Editing Median voter theorem (section)

== Empirical evidence and contradictions ==
In the [[United States]] [[United States Senate|Senate]], each [[U.S. state|state]] is allocated two seats. [[Steven Levitt|Levitt]] (1996) examined the voting patterns of pairs of senators from the same state when one belonged to the Democratic Party and the other to the Republican Party. According to the Median Voter Theorem, the voting patterns of two senators representing the same state should be identical, regardless of party affiliation. However, reality differs. Moreover, Levitt found that the similarity in their voting patterns was only slightly higher than that of randomly paired senators. This finding suggests that senators' ideological leanings have a stronger influence on their decisions than voters' preferences, contradicting the prediction of the Median Voter Theorem.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Levitt |first=Steven D. |date=1996 |title=How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2118205 |journal=The American Economic Review |volume=86 |issue=3 |pages=425–441 |issn=0002-8282}}</ref>

Pande (2003) studied political changes in [[India]] between 1960 and 1992 that increased political representation for marginalized groups. The data she collected showed that as a result of these changes, transfer payments to these populations increased even though the overall electorate (which had already included these groups) remained unchanged. This finding contradicts the Median Voter Theorem, as the model predicts that such a political shift should not alter the political equilibrium.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Pande |first=Rohini |date=September 2003 |title=Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India |url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282803769206232 |journal=American Economic Review |language=en |volume=93 |issue=4 |pages=1132–1151 |doi=10.1257/000282803769206232 |issn=0002-8282}}</ref> 

Chattopadhyay and [[Esther Duflo|Duflo]] (2004) examined another political change in India, which mandated that women lead one-third of village councils. These councils are responsible for providing various public goods to rural communities. According to the Median Voter Theorem, this policy should not have affected the composition of [[Public good|public goods]] supplied by local governments, as a female candidate still needs to be elected by a majority vote. As long as the median voter's preferences remain unchanged, the allocation of public goods should remain stable. However, empirical data showed that in villages where a woman was elected, the distribution of public goods shifted toward those preferred by women. Furthermore, in districts where women were elected for a second term, the allocation of public goods continued to reflect women's preferences. It is important to note, however, that while the composition of public goods changed when a woman led the village council, this does not necessarily imply an improvement or decline in overall social welfare.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Chattopadhyay |first=Raghabendra |last2=Duflo |first2=Esther |date=2004 |title=Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00539.x |journal=Econometrica |language=en |volume=72 |issue=5 |pages=1409–1443 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00539.x |issn=1468-0262|hdl=10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00539.x |hdl-access=free }}</ref> 

Similar findings were reported by Miller (2008), who analyzed the impact of [[Women's suffrage|granting women the right to vote across the United States]] in 1920. Miller built on previous research indicating that women prioritize child welfare more than men and demonstrated that extending voting rights to women led to an immediate shift in federal policy. This change resulted in a significant increase in healthcare spending and a consequent reduction in child mortality rates by 8%–15%. However, unlike previous cases, Miller's findings actually support the Median Voter Theorem. This is because granting women suffrage altered the composition of the electorate, shifting the median voter’s position toward the preferences of the new female voters.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Miller |first=Grant |date=2008-08-01 |title=Women's Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History* |url=https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/123/3/1287/1928181?redirectedFrom=fulltext |journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics |volume=123 |issue=3 |pages=1287–1327 |doi=10.1162/qjec.2008.123.3.1287 |issn=0033-5533 |pmc=3046394 |pmid=21373369}}</ref> 

Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) investigated whether voters influence politicians' positions or merely choose from existing policy stances. They found that an '''[[Exogeny|exogenous]]''' shift in the voter base does not alter candidates' positions. For instance, an increase in [[Democratic Party (United States)|Democratic]] voters in a given area does not push a [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican]] candidate’s stance further to the left, and vice versa. This finding suggests that the electorate selects from the positions that politicians already hold, rather than shaping those positions, contradicting the prediction of the Median Voter Theorem, which assumes candidates are ideologically neutral.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Lee |first=David S. |last2=Moretti |first2=Enrico |last3=Butler |first3=Matthew J. |date=2004-08-01 |title=Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House* |url=https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/119/3/807/1938834?redirectedFrom=fulltext |journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics |volume=119 |issue=3 |pages=807–859 |doi=10.1162/0033553041502153 |issn=0033-5533|url-access=subscription }}</ref>  

Gerber and Lewis (2015) analyzed voting data from a series of referendums in [[California]] to estimate the preferences of the median voter. They found that elected officials are constrained by the preferences of the median voter in homogeneous regions but less so in heterogeneous ones.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gerber |first=Elisabeth R. |last2=Lewis |first2=Jeffrey B. |date=December 2004 |title=Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation |url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/424737 |journal=Journal of Political Economy |volume=112 |issue=6 |pages=1364–1383 |doi=10.1086/424737 |issn=0022-3808}}</ref> 

In contrast, Brunner and Ross (2010), who also studied voter data from two referendums in California, found that the decisive voter in votes concerning public expenditure was not the median voter, but rather a voter from the fourth income [[decile]]. This finding aligns with other studies suggesting that low-income voters often form coalitions with high-income voters to oppose increases in public spending.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Brunner |first=Eric J. |last2=Ross |first2=Stephen L. |date=2010-12-01 |title=Is the median voter decisive? Evidence from referenda voting patterns |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S004727271000126X |journal=Journal of Public Economics |volume=94 |issue=11 |pages=898–910 |doi=10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.09.009 |issn=0047-2727|url-access=subscription }}</ref> 

Referendum data from [[Switzerland]] was used by Stadelmann, Portmann, and Eichenberger (2012) to examine the degree to which legislators' votes align with the preferences of the median voter in their districts. Their research showed that the Median Voter Model explains legislative voting behavior better than an alternative random voting hypothesis, but only by a modest margin of 17.6%. Additionally, they found that support from the median voter in a senator’s district increases the likelihood of the senator supporting a given proposal by 8.4% in parliament.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Stadelmann |first=David |last2=Portmann |first2=Marco |last3=Eichenberger |first3=Reiner |date=2012-03-01 |title=Evaluating the median voter model’s explanatory power |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0165176511003958 |journal=Economics Letters |volume=114 |issue=3 |pages=312–314 |doi=10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.015 |issn=0165-1765|url-access=subscription }}</ref> 

Milanovic (2000), using data from 79 countries, concluded that the greater the inequality in a country's pre-tax income distribution, the more aggressive the redistributive policies of the winning government. This finding supports the Median Voter Theorem.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Milanovic |first=Branko |date=September 2000 |title=The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income redistribution: an empirical test with the required data |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0176268000000148 |journal=European Journal of Political Economy |language=en |volume=16 |issue=3 |pages=367–410 |doi=10.1016/S0176-2680(00)00014-8|hdl=10419/160928 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>