Editing Value theory (section)

== Schools of thought ==
=== Realism and anti-realism ===
Value [[Philosophical realism|realism]] is the view that values have mind-independent existence.<ref name="auto3">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KhqPito92b8C&pg=PA11 11]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>{{efn|If this position limits itself to the moral realm, it is known as ''[[moral realism]]'', an influential position in [[ethics]].<ref name="auto3"/>}} This means that [[Subjectivity and objectivity (philosophy)|objective]] facts determine what has value, irrespective of subjective beliefs and preferences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|pp=639–640}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> According to this view, the evaluative statement "That act is bad" is as objectively true or false as the empirical statement "That act causes distress".<ref>{{harvnb|Zagzebski|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KhqPito92b8C&pg=PA11 11–12]}}</ref>

Realists often analyze values as [[Property (philosophy)|properties]] of valuable things.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|pp=639–640}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section, § Do Value Claims Have Truth Makers?}} | {{harvnb|Oliver|1998}} }}</ref> For example, stating that kindness is good asserts that kindness possesses the property of goodness. Value realists disagree about what type of property is involved. [[Ethical naturalism|Naturalists]] say that value is a natural property. Natural properties, like size and shape, can be known through [[Empirical evidence|empirical observation]] and are studied by the natural sciences. [[Ethical non-naturalism|Non-naturalists]] reject this view but agree that values are real. They say that values differ significantly from empirical properties and belong to another domain of reality. According to one view, they are known through rational or emotional intuition rather than empirical observation.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|pp=639–640}} | {{harvnb|Lutz|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. What Is Moral Naturalism?}} | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 4a. Moral Realisms}} | {{harvnb|FitzPatrick|2011|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230294899_2 7–8]}} | {{harvnb|Ridge|2019|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Oliver|1998}} }}</ref>

Another disagreement among realists is about whether the entity carrying the value is a concrete [[Particular|individual]] or a [[State of affairs (philosophy)|state of affairs]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA35 35]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Bradley|2006|pp=111–112}} | {{harvnb|Oliveira|2016|loc=§ 1. Introduction}} }}</ref> For instance, the name "Bill" refers to an individual while the sentence "Bill is pleased" refers to a state of affairs, which combines the individual "Bill" with the property "pleased". Some value theorists hold that the value is a property directly of Bill while others contend that it is a property of the state of affairs that Bill is pleased.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA35 35]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Bradley|2006|pp=111–112, 115}} | {{harvnb|Oliveira|2016|loc=§ 1. Introduction}} }}</ref> This distinction affects various disputes in value theory. In some cases, a value is intrinsic according to one view and extrinsic according to the other.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA35 35–36, 130–131]}} | {{harvnb|Bradley|2006|pp=111–112}} }}</ref>

Value realism contrasts with [[anti-realism]], which comes in various forms. In its strongest version, anti-realism rejects the existence of values in any form, claiming that value statements are meaningless.<ref>{{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section, § Are Value Claims Truth Evaluable?, § Value Realism by Degrees: a Flow Chart}}</ref>{{efn|This view is sometimes called ''radical [[nihilism]]''.<ref>{{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=§ Are Value Claims Truth Evaluable?, § Quasi-Realism and Creeping Minimalism}}</ref>}} There are various intermediate views between this position and realism. Some anti-realists accept that value claims have meaning but deny that they have a [[truth value]],{{efn|This means that value statements are neither true nor false.<ref>{{harvnb|HarperCollins|2022a}}</ref>}} a position known as ''[[non-cognitivism]]''. For example, [[Emotivism|emotivists]] say that value claims express emotional attitudes, similar to how exclamations like "Yay!" or "Boo!" express emotions rather than stating facts.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=§ Are Value Claims Truth Evaluable?}} | {{harvnb|Tappolet|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA80 80]}} | {{harvnb|DeNicola|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_sp6DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA267 267]}} | {{harvnb|Oliver|1998}} }}</ref>{{efn|[[Projectivism]] is a closely related view holding that values are projections of emotions onto the world.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tappolet|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA80 80]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=§ Quasi-Realism and Creeping Minimalism}} | {{harvnb|Oliver|1998}} }}</ref>}}

[[Cognitivism (ethics)|Cognitivists]] contend that value statements have a truth value. Following this view, [[Error theory|error theorists]] defend anti-realism by stating that all value statements are false because there are no values.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=§ Do Value Claims Have Truth Makers?}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|1988|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-msmrkE-67IC&pg=PA10 10]}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KhqPito92b8C&pg=PA14 14]}} | {{harvnb|Oliver|1998}} }}</ref> Another view accepts the existence of values but denies that they are mind-independent. According to this view, the [[mental state]]s of individuals determine whether an object has value, for instance, because individuals desire it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=§ Are the Value Facts Mind Independent?}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA60 60–62]}} | {{harvnb|Mander|2016|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=f0UFCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT14 § 2.3 An Overview]}} }}</ref> A similar view is defended by [[Existentialism|existentialists]] like [[Jean-Paul Sartre]], who argued that values are human creations that endow the world with meaning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Onof|loc=§6c. An Ethical Dimension}} | {{harvnb|Landau|2012|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> Subjectivist theories say that values are relative to each subject, whereas more objectivist outlooks hold that values depend on [[mind]] in general rather than on the individual mind.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=§ Are the Value Facts Mind Independent?}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA60 60–62]}} }}</ref>

