Editing Richard Helms (section)

===Vietnam: ''Phoenix''===
[[File:Vietnamese villagers suspected of being communists by the US Army - 1966.jpg|thumb|upright|Vietnamese peasants held, suspected of Viet Cong affiliation.]]
As a major element in his counterinsurgency policy, [[Ngo Dinh Diem]] (President 1954–1963) had earlier introduced the establishment of [[strategic hamlet]]s in order to contest Viet Cong operations in the countryside.<ref>Tucker, editor, ''The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' (Oxford University 1998, 2000) p. 385.</ref><ref>The ''strategic hamlet'' was to counter the Viet Cong's ''combat hamlets'' in ''liberated zones''. Douglas Pike, ''Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam'' (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1966) p. 293.</ref> From several antecedents the controversial [[Phoenix program]] was launched during 1967–1968.<ref>Phoenix remains highly controversial. Douglas Valentine's ''The Phoenix Program'' (William Morrow 1992) offers a politically charged attack on its criminal misdeeds. [[Mark Moyar]] presents an establishment view in his ''Phoenix and the Birds of Prey'' (Naval Institute 2000).</ref> Various Vietnamese forces (intelligence, military, police, and civilian) were deployed in the field against Viet Cong support networks. The CIA played a key role in its design and leadership,<ref>Karnow, ''A History of Vietnam'' (1983) pp. 601–602.</ref><ref>Colby (1978) pp. 266–286, at 266–267. The program was called by the Vietnamese government ''Phung Hoang'' (at 267), which in Vietnam was also a mythological bird.</ref> and built on practices developed by Vietnamese, i.e., the provincial chief, Colonel [[Tran Ngoc Chau]].<ref>Zalin Grant, ''Facing the Phoenix: The CIA and the Political Defeat of the United States in Vietnam'' (New York: W. W. Norton 1991) pp. 171–174. "Chau believed that democracy could be created in the countryside and that the best policy was to win the communists over to the government, not kill them. This was why he established an amnesty program." Grant, p. 173.</ref><ref>Cf., Tran Ngoc Chau, ''Vietnamese Labyrinth: Allies, Enemies, and Why the U.S. Lost the war'' (Lubbock: Texas Tech University 2013), foreword by [[Daniel Ellsberg]], e.g., at 229 re CIA and Diem. Yet Colonel Chau caustically writes:

{{quote|[T]he Phoenix Program [was] the infamous perversion of a portion of the Census Grievance pacification program I had instituted in Kien Hoa province. The Phoenix Program was aimed at kidnapping or eliminating enemy leaders, not true pacification—as I had envisioned it.}}|Chau at 332.</ref>

CIA was not officially in control of Phoenix, [[Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support|CORDS]] was. In early 1968, DCI Helms had agreed to allow [[William Colby]] to take a temporary leave of absence from the CIA in order to go to Vietnam and lead CORDS, a position with ambassadorial rank. In doing so, Helms personally felt "thoroughly disgusted"... thinking [[Robert Komer]] had "put a fast one over on him". Komer was then in charge of the CORDS pacification program in South Vietnam. Recently Helms had promoted Colby to a top CIA post: head of the Soviet Division (before Colby had been running the CIA's Far East Division, which included Vietnam). Now Colby transferred out of CIA, to CORDS to run Phoenix.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 335–336.</ref><ref>Colby (1978) pp. 190, 242, 245–247; quotes at 245. Operation Phoenix was part of the CORDS program (at 246–247). [[Agency for International Development|U.S.AID]] funded CORDS, yet CORDS was placed in the [[Military Assistance Command, Vietnam]] (MACV) chain of command (at 267). Colby had served as CIA's chief of station in Saigon during the early 1960s (pp. 141, 162), then at Far East Division in Washington (pp. 178, 190).</ref> Many other Americans worked to monitor and manage the Phoenix program including, according to Helms, "a seemingly ever-increasing number of CIA personnel".<ref>Helms (2003) p. 336 (quote).</ref><ref>Tucker, editor, ''The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' (Oxford University 1998, 2000) p. 329: Phoenix, CORDS, MACV, CIA. "After 1967, U.S.AID economic assistance was channeled through CORDS, established under [MACV] to organize all civilian and military aid programs involved in the pacification effort" (Tucker, p. 437). "Despite negative press reports, top-ranking CIA as well as [communist] leaders agreed that the Phoenix program was a success" (Tucker at 329).</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 436–441.</ref>

