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Thomas Schelling
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===''Arms and Influence'' (1966)=== Schelling's theories about war were extended in ''Arms and Influence'', published in 1966.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/book.asp?isbn=0300002211|title=Arms and Influence β Schelling, Thomas C. β Yale University Press|date=January 7, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160107193224/http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/book.asp?isbn=0300002211|archive-date=January 7, 2016}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Leites |first=Nathan |date=1967 |title=Weakening the Belief in General War: Schelling on Strikes |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/weakening-the-belief-in-general-war-schelling-on-strikes/49FC8EB55E8BEDBCF7A1A91B0EB1A4D9 |journal=World Politics |language=en |volume=19 |issue=4 |pages=709β719 |doi=10.2307/2009722 |jstor=2009722 |issn=1086-3338|url-access=subscription }}</ref> According to the publisher, the book "carries forward the analysis so brilliantly begun in his earlier ''The Strategy of Conflict'' (1960) and ''Strategy and Arms Control'' (with [[Morton Halperin]], 1961), and makes a significant contribution to the growing literature on modern war and [[diplomacy]]." Chapter headings include ''The Diplomacy of Violence'', ''The Diplomacy of Ultimate Survival'' and ''The Dynamics of Mutual Alarm''. Within the work, Schelling discusses military capabilities and how they can be used as bargaining power. Instead of considering only the choices that are available on a surface level, one can think ahead to try to influence the other party to come to the desired conclusion. Specifically, Schelling mentions the actions taken by the U.S. during the Cuban and Berlin crises and how they functioned as not only preparation for war but also signals. For example, Schelling points out that the bombing of North Vietnam "is as much coercive as tactical."<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300143379/arms-and-influence|title=Arms and Influence {{!}} Yale University Press|website=yalebooks.yale.edu|access-date=2019-11-14}}</ref> Not only was the bombing to cripple their enemies armies, but it also served to bring Vietnam to the table for negotiations. Much of this writing was influenced largely due to Schelling's personal interest in Game Theory and its application to nuclear armaments. Schelling's work influenced [[Robert Jervis]].''<ref name=":02">{{Cite web|last=Jervis|first=Robert|date=March 4, 2020|title=H-Diplo Essay 198- Robert Jervis on Learning the Scholar's Craft|url=https://issforum.org/essays/198-jervis|access-date=June 8, 2021|website=H-Diplo {{!}} ISSF|language=en-US}}</ref>''<ref>{{Cite web|last=Jervis|first=Robert|date=December 28, 2016|title=Thomas C. Schelling: A Reminiscence|url=https://warontherocks.com/2016/12/thomas-c-schelling-a-reminiscence/|access-date=December 10, 2021|website=War on the Rocks|language=en-US}}</ref>
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