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Stable matching problem
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==Further reading== * Kleinberg, J., and Tardos, E. (2005) ''Algorithm Design'', Chapter 1, pp 1β12. See companion website for the Text [http://www.aw-bc.com/info/kleinberg/] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110514100625/http://www.aw-bc.com/info/kleinberg/ |date=2011-05-14 }}. * {{cite book |author-link=Donald Knuth |last=Knuth |first=D. E. |year=1996 |title=Stable Marriage and Its Relation to Other Combinatorial Problems: An Introduction to the Mathematical Analysis of Algorithms |others=English translation |series=CRM Proceedings and Lecture Notes |publisher=American Mathematical Society }} * {{cite journal |last=Pittel |first=B. |year=1992 |title=On likely solutions of a stable marriage problem |journal=[[The Annals of Applied Probability]] |volume=2 |issue=2 |pages=358β401 |doi=10.1214/aoap/1177005708 |jstor=2959755 |doi-access=free }} * {{cite journal |last=Roth |first=A. E. |year=1984 |title=The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory |journal=[[Journal of Political Economy]] |volume=92 |issue=6 |pages=991β1016 |doi=10.1086/261272 |s2cid=1360205 |url=http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/29410143/evolut.pdf }} * {{cite book | last1=Roth |first1=A. E. |last2=Sotomayor |first2=M. A. O. |year=1990 |title=Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |title-link= Two-Sided Matching}} * {{cite book | last1=Shoham | first1=Yoav | last2=Leyton-Brown | first2=Kevin | title=Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations | publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] | isbn=978-0-521-89943-7 | url=http://www.masfoundations.org | year=2009 | location=New York}} See Section 10.6.4; [http://www.masfoundations.org/download.html downloadable free online]. * {{cite book|author1=Schummer, J.|author2=Vohra, R. V.| isbn = 978-0521872829 |chapter=Mechanism design without money| title = Algorithmic Game Theory | editor1-last = Nisan | editor1-first= Noam |year=2007 | chapter-url = http://www.cambridge.org/journals/nisan/downloads/Nisan_Non-printable.pdf | editor2-last = Roughgarden | editor2-first= Tim | editor3-last = Tardos | editor3-first= Eva | editor4-last = Vazirani | editor4-first= Vijay | pages = 255β262}} * {{cite book | last1=Gusfield | first1=D. | last2=Irving | first2= R.W. | title=The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms. | publisher=[[MIT Press]] | year=1989 | url=https://archive.org/details/stablemarriagepr0000gusf/mode/2up | isbn=0-262-07118-5}}
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