Editing Secularization (section)

== Regional developments ==
[[File:State Religions.svg|thumb|326x326px|State religion by country]]

===United States===

'''1870–1930'''. Christian Smith examined the secularization of American public life between 1870 and 1930. He noted that in 1870 a Protestant establishment thoroughly dominated American culture and its public institutions. By the turn of the 20th century, however, [[positivism]] had displaced the [[Baconian method]] (which had hitherto bolstered [[natural theology]]) and higher education had been thoroughly secularized. In the 1910s "[[legal realism]]" gained prominence, de-emphasizing the religious basis for [[law]]. That same decade publishing houses emerged that were independent of the Protestant establishment. During the 1920s secularization extended into popular culture and mass public education ceased to be under Protestant cultural influence. Although the general public was still highly religious during this time period, by 1930 the old Protestant establishment was in "shambles".<ref>Smith, Christian. [https://books.google.com/books?id=IbEwDwAAQBAJ&dq=info:paCf6RiVs7IJ:scholar.google.com/&pg=PR7 ''The Secular Revolution: Powers, Interests, and Conflicts in the Secularization of American Public Life''] (2012) pp.25-28</ref>

Key to understanding the secularization, Smith argues, was the rise of an elite intellectual class skeptical of religious orthodoxies and influenced by the European [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] tradition. They consciously sought to displace a Protestant establishment they saw as standing in their way.<ref>Smith, Christian. [https://books.google.com/books?id=IbEwDwAAQBAJ&dq=info:paCf6RiVs7IJ:scholar.google.com/&pg=PR7 The Secular Revolution: Powers, Interests, and Conflicts in the Secularization of American Public Life] (2012) pp.32-43</ref>

'''2000–2021'''. Annual [[Gallup (company)|Gallup]] polls from 2008 through 2015 showed that the fraction of Americans who did not identify with any particular religion steadily rose from 14.6% in 2008 to 19.6% in 2015. At the same time, the fraction of Americans identifying as [[Christianity in the United States|Christians]] sank from 80.1% to 69% in 2021.<ref name=":3">{{Cite news|url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/187955/percentage-christians-drifting-down-high.aspx|title=Percentage of Christians in U.S. Drifting Down, but Still High|last=Inc.|first=Gallup|work=Gallup.com|access-date=2018-09-03|language=en-us}}</ref><ref name=":4" /> In December 2021 ~21% of Americans declared no religious identity or preference.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/224642/2017-update-americans-religion.aspx|title=2017 Update on Americans and Religion|last=Inc.|first=Gallup|work=Gallup.com|access-date=2018-09-03|language=en-us}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{Cite web|last=Inc|first=Gallup|date=2021-12-23|title=How Religious Are Americans?|url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/358364/religious-americans.aspx|access-date=2021-12-27|website=Gallup.com|language=en}}</ref> Given that non-Christian religions stayed roughly the same (at about 5-7% from 2008 to 2021) secularization thus seems to have affected primarily Christians.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" />

However, researchers argue that being unaffiliated does not automatically mean objectively nonreligious<ref>Frank Newport, ''God is Alive and Well: The Future of Religion in America''. Simon and Schuster (2013). pp 14-15. "All of this points to a simple conclusion: When Americans answer the "what is your religion" question by saying "none," it doesn't necessarily mean that they are devoid of religiousness. A "none" response could also mean that the respondents simply don't belong to a formal religious organization, group, or denomination. Or it could mean that they don't choose to label themselves with the name of a formal religious organization, group, or denomination. The "none" in these instances reflects how the respondents wanted to view themselves or how they chose to express their religion, not necessarily an absence of religiousness.</ref><ref name="Unaff Yet Rel" /><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hout |first1=Michael |last2=Fischer |first2=Claude S. |title=Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Political Backlash and Generational Succession, 1987-2012 |journal=Sociological Science |date=13 October 2014 |volume=1 |pages=423–447 |doi=10.15195/v1.a24|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Hout 2017">{{cite journal |last1=Hout |first1=Michael |title=American Religion, All or Nothing at All |journal=Contexts |date=November 2017 |volume=16 |issue=4 |pages=78–80 |doi=10.1177/1536504217742401|s2cid=67327797 |doi-access=free }}</ref> since most of the unaffiliated do still hold some religious and spiritual beliefs.<ref name="Unaff Yet Rel">{{cite book |last1=Johnson |first1=Todd |last2=Zurlo |first2=Gina |editor1-last=Cipriani |editor1-first=Roberto |editor2-last=Garelli |editor2-first=Franco |title=Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion: Volume 7: Sociology of Atheism |date=2016 |publisher=Brill |location=Leiden |isbn=9789004317536 |pages=56–60 |chapter=Unaffiliated, Yet Religious: A Methodological and Demographic Analysis}}</ref><ref name="Choosing our Religion: The Spiritua">{{cite book |last1=Drescher |first1=Elizabeth |title=Choosing our Religion: The Spiritual Lives of America's Nones |date=2016 |location=New York |isbn=9780199341221}}</ref> For example, 72% of American unaffiliated or "Nones" believe in God or a Higher Power.<ref>{{cite web |title=Key findings about Americans' belief in God |url=https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/25/key-findings-about-americans-belief-in-god/ |website=Pew Research Center |date=April 25, 2018}}</ref> The "None" response is more of an indicator for lacking affiliation than an active measure for irreligiosity, and a majority of the "Nones" can either be conventionally religious or "spiritual".<ref>Frank Newport, ''God is Alive and Well: The Future of Religion in America''. Simon and Schuster (2013). pp 14-15.</ref><ref name="Unaff Yet Rel" /><ref name="Choosing our Religion: The Spiritua"/>

