Editing Political polarization (section)

===The media===
Also stated by Sheena Peckham, algorithms used by social media to operate creates an echo-chamber for the user causing selective exposure and thus leading to online hate, misinformation, malinformation and more (Peckham, 2023). A number of techniques were employed by the researchers and social scientist to trace the relationship between internet usage. Lelkes, along with his colleagues, use state right-of-way laws, which affect the cost of internet infrastructure, as an instrument used for internet access in their country (Lelkes et al. 2017) and discovered a positive relation between internet access and affective polarization in the country. At the same time, (Alcot et al. 2021) conducted another experiment in which individuals in the US. were asked to deactivate their Facebook account for a $102 incentive, prior to the US. midterm election. It was found that those who deactivated their accounts and did not use Facebook were less polarized as compared to those individuals whose accounts were still activated during the experiment.<ref>Peckham, S. (2023) What are algorithms? how to prevent echo chambers, Internet 
Matters. Available at: https://www.internetmatters.org/hub/news-blogs/what-are-algorithms-how-to-prevent-echo-chambers/ (Accessed: 14 February 2024).</ref><ref>Lelkes Y, Sood G, Iyengar S. 2017. The hostile audience: the effect of access to 
broadband internet on partisan affect. Am. J. Political Sci. 61(1):5–20</ref><ref>Alcott, H., Braghieri, L., Eichmeyer, S., & Gentzkow, M. (2020). The welfare effects of 
social media. American Economic Review, 110(3), 629-676</ref>

In addition, Boxell assess ANEX data from 1972-2016 by age cohorts analyzing their likelihood of using social media. He was shocked to found that the largest polarization index over time was occurred among oldest cohort, which was less likely to use social media (Boxell et al., 2017).<ref>Boxell L, Gentzkow M, Shapiro JM. 2017. Greater internet use is not associated with 
faster growth in political polarization among US demographic groups. PNAS 
114(40):10612–17</ref> Thus, he found a small or negative relation between internet usage and polarization. Also, Markus Prior in his article tried to trace the causal link between social media and affective polarization but he found no evidence that partisan media are making ordinary American voter more partisan, thus negating the role of partisan media as a cause of affective polarization (Prior, 2013).<ref>Prior M (2013) Media and political polarization. Annual Review of Political 
Science 16(1): 101–127</ref>

The mass media has grown as an institution over the past half-century. Political scientists argue that this has particularly affected the voting public in the last three decades, as previously less partisan viewers are given more polarized news media choices. The mass media's current, fragmented, high-choice environment has induced a movement of the audience from more even-toned political programming to more antagonistic and one-sided broadcasts and articles. These programs tend to appeal to partisan viewers who watch the polarized programming as a self-confirming source for their ideologies.<ref name="mann-12" /><ref name="hetherington-09" /><ref name="hollander-08">{{cite journal|last=Hollander|first=B.A.|title=Tuning Out or Tuning Elsewhere? Partisanship, Polarization, and Media Migration from 1998 to 2006|journal=Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly|date=1 March 2008|volume=85|issue=1|pages=23–40|doi=10.1177/107769900808500103|s2cid=144996244}}</ref>

Countries with less diversified but emerging media markets, such as [[China]] and [[South Korea]], have become more polarized due to the diversification of political media.<ref name="yuan-07">{{cite book|last=Yuan|first=Elaine Jingyan|title=The New Multi-channel Media Environment in China: Diversity of Exposure in Television Viewing|year=2007|publisher=Northwestern University|isbn=978-1109940213}}</ref><ref name="kim-11">{{cite book|last=Kim|first=S.J.|title=Emerging patterns of news media use across multiple platforms and their political implications in south korea|year=2011|publisher=Northwestern University|id={{ProQuest|873972899}}}}</ref> In addition, most search engines and social networks (e.g., Google, Facebook) now utilize computer algorithms as filters, which personalize web content based on a user's search history, location, and previous clicking patterns, creating more polarized access to information.<ref>Rushkoff, D. (2010). ''Program or be programmed: Ten commands for a digital age.'' Berkeley, CA: Soft Skull Press.</ref> This method of personalizing web content results in ''[[filter bubble]]s'', a term coined by digital activist [[Eli Pariser]] that refers to the polarized ideological bubbles that are created by computer algorithms filtering out unrelated information and opposing views.<ref>Pariser, E. (2011). ''The filter bubble: What the internet is hiding from you''. New York, NY: The Penguin Press.</ref>

