept of the Aesthetic: 2.4 Aesthetic Experience |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-concept/#AesExp |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 October 2021 |date=2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Aesthetics - The aesthetic experience |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/aesthetics/The-aesthetic-experience |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=12 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref>

[[Transformative Experience|Transformative experiences]] are experiences involving a radical transformation that leaves the experiencer a different person from who they were before.<ref name="Paul">{{cite journal |last1=Paul |first1=L. A. |title=Précis of Transformative Experience |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2015 |volume=91 |issue=3 |pages=760–765 |doi=10.1111/phpr.12249 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PAUPOT|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Examples of transformative experiences include having a child, fighting in a war, or undergoing a religious conversion. They involve fundamental changes both in one's beliefs and in one's core preferences.<ref name="Paul"/><ref name="Pettigrew"/> It has been argued that transformative experiences constitute counterexamples to [[rational choice theory]] because the person deciding for or against undergoing a transformative experience cannot know what it will be like until afterward. It also may be because it is not clear whether the decision should be grounded in the preferences before or after the transformation.<ref name="Paul"/><ref name="Pettigrew">{{cite journal |last1=Pettigrew |first1=Richard |title=Transformative Experience and Decision Theory |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2015 |volume=91 |issue=3 |pages=766–774 |doi=10.1111/phpr.12240 |hdl=1983/b4796dab-2003-4e0b-99ef-9c3bc276b547 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PETTEA-2|hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Campbell |first1=Tim |last2=Mosquera |first2=Julia |title=Transformative Experience and the Shark Problem |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2020 |volume=177 |issue=11 |pages=3549–3565 |doi=10.1007/s11098-019-01382-1 |s2cid=213752362 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CAMTEA-3|doi-access=free }}</ref>