===Britain===
====History====

In Britain, secularization came much later than in most of Western Europe. It began in the 1960s as part of a much larger social and cultural revolution. Until then the postwar years had seen a revival of religiosity in Britain.<ref>Callum G. Brown, ''The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation, 1800-2000'' (2009) pp 170-92.</ref> Sociologists and historians have engaged in vigorous debates over when it started, how fast it happened, and what caused it.<ref>Jeremy Morris, "Secularization and religious experience: arguments in the historiography of modern British religion." ''Historical Journal'' 55#1 (2012): 195-219.</ref>

Sponsorship by royalty, aristocracy, and influential local gentry provided an important support system for organized religion. The sponsorship faded away in the 20th century, as the local élites were no longer so powerful or so financially able to subsidize their favorite activities. In coal-mining districts, local collieries typically funded local chapels, but that ended{{when|date=March 2016}} as the industry grew distressed and the unionized miners rejected élite interference in their local affairs. This allowed secularizing forces to gain strength.<ref>Steve Bruce, "Patronage and secularization: social obligation and church support Patronage and secularization: social obligation and church support," ''British Journal of Sociology'' (2012) 63#3 pp 533-552.</ref>

====Recent developments====

Data from the annual [[British Social Attitudes Survey|British Social Attitudes survey]] and the biennial [[European Social Survey]] suggest that the proportion of Britons who identify as Christian fell from 55% (in 1983) to 43% (in 2015). While members of non-Christian religions – principally Muslims and Hindus – quadrupled, the non-religious ("nones") now make up 53% of the British population.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21728600-only-15-call-themselves-anglicans-dont-bet-church-losing-its-official-role-any-time|title=A majority of Britons now follow no religion|date=9 Sep 2017|newspaper=The Economist|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171013065031/https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21728600-only-15-call-themselves-anglicans-dont-bet-church-losing-its-official-role-any-time|archive-date=2017-10-13|url-status=live}}</ref> More than six in 10 "nones" were brought up as Christians, mainly Anglican or Catholic. Only 2% of "nones" were raised in religions other than Christian.<ref name=":1">{{Cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/13/uk-losing-faith-religion-young-reject-parents-beliefs|title=Nearly 50% are of no religion – but has UK hit 'peak secular'?|last1=Sherwood|first1=Harriet|date=2017-05-13|work=The Guardian|access-date=2017-09-01|last2=correspondent|first2=religion|language=en-GB|issn=0261-3077|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170831194722/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/13/uk-losing-faith-religion-young-reject-parents-beliefs|archive-date=2017-08-31}}</ref> People who were brought up to practice a religion, but who now identify as having no religion, so-called "non-verts", had different rates of leaving the religion of their upbringing, namely 14% for Jews, 10% for Muslims and Sikhs, and 6% for Hindus. The proportions of the non-religious who convert to a faith are small: 3% now identify as Anglicans, less than 0.5% convert to Catholicism, 2% join other Christian denominations, and 2% convert to non-Christian faiths.<ref name=":1" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Bullivant |first=Steven |date=2017 |title=The "No Religion" Population of Britain: Recent Data from the British Social Attitudes Survey (2015) and the European Social Survey (2014) |url=https://www.stmarys.ac.uk/research/centres/benedict-xvi/docs/2017-may-no-religion-report.pdf |access-date=2024-03-27 |website=[[St Mary's University, Twickenham]]}}</ref>

