Editing Schulze method (section)

=== Satisfied criteria ===
The Schulze method satisfies the following criteria:
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* [[Monotonicity criterion]]<ref name="schulze2011">Markus Schulze, "[https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4 A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method]", Social Choice and Welfare, volume 36, number 2, page 267–303, 2011. Preliminary version in ''Voting Matters'', 17:9-19, 2003.</ref>{{rp|§4.5}}
* [[Majority favorite criterion|Majority criterion]]
* [[Majority loser criterion]]
* [[Condorcet criterion]]
* [[Condorcet loser criterion]]
* [[Smith criterion]]<ref name=schulze2011 />{{rp|§4.7}}
* [[Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives]]<ref name=schulze2011 />{{rp|§4.7}}
* [[Mutual majority criterion]]
* [[Independence of clones criterion|Independence of clones]]<ref name=schulze2011 />{{rp|§4.6}}
* [[Reversal symmetry]]<ref name=schulze2011 />{{rp|§4.4}}
* Mono-append<ref name="woodall1994">Douglas R. Woodall, [http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE3/P5.HTM Properties of Preferential Election Rules], ''Voting Matters'', issue 3, pages 8–15, December 1994</ref>
* Mono-add-plump<ref name=woodall1994/>
* [[Resolvability criterion]]<ref name=schulze2011 />{{rp|§4.2}}
* [[Polynomial time|Polynomial runtime]]<ref name=schulze2011 />{{rp|§2.3"}}
* prudence<ref name=schulze2011 />{{rp|§4.9"}}
* MinMax sets<ref name=schulze2011 />{{rp|§4.8"}}
* [[Plurality criterion|Woodall's plurality criterion]] if [[Condorcet method#Defeat strength|winning votes]] are used for d[X,Y]
* Symmetric-completion<ref name=woodall1994/> if [[Condorcet method#Defeat strength|margins]] are used for d[X,Y]
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