A 2011 study found ideological segregation of online news consumption is lower than the segregation of most offline news consumption and lower than the segregation of face-to-face interactions.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Gentzkow|first1=Matthew|last2=Shapiro|first2=Jesse M.|date=2011-11-01|title=Ideological Segregation Online and Offline *|journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics|volume=126|issue=4|pages=1799–1839|doi=10.1093/qje/qjr044|issn=0033-5533|hdl=1811/52901|s2cid=9303073|url=https://kb.osu.edu/bitstream/1811/52901/1/Mershon_ShapiroJ_photos_2011-10-27.pdf|hdl-access=free}}</ref> This suggests that the filter bubbles effects of online media consumption are exaggerated. Other research also shows that online media does not contribute to the increased polarization of opinions.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Hohenberg|first1=Clemm von|last2=Bernhard|last3=Maes|first3=Michael|last4=Pradelski|first4=Bary S.R.|date=2017-05-25|title=Micro influence and macro dynamics of opinions|doi=10.2139/ssrn.2974413 |ssrn=2974413|s2cid=157851503 }}</ref> [[Solomon Messing]] and Sean J. Westwood state that individuals do not necessarily become polarized through media because they choose their own exposure, which tends to already align with their views.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Messing|first1=Solomon|last2=Westwood|first2=Sean|date=31 Dec 2012|title=Selective Exposure in the Age of Social Media|journal=Communication Research|volume=41|issue=8|pages=1042–1063|doi=10.1177/0093650212466406|s2cid=35373607}}</ref> For instance, in an experiment where people could choose the content they wanted, people did not start to dislike their political opponents more after selecting between pro or anti immigration content.<ref name="Dahlgren, P. M. 2021">{{cite journal |last1=Dahlgren |first1=Peter M. |title=Forced vs. Selective Exposure: Threatening Messages Lead to Anger but Not Dislike of Political Opponents |journal=Journal of Media Psychology |date=2021 |doi=10.1027/1864-1105/a000302|s2cid=266491415 }}</ref> People did, however, start to counterargue the content.<ref name="Dahlgren, P. M. 2021" />

Academic studies found that providing people with impartial, objective information has the potential to reduce political polarization, but the effect of information on polarization is highly sensitive to contextual factors.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Duhaime|first1=Erik|last2=Apfelbaum|first2=Evan|date=2017|title=Can Information Decrease Political Polarization? Evidence From the U.S. Taxpayer Receipt |journal=Social Psychological and Personality Science|volume=8|issue=7|page=736|doi=10.1177/1948550616687126|s2cid=151758489}}</ref> Specifically, polarization over government spending was reduced when people were provided with a "Taxpayer Receipt," but not when they were also asked how they wanted the money to be spent. This suggests that subtle factors like the mood and tone of partisan news sources may have a large effect on how the same information is interpreted. This is confirmed by another study that shows that different emotions of messages can lead to polarization or convergence: joy is prevalent in emotional polarization, while sadness and fear play significant roles in emotional convergence.<ref>Hilbert, M., Ahmed, S., Cho, J., Liu, B., & Luu, J. (2018). Communicating with Algorithms: A Transfer Entropy Analysis of Emotions-based Escapes from Online Echo Chambers. Communication Methods and Measures, 12(4), 260–275. https://doi.org/10.1080/19312458.2018.1479843 ; https://www.martinhilbert.net/communicating-with-algorithms/</ref> These findings can help to design more socially responsible algorithms by starting to focus on the emotional content of algorithmic recommendations.

Research has primarily focused on the [[United States]], a country with high polarization that has also increased over time. In [[Sweden]], on the other hand, there is a stable ideological polarization over time.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Oscarsson |first1=Henrik |last2=Bergman |first2=Torbjörn |last3=Bergström |first3=Annika |last4=Hellström |first4=Johan |title=Demokratirådets rapport 2021: polarisering i Sverige |location=Stockholm |publisher=SNS |year=2021 |isbn=978-9188637567 }}</ref> Experiments and surveys from Sweden also give limited support to the idea of increased ideological or affective polarization due to media use.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Dahlgren |first1=Peter M. |title=Media Echo Chambers: Selective Exposure and Confirmation Bias in Media Use, and its Consequences for Political Polarization |date=2020 |publisher=University of Gothenburg |location=Gothenburg |isbn=978-91-88212-95-5 |url=https://gupea.ub.gu.se/handle/2077/67023?locale=en}}</ref>

{{further|Social media#Political polarization|Echo chamber (media)}}