In 2018, [[Pew Research Center]] that large majority (89%) of those who were raised as Christians in the United Kingdom still identify as such, while the remainder mostly self-identify as religiously unaffiliated.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2018-05-29|title=Being Christian in Western Europe|url=https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2018/05/Being-Christian-in-Western-Europe-FOR-WEB1.pdf|access-date=2021-01-21|website=Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project|language=en-US}}</ref>

=== Spain ===
Spain used to be one of the most religious countries in Europe, but secularization has progressed fast during the past few decades. This was partly due to the role of the [[Catholic Church]] constituting the "doctrinal basis of the most significant organizations of the anti-democratic and anti-liberal right-wing"<ref>{{Cite book|pages=255–263|chapter=Catolicismo y derecha autoritaria. Del maurismo a Falange Española|title=Religión y sociedad en España (siglos XIX y XX)|editor-first=Paul|editor-last=Aubert|year=2002|location=Madrid|publisher=[[Casa de Velázquez]]|first=Juan|last=Avilés Farré|series=Collection de la Casa de Velázquez |isbn=9788490961124 |author-link=Juan Avilés Farré|chapter-url=https://books.openedition.org/cvz/2771?lang=es}}</ref> and the resulting [[anti-clericalism]] that was one of the roots of the [[Spanish Civil War|Spanish civil war]]. Notably, the dictatorship of [[Francisco Franco]]'s core ideology was [[national Catholicism]].

However, agreements linked to the constitution of 1978 separated church and state. In 2001, 82% of Spaniards identified as Catholic but only half did in 2021. Only around 20% of Spaniards go to mass regularly and only 20% of weddings are taking place in a church (2019). Similarly, [[divorce]] was legalized in 1981, as was [[abortion]] and [[same-sex marriage]] soon after.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Anonymous|date=2021-05-01|title=Religion in Spain - Empty pews, big pulpit.|newspaper=The Economist|volume=May 1, 2021|pages=26–27}}</ref>

=== Germany ===
Like other European countries, Germany has recorded a decrease in [[religiosity]] (in terms of proportion of individuals affiliated to a Church and baptisms for example) but the trends in East and West Germany are significantly different. In East Germany, the process of secularization has been significantly quicker.<ref>Melissa Hardy, Vegard Skirbekk & Marcin Stonawski (2020) The Religiously Unaffiliated in Germany, 1949–2013: Contrasting Patterns of Social Change in East and West, The Sociological Quarterly, 61:2, 254-286, https://doi.org/10.1080/00380253.2019.1593064.</ref> These differences are explained by sociologists ([[Jörg Stolz]], Detlef Pollack and [[Nan Dirk de Graaf]]<ref>Jörg Stolz, Detlef Pollack, Nan Dirk De Graaf, Can the State Accelerate the Secular Transition? Secularization in East and West Germany as a Natural Experiment, European Sociological Review, Volume 36, Issue 4, August 2020, Pages 626–642, https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcaa014.</ref>) by the State repression in the 1950s and 1960s, which challenges predictions of natural cohort replacements stated by the Voas model.<ref>David Voas, The Rise and Fall of Fuzzy Fidelity in Europe, European Sociological Review, Volume 25, Issue 2, April 2009, Pages 155–168, https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcn044.</ref>

===Asia===
==== India ====
{{See also|Secularism in India}}
[[India]], post-independence, has seen the emergence of an assertive secular state.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Galanter|first=Marc|title=Hinduism, Secularism, and the Indian Judiciary|journal=Philosophy East and West|volume=21}}</ref>