A different position accepts that values are mind-independent but holds that they are reducible to other facts, meaning that they are not a fundamental part of reality. One form of [[reductionism]] maintains that a thing is good if it is fitting to favor this thing, regardless of whether people actually favor it, a position known as the ''fitting-attitude theory of value''. The buck-passing account, a closely related reductive view, argues that a thing is valuable if people have reasons to treat the thing in certain ways. These reasons come from other features of the valuable thing. According to some views, reductionism is a form of realism, but the strongest form of realism says that value is a fundamental part of reality and cannot be reduced to other aspects.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section, § Are the Value Facts Irreducible?, § Value Realism by Degrees: a Flow Chart}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA67 67–68]}} | {{harvnb|Oliver|1998}} | {{harvnb|Howard|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1.5 Buck Passing}} | {{harvnb|Suikkanen|2009|pp=768–769}} }}</ref>

=== Sources of value ===
Various theories about the sources of value have been proposed. They aim to clarify what kinds of things are intrinsically good.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA357 357]}} | {{harvnb|Oliveira|2016|loc=§ 1. Introduction}} | {{harvnb|Kershnar|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vwMN7WRb2fEC&pg=PA37 37]}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA140 140]}} }}</ref> The historically influential theory of [[hedonism]]{{efn|This view is sometimes called ''axiological hedonism'' to distinguish it from related theories under this label.<ref>{{harvnb|de Bres|2014|pp=[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-rawls-lexicon/hedonism/602FBE3D4ACFED4422C43BCCBA3BAB48 336–338]}}</ref>}} states that how people feel is the only source of value. More specifically, it says that [[pleasure]] is the only intrinsic good and [[pain]] is the only intrinsic evil.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA359 359]}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA140 140]}} }}</ref> According to this view, everything else only has instrumental value to the extent that it leads to pleasure or pain, including knowledge, health, and justice. Hedonists usually understand the term ''pleasure'' in a broad sense that covers all kinds of enjoyable experiences, including bodily pleasures of food and sex as well as more intellectual or abstract pleasures, like the joy of reading a book or happiness about a friend's promotion. Pleasurable experiences come in degrees, and hedonists usually associate their intensity and duration with the magnitude of value they have.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA359 359–360]}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 2. Ethical Hedonism}} }}</ref>{{efn|Qualitative hedonists argue that the quality of pleasure is an additional factor influencing its value besides intensity and duration. Some distinguish higher pleasures of the mind, like enjoying fine art and philosophy, from lower pleasures of the body, like enjoying food and drink.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ III. Axiological Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2013|loc=§ What Determines the Intrinsic Value of a Pleasure or a Pain?}} }}</ref>}}

Many hedonists identify pleasure and pain as symmetric opposites, meaning that the value of pleasure balances out the disvalue of pain if they have the same intensity. However, some hedonists reject this symmetry and give more weight to avoiding pain than to experiencing pleasure.<ref>{{harvnb|Hurka|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA360 360]}}</ref> Although it is widely accepted that pleasure is valuable, the hedonist claim that it is the only source of value is controversial.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA361 361]}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 2.3 Other Arguments Against Ethical Hedonism}} }}</ref> [[Welfarism]], a closely related theory, understands [[well-being]] as the only source of value. Well-being is what is ultimately good for a person, which can include other aspects besides pleasure, such as health, [[personal growth]], meaningful [[Interpersonal relationship|relationships]], and a sense of purpose in life.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2021|loc=Lead section, § 5.1 Welfarism}} | {{harvnb|Hall|Tiberius|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zZdGCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA175 175–176]}} | {{harvnb|Nebel|2024|loc=§ Introduction}} | {{harvnb|Hooker|2015|pp=15–16}} }}</ref>

Desire theories offer a slightly different account, stating that desire satisfaction{{efn|Some theorists use the terms ''desire satisfaction'' and ''desire fulfillment'' as synonyms while others distinguish between them. According to the latter view, desire satisfaction is a subjective state involving a possibly false belief that a desire is satisfied. Desire fulfillment is an objective state present if the desired outcome actually exists, even if the person does not know about it.<ref>{{harvnb|Oddie|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OTElDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA49 49]}}</ref>}} is the only source of value.{{efn|Some desire theories aim to explain goodness in general while others restrict themselves to goodness for a person.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA362 362–363]}} | {{harvnb|Scanlon|1993|pp=186–187}} }}</ref>}} This theory overlaps with hedonism because many people desire pleasure and because desire satisfaction is often accompanied by pleasure. Nonetheless, there are important differences: people desire a variety of other things as well, like knowledge, achievement, and respect; additionally, desire satisfaction may not always result in pleasure.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA361 361–362, 364]}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA140 140]}} }}</ref> Some desire theorists hold that value is a property of desire satisfaction itself, while others say that it is a property of the objects that satisfy a desire.<ref>{{harvnb|Hurka|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA362 362–363]}}</ref> One debate in desire theory concerns whether every desire is a source of value. For example, if a person has a false belief that money makes them happy, it is questionable whether the satisfaction of their desire for money is a source of value. To address this consideration, some desire theorists say that a desire can only provide value if a fully informed and rational person would have it, thereby excluding misguided desires from being a source of value.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA362 362–363]}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2016|pp=138–140}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 3.2 Fitting Attitudes}} | {{harvnb|Scanlon|1993|pp=186–187}} }}</ref>

