Editing Operation Linebacker II (section)

===Initial phase===
The first three missions of the operation were flown as planned by SAC on three consecutive nights beginning on 18 December 1972. On the first night 129 bombers took off, 87 of them from Guam.<ref name = 'McCarthy 1'>McCarthy and Allison, p. 1.</ref><ref>Morocco, p. 148.</ref> 39 support aircraft of the Seventh Air Force, the Navy's Task Force 77 and the [[United States Marine Corps|Marine Corps]] supported the bombers by providing F-4 Phantom fighter escorts, [[Republic F-105 Thunderchief]] [[Wild Weasel]] SAM-suppression missions, Air Force [[Douglas B-66 Destroyer|Douglas EB-66 Destroyer]] and Navy [[Northrop Grumman EA-6B Prowler|Grumman EA-6 Prowler]] radar-jamming aircraft, chaff drops, [[KC-135]] refueling aircraft and search and rescue aircraft; the skies were dominated by American airpower to ensure the safety of the aircraft involved in the operation.<ref name = 'McCarthy9'>McCarthy and Allison, 1979, p. 9.</ref> One B-52 bomber pilot flying out of Guam recalled "We took off one airplane a minute out of Guam for hours. Just on time takeoff after on time takeoff."<ref>{{cite video | title=Interview with Michael J. (Mike) Connors, 1981 | url=http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/vietnam-38a2e0-interview-with-michael-j-mike-connors-1981|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208052425/http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/vietnam-38a2e0-interview-with-michael-j-mike-connors-1981| publisher=WGBH Media Library and Archives | date=21 April 1981|archive-date=8 December 2015}}</ref>

[[File:North Vietnamese Antiaircraft Weapons.jpg|thumb|upright|North Vietnamese anti-aircraft weapons]]
The targets of the first wave of bombers were the North Vietnamese airfields at [[Kép Air Base|Kép]], [[Phúc Yên Air Base|Phúc Yên]] and [[Hòa Lạc Air Base|Hòa Lạc]] and a warehouse complex at [[Yên Viên Railway Station|Yên Viên]] while the second and third waves struck targets around Hanoi. Three B-52's were shot down by the 68 [[surface-to-air missile]]s (SAMs) launched by North Vietnamese batteries, two B-52Gs from Andersen and a B-52D from U-Tapao.<ref name="Zaloga23">Zaloga 2007, p. 23</ref><ref name="Morocco, p. 150">Morocco, p. 150.</ref> Two of the B-52's were shot down over North Vietnam, while the third aircraft made it back to Thailand before crashing {"The 11 Days of Christmas" Marshall L. Michell III, pg 115}.  Two D models from Andersen with heavy battle damage managed to limp into U-Tapao for repairs.<ref>McCarthy and Allison, p. 65.</ref> Of the three downed B-52's, parts of two crews were captured after bailing out over North Vietnam, while the third crew were all rescued in Thailand {"The 11 Days of Christmas" Marshall L. Michel III, pg 115}.   That same evening, an Air Force [[F-111]] Aardvark was shot down while on a mission to bomb the broadcasting facilities of [[Radio Hanoi]].<ref>Walter J. Boyne, ''Linebacker II''. Air Force Magazine, May 1997, Vol. 80, Number 11.</ref>{{page needed|date=December 2023}} Unlike Linebacker, which had been launched in response to a North Vietnamese offensive in South Vietnam, President Nixon did not address the nation on television to explain the escalation. Instead, Kissinger held a press conference at which he accused (at Nixon's behest) Le Duc Tho of having "backed off" on some of the October understandings.<ref>Ambrose, p. 405.</ref>

On the second night, 93 sorties were flown by the bombers. Their targets included the Kinh No Railroad and storage area, the [[Thái Nguyên]] thermal power plant, and the Yên Viên complex. Although 20 SAMs were launched and a number of the bombers were damaged, none were lost on the mission.<ref name = 'Zaloga23'/> SAC expected that the third (and supposedly last) night of the operation would proceed just as well as the previous one.{{Citation needed|date=October 2015}} The targets of the 99 bombers sent in on 20 December included the Yên Viên railyards, the Ai Mo warehouse complex, the Thái Nguyên power plant, a transshipment point at [[Bắc Giang]], the Kinh No Railroad complex and the Hanoi petroleum products storage area—all in or near Hanoi. The combination of repetitive tactics, degraded EW systems and limited jamming capability led to dire consequences when, as the official Air Force history of the campaign has stated, "all hell broke loose."<ref>McCarthy and Allison, p. 83.</ref>

The repetitious nature of the previous evening's strike profiles had allowed North Vietnamese air defense forces to anticipate strike patterns and to salvo 34 missiles into the target area.<ref name = 'Zaloga23'/> Four B-52Gs and three B-52Ds were lost in the first and third waves of the mission.<ref name = 'Zaloga23'/> A fourth D model, returning to Thailand, crashed in Laos. Only two of the eight downed crews were recovered by search and rescue aircraft.<ref name="Morocco, p. 150"/> The repercussions from the mission were fast and furious. SAC headquarters was under pressure from "many external sources" to "stop the carnage ... it has become a blood bath".<ref name="McCarthy and Allison, p. 85">McCarthy and Allison, p. 85.</ref> Of more concern was the position taken by many senior Air Force officers that they "would lose too many bombers and that airpower doctrine would be proven fallacious ... or, if the bombing were stopped, the same thing would occur".<ref name="McCarthy and Allison, p. 85"/>

The main problem seemed to lie within the headquarters of SAC, which had based its tactics on a MiG threat that had not materialized during the three missions. The tactics (flight paths, altitudes, formations, timing, etc.) had not varied. The Air Force explanation for this course of events was that the similarity would be helpful to the B-52 crews, who were inexperienced in flying in such high-threat environments.<ref>Gilster, p. 112.</ref> Air Force historian Earl Tilford offered a differing opinion: "Years of dropping bombs on undefended jungle and the routines of planning for nuclear war had fostered a mind-set within the SAC command that nearly led to disaster&nbsp;... Poor tactics and a good dose of overconfidence combined to make the first few nights of Linebacker nightmarish for the B-52 crews."<ref>Tilford, pp. 255–256.</ref> During the operation the USAF depended almost entirely on the [[Ryan Model 147#The last days of the Lightning Bugs 1969-1975|Ryan Model 147 Buffalo Hunter AQM-34L/M]] [[unmanned aerial vehicle]]s for [[bomb damage assessment]] due to bad weather.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA525674.pdf|title=Air Force UAVs: The Secret History|author=Ehrhard, Thomas|date=July 2010|website=Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC®)|publisher=Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies|access-date=20 July 2015|archive-date=18 May 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170518190154/http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA525674|url-status=live}}</ref>