==== China ====

One traditional view of Chinese culture sees the teachings of [[Confucianism]] – influential over many centuries – as basically secular.<ref>
{{cite web
 |url          = http://www.the-american-interest.com/2012/02/15/is-confucianism-a-religion/
 |title        = Is Confucianism a Religion?
 |last1        = Berger
 |first1       = Peter
 |author-link1 = Peter L. Berger
 |date         = 2012-02-15
 |website      = The American Interest
 |issn         = 1556-5777
 |publisher    = The American Interest LLC
 |access-date  = 2016-03-03
 |quote        = There can be no doubt that Confucianism has been a powerful cultural influence throughout East Asia, providing social and political values not only in China, but in Japan, South Korea and Vietnam. [...] [T]here has been the view of Confucianism as nothing but a secular, perhaps even a secularizing morality.
 |url-status      = live
 |archive-url   = https://web.archive.org/web/20150817062142/http://www.the-american-interest.com/2012/02/15/is-confucianism-a-religion/
 |archive-date  = 2015-08-17
}}
</ref>

Chang Pao-min summarises perceived historical consequences of very early secularization in China:

<blockquote>
The early secularization of Chinese society, which must be recognized as a sign of modernity [...] has ironically left China for centuries without a powerful and stable source of morality and law. All this simply means that the pursuit of wealth or power or simply the competition for survival can be and often has been ruthless without any sense of restraint. [...] Along with the early secularization of Chinese society which was equally early, the concomitant demise of feudalism and hereditary aristocracy, another remarkable development, transformed China earlier than any other country into a unitary system politically, with one single power centre. It also rendered Chinese society much more egalitarian than Western Europe and Japan.<ref>
{{cite journal
| last1                 = Chang
| first1                = Pao-min
| date                  = 1999
| title                 = Corruption and Crime in China: Old Problems and New trends
| jstor                   = 23257220 
| journal               = The Journal of East Asian Affairs
| publisher             = Institute for National Security Strategy
| publication-date      = 1999
| volume                = 13
| issue                 = 1, Spring/Summer
| page                  = 223
| issn                  = 1010-1608
}}
quoted in:
{{cite book
| last1 = Bao-Er
| title = China's Child Contracts: A philosophy of child rights in twenty-first century China
| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=ohtoVh2twaYC
| location = Blaxland, New South Wales
| publisher = The Blue Mountains Legal Research Centre
| date = 2007
| page = 43
| isbn = 9781921300561
| access-date = 2016-03-03
}}
</ref>
</blockquote>

In this arguably secular setting, the [[Chinese Communist Party]] régime of the [[China|People's Republic of China]] (in power on the Chinese mainland from 1949) promoted deliberate secularization.<ref>
See for example:
{{cite book
| last1 = Marsh
| first1 = Christopher
| chapter = Introduction: From Forced Secularization to Desecularization
| title = Religion and the State in Russia and China: Suppression, Survival, and Revival
| chapter-url = https://books.google.com/books?id=-xlLFUegIBQC
| publisher = A&C Black
| date = 2011
| page = 10
| isbn = 9781441112477
| access-date = 2016-03-03
| quote = [...] forced secularization is not so easily achieved, and [...] the lengths to which the Soviet and PRC regimes went was insufficient to completely - or even thoroughly - expunge religion from society. [...] [T]hese regimes were willing to go to great lengths to eliminate religion in the name of science and progress, and the outcome at every stage was uncertain.
}}
</ref>

=== Arab world ===
{{Main|Islam and secularism}}Many countries in the Arab world show signs of increasing secularization. For instance, in [[Egypt]], support for imposing [[sharia]] (Islamic law) fell from 84% in 2011 to 34% in 2016. Egyptians also pray less: among older Egyptians (55+) 90% prayed daily in 2011. Among the younger generation (age 18–24) that fraction was only 70% in 2011. By contrast, in 2016 these numbers had fallen to <80% (55+) and <40% (18–24).<ref name=":2" /> The other age groups were in between these values. In [[Lebanon]] and [[Morocco]], the number of people listening to daily recitals of the Quran fell by half from 2011 to 2016.<ref name=":2">{{Cite news|date=4 Nov 2017|title=The new Arab Cosmopolitans.|newspaper=The Economist}}</ref> Some of these developments seem to be driven by need, e.g. by stagnating incomes which force women to contribute to household income and therefore to work. High living costs delay marriage and, as a consequence, seem to encourage pre-marital sex.<ref name=":2" /> However, in other countries, such as [[Jordan]] and [[Palestine]], support for sharia and Islamist ideas seems to grow. Even in countries in which secularization is growing, there are backlashes. For instance, the president of Egypt, [[Abdel Fattah el-Sisi|Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi]], has banned hundreds of newspapers and websites who may provoke opposition.<ref name=":2" />