Editing Metaethics (section)

===Centralism and non-centralism<!--'Moral centralism', 'Moral non-centralism', and 'Non-centralism' redirect here-->===

Yet another way of categorizing metaethical theories is to distinguish between '''centralist'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> and '''non-centralist'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> moral theories. The debate between centralism and non-centralism revolves around the relationship between the so-called "thin" and "thick" concepts of morality: thin moral concepts are those such as good, bad, right, and wrong; thick moral concepts are those such as courageous, inequitable, just, or dishonest.<ref>[[Frank Jackson (philosopher)|Jackson, Frank]]. 1992. "Critical Notice." ''[[Australasian Journal of Philosophy]]'' 70(4):475–488.</ref> While both sides agree that the thin concepts are more general and the thick more specific, centralists hold that the thin concepts are antecedent to the thick ones and that the latter are therefore dependent on the former. That is, centralists argue that one must understand words like "right" and "ought" before understanding words like "just" and "unkind." Non-centralism rejects this view, holding that thin and thick concepts are on par with one another and even that the thick concepts are a sufficient starting point for understanding the thin ones.<ref>Hurley, S.L. (1989). ''Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity''. Oxford: [[Oxford University Press]].</ref><ref>Hurley, S.L. (1985). "Objectivity and Disagreement." in ''Morality and Objectivity'', [[Ted Honderich]] (ed.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 54–97.</ref>

Non-centralism has been of particular importance to ethical naturalists in the late 20th and early 21st centuries as part of their argument that normativity is a non-excisable aspect of language and that there is no way of analyzing thick moral concepts into a purely descriptive element attached to a thin moral evaluation, thus undermining any fundamental division between facts and norms. [[Allan Gibbard]], [[R. M. Hare]], and [[Simon Blackburn]] have argued in favor of the fact/norm distinction, meanwhile, with Gibbard going so far as to argue that, even if conventional English has only mixed normative terms (that is, terms that are neither purely descriptive nor purely normative), we could develop a nominally English metalanguage that still allowed us to maintain the division between factual descriptions and normative evaluations.<ref>[[Jocelyne Couture-Nowak|Couture, Jocelyne]], and [[Kai Nielsen (philosopher)|Kai Nielsen]]. 1995. "Introduction: The Ages of Metaethics." Pp. 1–30 in ''On the Relevance of Metaethics: New Essays in Metaethics'', edited by J. Couture and K. Nielsen. Calgary: [[University of Calgary Press]].</ref><ref>{{cite journal | author-link = Allan Gibbard | last = Gibbard | first = Allan | date = 1993 | title =Reply to Railton | volume = 4 | pages = 52–59 | journal = Naturalism and Normativity | editor = E. Villanueva | location = Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview | doi = 10.2307/1522826 | jstor = 1522826 | publisher = Ridgeview Publishing Company}}</ref>