[[File:William Colby.jpg|thumb|left|[[William Colby]], a key U.S. officer in Vietnam, later DCI]]
After receiving special Phoenix training, Vietnamese forces in rural areas went head to head against the [[Viet Cong Infrastructure]], e.g., they sought to penetrate communist organizations, to arrest and interrogate or slay their [[Cadre (politics)|cadres]].<ref>Colby (1978) at 269. "Phoenix in fact had no forces of its own," but relied on various Vietnamese police and security services, and civilian programs.</ref><ref>Cf., Ranelagh (1986) at 444.</ref> The Vietnam War resembled a ferocious civil war; the Viet Cong had already assassinated thousands of Vietnamese village leaders.<ref>Pike, ''Viet Cong'' (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1966) p. 102: Table 5-1 (showing assassination numbers for 1957–1965); pp. 246–249 (incidents recounted). Incitement of hatred was often employed in order to keep its cadres prepared for war, quoting Viet Cong literature (Pike, pp. 283–285).</ref><ref>"Schoolteacers ... were another target." Viet Cong used intimidation, kidnapping, torture, indoctrination, execution. [[Denis Warner]], ''The Last Confucian'' (Baltimore: Penguin 1964) p. 161.</ref> Unfortunately, in its strategy of fighting fire with fire, forces in the Phoenix program used torture, and became entangled in actions involving local and official corruption, resulting in many questionable killings, perhaps thousands.<ref>Karnow, ''A History of Vietnam'' (1983) p. 238 (Viet Cong assassinations), p. 602 (Phoenix program brutality).</ref><ref>[[Al Santoli]], editor, ''Everything We Had. An oral history of the Vietnam war by thirty-three American soldiers who fought it'' (New York: Random House 1981; reprint Ballantine 1982) pp. 199–202 "The Phoenix". Bruce Lawlor (CIA case officer in Vietnam) said the Phoenix and pacification programs were "thought of by geniuses and implemented by idiots." The "press reports here in the United States" were "a factor in shutting down the whole program." At first, "the Green Berets were a symbol of counterinsurgency and they were excellent. ... [[Barry Sadler]] [his song] was the worst thing that ever happened to them. ... the Green Berets no more were an elite small unit."</ref><ref>[[David Harris (protester)|David Harris]], ''Our War: What We Did in Vietnam and What it Did to Us'' (New York: Random House 1996) pp. 100–106: a short, caustic sketch of Phoenix operations, which emphasizes the notorious crimes.</ref> Despite its grave faults, Colby opined that the program did work well enough to stop Viet Cong gains. Colby favorably compared ''Operation Phoenix'' with the CIA's relative success in its "secret war" in [[Laotian Civil War|Laos]].<ref>Colby (1978) pp. 266–286 (Phoenix); 194, 195–196, 300–301 (and Laos). Colby was aware of severe problems (pp. 270–271).</ref><ref>Colby wrote a book advancing his counterinsurgency analysis: ''Lost Victory: A First-Hand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam'' (McGraw-Hill 1989).</ref>

Helms notes that the early efforts of Phoenix "were successful, and of serious concern to the NVN [North Vietnamese] leadership". Helms then goes on to recount the Phoenix program's progressive slide into corruption and counterproductive violence, which came to nullify its early success. Accordingly, by the time it was discontinued Phoenix had become useless in the field and a controversial if not a notorious political liability.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 337 (quote), 338.</ref><ref>Antiwar critics at home became convinced that by ''Operation Phoenix'' the CIA was "secretly implementing policies repugnant to the American public". Ranelagh (1986) p. 437.</ref><ref>Joseph Buttinger, ''Vietnam. The unforgettable tragedy'' (New York: Horizon 1977) pp. 82–87, Phoenix program discussed at 86. Buttinger writes that [[Saigon]]'s land reform programs were often defeated by corruption, e.g., lands distributed to peasants in an area under pacification were later seized by former landlords who then charged the peasants rent (p. 114).</ref> Helms in his memoirs presents this situation:

<blockquote>PHOENIX was directed and staffed by Vietnamese over whom the American advisors and liaison officers did not have command or direct supervision. The American staff did its best to eliminate the abuse of authority—the settling of personal scores, rewarding of friends, [[summary execution]]s, prisoner mistreatment, false denunciation, illegal property seizure—that became the by-products of the PHOENIX counterinsurgency effort. In the blood-soaked atmosphere created by Viet Cong terrorism, the notion that regulations and directives imposed by foreign liaison officers could be expected to curb revenge and profit-making was unrealistic.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 336–339, quote at 338 ("staffed by Vietnamese").</ref></blockquote>

