Editing Operation Uphold Democracy (section)

===Invasion, ultimatum and capitulation===
[[File:A Marine High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) equipped with a tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile patrols the street prior to the big celebrati - DPLA - 136d2152dfbc41d34316b6e282cb884c.jpeg|thumb|right|U.S. Marine Corps HMMWV in Cap Haitien, 30 September 1994]]
On 16 September 1994, as these forces prepared to invade, with the lead elements of Bravo Co., [[2nd Ranger Battalion]] already in the air after being staged in Guantanamo Bay, a diplomatic element led by former President [[Jimmy Carter]], U.S. Senator [[Sam Nunn]] and retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General [[Colin Powell]] persuaded the leaders of Haiti to step down and allow the elected officials to return to power. The main leader holding power, General Cédras, was the key focus of the delegation. General Powell's personal relationship with Cédras, from when Cédras was a student in the [[Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation|School of the Americas]] as a young officer, played a significant role in the American delegation gaining an audience with Cédras and enabling the conduct of negotiations for approximately two weeks.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Dowd |first=Maureen |date=21 September 1994 |title=MISSION TO HAITI: THE DIPLOMAT; Despite Role as Negotiator, Carter Feels Unappreciated |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/21/world/mission-haiti-diplomat-despite-role-negotiator-carter-feels-unappreciated.html |website=New York Times}}</ref>

Despite the insistent diplomatic efforts of the American delegation and the insinuation that force would be used if required, negotiations were at a virtual stalemate for the entire time, with General Cédras refusing to concede the legitimacy of the democratic elections. As a final effort to force him to step down without violence, the delegation presented General Cédras with a video feed of the [[82nd Airborne Division]]'s aircraft being loaded with troops, with the Division's DRF-1 (Division Ready Force 1, the Battalion designated first to deploy, with its equipment and vehicles pre-loaded for parachute drop world-wide) 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment "Red Falcons" already deployed to [[Fort Sherman|Ft. Sherman]], [[Panama]]. Therefore, the 2nd Battalion, 325th AIR "White Falcons" were attached to the 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division Ready Brigade-1 (DRB-1).<ref>{{cite web |last=Pike |first=John |title=2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment |url=https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/2-325air.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171016175325/https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/2-325air.htm |archive-date=16 October 2017 |access-date=12 February 2018 |website=www.globalsecurity.org}}</ref> While allowing Cédras to process the panic-inducing sight, he was informed that while he assumed he was watching a live feed, he was in fact viewing a video captured more than 2 hours before. As such, the lead elements of the 3,900-strong paratrooper force<ref>{{Cite web |title=ฝาก20รับ100ทํา300 |url=https://wwwglobalsecurity.org/military/ops/uphold_democracy.htm}}</ref> had already launched from [[Fort Bragg]], [[North Carolina]] and were currently over the [[Atlantic Ocean]]. They further informed him of the United States' commitment to supporting democracy and that a forced-entry airborne assault on the island nation would, in all likelihood, result in Haiti coming under U.S. control before the next sunrise.

The Carter delegation proceeded to issue a final ultimatum to the Cédras; his choices were to either recognize the wish of the Haitian people as expressed through the democratic election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and quietly retire, or continue to deny the election's outcome. In the latter case, the U.S. would forcibly wrest control of his country and see justice done. To remove all uncertainty from the general's mind, he was reminded by the delegation that the [[82nd Airborne Division]] had also spearheaded overwhelmingly decisive victories during [[Invasion of Grenada|Operation Urgent Fury]] in [[Grenada]] and [[United States invasion of Panama|Operation Just Cause]] in Panama in the recent past. Within minutes, General Cédras capitulated under the most favorable terms available to him at that time.

Cédras's capitulation took time to be decided, and even after it was done, did not immediately take effect among the [[Armed Forces of Haiti]] ({{langx|fr|Forces Armées d'Haïti—FAd'H}}), nor was it immediately followed by other members of the junta. As a result, U.S. forces landing in Haiti saw their objective as severing the junta leadership from the FAd'H without provoking a panic among the rank and file. To facilitate this, General [[Hugh Shelton|Shelton]] negotiated a turnover of command from Cédras to Major General [[Jean-Claude Duperval]], who in turn promoted figures acceptable to Aristide into high positions in the FAd’H. Believing that he needed the FAd'H in the short run to avert anarchy, Shelton determined to reform the organization incrementally. Its abrupt collapse, he feared, would start a rapid and uncontrollable social decompression that might result in a large-scale insurgency. American rules of engagement were very restrictive; even paramilitary [[Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haïti|FRAPH]] junta supporters were to be treated as a legitimate political entity and thus not subject to neutralization unless they attacked first. Inclined initially to view the Americans as liberators, most ordinary Haitians experienced a profound sense of unfulfilled expectations upon discovery that American soldiers were negotiating and then collaborating with the despised FAd’H in maintaining order in the capital. Many Haitians had expected the U.S. to exact retribution from members of the junta. President Aristide urged the populace to remain calm until his return.<ref>Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, John T. Fishel. ''A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy''. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 1998. p. 96.</ref>

In one case on 20 September, recently landed U.S. Marines 2/2 in [[Port-au-Prince]] stood by while a protesting crowd was violently dispersed by the Haitian [[Haitian National Police|police]], resulting in a civilian death. The state of affairs was such that many Haitians did not know who was supposed to be in charge of the city. Following outcry among the U.S. military and citizenry, as well as among Haitians, the U.S. Army quickly changed its rules of engagement. Behind the scenes, Shelton sent an emissary, Colonel Michael Sullivan, commander of the 16th Military Police (MP) Brigade, to Port-au-Prince Police Chief Colonel Michel Francois with an unequivocal message that assaults on the populace would stop or Francois would be held accountable.<ref>Kretchik et al, p. 98.</ref>

The U.S. [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]] who occupied Haiti's second largest city, [[Cap-Haïtien|Cap Haitien]], had less restrictive rules; they began immediate foot patrols upon arriving, establishing a strong presence. One such patrol came across a FAd'H unit deemed to be making "threatening gestures" on 24 September, resulting in a brief firefight: ten FAd'H troops were killed for no U.S. losses. The incident helped establish U.S. authority in the public's mind (and was received enthusiastically by the populace when news spread the next day), though it was far from the last violent incident of the occupation. On 29 September, a FRAPH terrorist hurled a grenade into a crowd at a ceremony marking the reinstallation of the popular mayor of Port-au-Prince, [[Evans Paul]]; the terrorist was apprehended by the Marines the next day and interrogated.<ref>Kretchik et al, p. 99.</ref>