Editing Harm principle (section)

== Criticism ==
Stewart Hamish has argued that the harm principle does not provide a narrow scope of which actions count as harmful towards oneself or the population and that it cannot be used to determine whether people can be punished for their actions by the state. A state can determine whether an action is punishable by determining what harm the action causes. If a morally unjust action occurs but leaves no indisputable form of harm, there is no justification for the state to act and punish the perpetrators for their actions. The harm principle has an ambiguous definition of what harm specifically is and what justifies a state to intervene.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Stewart |first=Hamish |date=2009-08-23 |title=The Limits of the Harm Principle |journal=Criminal Law and Philosophy |volume=4 |issue=1 |pages=17–35 |doi=10.1007/s11572-009-9082-9 |issn=1871-9791 |s2cid=144027938}}</ref>

[[Ben Saunders (professor)|Ben Saunders]] has also said that the harm principle does not specify on whether the state is justified with intervention tactics. The ambiguity can lead a state to define what counts as a harmful self-regarding action at its own discretion. That freedom might allow for an individual's own liberty and rights to be in danger. It would not be plausible for a state to intervene with an action that will negatively affect the population more than an individual. The harm principle scope of usage has been described as too wide to follow directly and to implement possible punishment by a state.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Saunders |first=Ben |date=2016-08-30 |title=Reformulating Mill's Harm Principle |journal=Mind |volume=125 |issue=500 |pages=1005–1032 |doi=10.1093/mind/fzv171 |issn=0026-4423 |doi-access=free |hdl-access=free |hdl=1893/18198}}</ref>