After the war, interviews were conducted with Vietnamese communist leaders and military commanders familiar with the Viet Cong organization, its war-making capacity, and support infrastructure. They said the Phoenix operations were very effective against them, reports [[Stanley Karnow]].<ref>Karnow, ''A History of Vietnam'' (1983) pp. 602, 603, citing a VC leader, a VC colonel, a communist general, and the foreign minister of Vietnam in 1975.</ref> [[Thomas E. Ricks (journalist)|Thomas Ricks]], in evaluating the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency tactics of the Marine Corps and of the Phoenix program, confirmed their value by reference to "Hanoi's official history of the war".<ref>[[Thomas E. Ricks (journalist)|Thomas E. Ricks]], ''The Generals. American military command from World War II to today'' (New York: The Penguin Press 2012) pp. 269–273, 320 (''Combined Action Platoon'' program of Marine Corps); at 320–325 (Hanoi's Military History Institute of Vietnam, ''Victory in Vietnam''); at 324–325 (Phoenix); at 269, 342, 433 (Gen. Cushman re counterinsurgency); at 261 (Special Forces and CIA). Ricks links such counterinsurgency actions to new "surge" tactics in Iraq under General [[David Petraeus]] (at 432–438).</ref><ref>Cf. re American counterinsurgency, Thomas Ricks, ''The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008'' (New York: Penguin 2009) pp. 14–17, 24–31, and, e.g., 202–208.</ref> If one discounts the corrupt criminality and its political fallout, the Phoenix partisans were perhaps better able tactically to confront the elusive Viet Cong support networks, i.e., ''the sea in which the fish swam'', than the regular units of the [[Army of the Republic of Viet Nam|ARVN]] and the U. S. Army.<ref>Cf., [[Denis Warner]], ''The Last Confucian'' (Baltimore: Penguin 1964) pp. 17–26.</ref><ref>Cf., Anthony F. Krepinevich, Jr., ''The Army and Vietnam'' (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 1986) p. 221.</ref> Yet the military lessons of the war in full complexity were being understood by the Army, later insisted [[Harry G. Summers, Jr.|Colonel Summers]].<ref>Cf., [[Harry G. Summers, Jr.]], ''On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context'' ([[United States Army War College]], Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute [1981]). Summers' complex work raised many issues, e.g., tactical victory versus strategic defeat (pp. 1–2, 57–58), military aims and political will (13–32); cold war, nuclear war, and of Chinese intervention (33–38); the Viet Cong's revolutionary warfare start versus conventional invasion finish (47–48, 53, 55–57); cohesion of civil and military leadership (87–92, 97–98). Summers opines that the army is not the appropriate institution for "civic action" and "nation-building" (at 48–50, 104).</ref>

Regarding the Phoenix legacy, a sinister controversy haunts it.<ref>Phoenix "became CIA's single most notorious program of the entire war." Powers (1979) p. 207.</ref><ref>The recent ''U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual'' ([2007]; reprint University of Chicago 2007) p. 73 ''et seq.'', positively appraises the CORDS effort in Vietnam, but does not name its Phoenix Program.</ref> Distancing himself, Helms summarized: "As successful a program as PHOENIX was when guided by energetic local leaders," as a national program it succumbed to political corruption and "failed".<ref>Helms (2003) p. 338.</ref> Colby admitted serious faults, yet in conclusion found a positive preponderance.<ref>Colby (1978) pp. 270–280, at 270–271 (his 1969 directive to cure wrongdoing), 272 and 279 (his testimony before congressional committees), and 278–279, 280 (positive improvement then to quality of Vietnamese life in the countryside).</ref> "It was not the CIA," writes [[John Ranelagh]], "that was responsible for the excesses of Phoenix (although the agency clearly condoned what was happening)."<ref>Ranelagh (1986), quote at 439 (the Vietnamese did the "dirty work"). Ranelagh remarks that when Saigon fell in 1975, left behind to cope with the triumphant Communists were "countless counterterrorist agents—perhaps as high as 30,000—specially trained to operate in the Phoenix Program" (pp. 605–606).</ref> Author [[Tim Weiner]] compares the violent excesses of Phoenix to such associated with the early years of the [[Second Iraq War]].<ref>Weiner directly compares Operation Phoenix to what Vice President [[Dick Cheney]] after the [[9/11|September 11, 2001 Attacks]] called ''the dark side'', i.e., "the torture of captured enemy combatants". Weiner (2007) p. 481.</ref><ref>Immediately after 2001 the CIA was radically transformed, according to a national security journalist. "No longer a traditional espionage service ... [the CIA had] become a killing machine, an organization consumed with man hunting." Mark Mazzetti, ''The Way of the Knife. The CIA, a secret army, and a war at the ends of the earth'' (New York: Penguin 2013) p. 4. Yet Mazzetti notes (at 128–129, 132–134) how much of this new paramilitary role has since shifted from CIA back to the military's [[Joint Special Operations Command]] (JSOC).</ref><ref>Priest and Arkin, ''Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State'' (Boston: Little, Brown 2011) p. 33 (some at CIA "despised what they believe the CIA had become" since 2001), at 202–208 (subsequent CIA kill lists re [[Unmanned aerial vehicle|drone]] attacks). Yet the CIA now has been supplanted by the JSOC as the favored agency for lethal covert operations (pp. 53–54, 210–211).</ref>