Editing Philosophical methodology (section)

=== Common sense ===
The method of [[common sense]] is based on the fact that we already have a great variety of [[beliefs]] that seem very certain to us, even if we do not believe them based on explicit arguments.<ref name="Ichikawa"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=REYNOLDS |first1=JACK |title=Common Sense and Philosophical Methodology: Some Metaphilosophical Reflections on Analytic Philosophy and Deleuze |journal=The Philosophical Forum |date=4 August 2010 |volume=41 |issue=3 |pages=231–258 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-9191.2010.00361.x |hdl=10536/DRO/DU:30061043 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2010.00361.x |issn=0031-806X|hdl-access=free }}</ref> Common sense philosophers use these beliefs as their starting point of philosophizing. This often takes the form of criticism directed against theories whose premises or conclusions are very far removed from how the average person thinks about the issue in question.<ref name="BritannicaCommon">{{cite web |title=philosophy of common sense |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-common-sense |website=www.britannica.com |access-date=27 February 2022 |language=en}}</ref> [[G. E. Moore]], for example, rejects [[J. M. E. McTaggart]]'s sophisticated argumentation for the [[The Unreality of Time|unreality of time]] based on his common-sense impression that time exists.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/><ref>{{cite web |title=Analytic philosophy - History of analytic philosophy: G.E. Moore |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/analytic-philosophy/History-of-analytic-philosophy#ref560447 |website=www.britannica.com |access-date=27 February 2022 |language=en}}</ref> He holds that his simple common-sense impression is much more certain than that McTaggart's arguments are sound, even though Moore was unable to pinpoint where McTaggart's arguments went wrong. According to his method, common sense constitutes an evidence base.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/><ref name="BritannicaCommon"/> This base may be used to eliminate philosophical theories that stray too far away from it, that are abstruse from its perspective. This can happen because either the theory itself or consequences that can be drawn from it violate common sense.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/> For common sense philosophers, it is not the task of philosophy to question common sense. Instead, they should analyze it to formulate theories in accordance with it.<ref name="BritannicaCommon"/>

One important argument against this method is that common sense has often been wrong in the past, as is exemplified by various scientific discoveries. This suggests that common sense is in such cases just an antiquated theory that is eventually eliminated by the progress of science.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Sankey |first1=Howard |title=New Approaches to Scientific Realism Howard Sankey |date=24 August 2020 |publisher=De Gruyter |isbn=978-3-11-066473-7 |url=https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110664737-004/html |language=en |chapter=Scientific Realism and the Conflict with Common Sense|pages=68–84 |doi=10.1515/9783110664737-004 |hdl=11343/251906 |s2cid=229662541 }}</ref> For example, [[Albert Einstein]]'s [[theory of relativity]] constitutes a radical departure from the common-sense conception of [[space and time]], and [[quantum physics]] poses equally serious problems to how we tend to think about how elementary particles behave.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Horgan |first1=John |title=Einstein and Science's Assault on Common Sense |url=https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/einstein-and-science-s-assault-on-common-sense/ |website=Scientific American Blog Network |access-date=6 March 2022 |language=en}}</ref> This puts into question that common sense is a reliable [[Sources of knowledge|source of knowledge]]. Another problem is that for many issues, there is no one universally accepted common-sense opinion. In such cases, common sense only amounts to the majority opinion, which should not be blindly accepted by researchers.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Nichols |first1=Ryan |last2=Yaffe |first2=Gideon |title=Thomas Reid: 1.1 Common Sense and First Principles |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reid/#ComSenFirPri |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=27 February 2022 |date=2021}}</ref> This problem can be approached by articulating a weaker version of the common-sense method.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/> One such version is defended by [[Roderick Chisholm]], who allows that theories violating common sense may still be true. He contends that, in such cases, the theory in question is ''[[prima facie]]'' suspect and the [[Burden of proof (philosophy)|burden of proof]] is always on its side. But such a shift in the burden of proof does not constitute a blind belief in common sense since it leaves open the possibility that, for various issues, there is decisive evidence against the common-sense opinion.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Legum |first1=Richard |title=Roderick M. Chisholm: Epistemology |url=https://iep.utm.edu/chi-epis/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=27 February 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lemos |first1=Noah M. |title=Common Sense and "A Priori" Epistemology |journal=The Monist |date=1998 |volume=81 |issue=3 |pages=473–487 |doi=10.5840/monist199881324 |jstor=27903601 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903601 |issn=0026-9662}}</ref>