[[Perfectionism (philosophy)|Perfectionism]] identifies the realization of [[human nature]] and the cultivation of characteristic human abilities as the source of intrinsic goodness. It covers capacities and character traits belonging to the bodily, emotional, volitional, cognitive, social, artistic, and religious fields. Perfectionists disagree about which human excellences are the most important. Many are pluralistic in recognizing a diverse array of human excellences, such as knowledge, creativity, health, beauty, free agency, and moral virtues like benevolence and courage.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Shea|Kintz|2022|p=461}} | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA364 364–366]}} | {{harvnb|Wall|2021|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA140 140]}} }}</ref> According to one suggestion, there are two main fields of human goods: theoretical abilities responsible for understanding the world and practical abilities responsible for interacting with it.<ref>{{harvnb|Hurka|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA364 364]}}</ref> Some perfectionists provide an ideal characterization of human nature as the goal of human flourishing, holding that human excellences are those aspects that promote the realization of this goal. This view is exemplified in [[Aristotle]]'s focus on [[rationality]] as the nature and ideal state of human beings.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA365 365–366]}} | {{harvnb|Wall|2021|loc=§ 1. Perfectionism and Value Theory}} }}</ref> Non-humanistic versions extend perfectionism to the natural world in general, arguing that excellence as a source of intrinsic value is not limited to the human realm.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wall|2021|loc=§ 1. Perfectionism and Value Theory}} | {{harvnb|Gill|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=VMcFEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA85 85]}} }}</ref>

=== Monism and pluralism ===
[[Monism|Monist]] theories of value assert that there is only a single source of intrinsic value. They agree that various things have value but maintain that all fundamentally good things belong to the same type. For example, hedonists hold that nothing but pleasure has intrinsic value, while desire theorists argue that desire satisfaction is the only source of fundamental goodness. [[Pluralism (philosophy)|Pluralists]] reject this view, contending that a simple single-value system is too crude to capture the complexity of the sphere of values. They say that diverse sources of value exist independently of one another, each contributing to the overall value of the world.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA136 136–137, 139–140]}} | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 2.2 Monism/Pluralism}} | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA358 358–359]}} }}</ref>

One motivation for value pluralism is the observation that people value diverse types of things, including happiness, friendship, success, and knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 2.2 Monism/Pluralism}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA145 145–146]}} }}</ref> This diversity becomes particularly prominent when people face difficult decisions between competing values, such as choosing between friendship and career success.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 2. The Attraction of Pluralism}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 2.2 Monism/Pluralism}} }}</ref> In such cases, value pluralists can argue that the different items have different types of values. Since monists accept only one source of intrinsic value, they may provide a different explanation by proposing that some of the valuable items only have instrumental value but lack intrinsic value.<ref>{{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 2.2.2 Revisionary Commitments?}}</ref>

[[File:IsaiahBerlin1983.jpg|thumb|alt=Black-and-white photo of a man with glasses wearing a suit and a bow tie|[[Isaiah Berlin]] argued that conflicts between different types of values, like [[liberty]] and [[Social equality|equality]], cannot always be resolved.<ref>{{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 4.4 Accepting Incomparability}}</ref>]]

Pluralists have proposed various accounts of how their view affects practical decisions. Rational decisions often rely on value comparisons to determine which course of action should be pursued.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 4. Pluralism and Rational Choice}} | {{harvnb|Hsieh|Andersson|2021|loc=Lead section, § 4. Deliberation and Choice}} }}</ref> Some pluralists discuss a hierarchy of values reflecting the relative importance and weight of different value types to help people promote higher values when faced with difficult choices.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kinneging|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1Qya55bssVQC&pg=PA206 206–207]}} | {{harvnb|Perrin|1991|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-6ewCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA69 69, 73–74, 76]}} }}</ref> For example, philosopher [[Max Scheler]] ranks values based on how enduring and fulfilling they are into the levels of pleasure, utility, vitality, culture, and holiness. He asserts that people should not promote lower values, like pleasure, if this comes at the expense of higher values.<ref name="auto13">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Perrin|1991|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-6ewCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA69 69, 73–74, 76–80]}} | {{harvnb|Davis|Steinbock|2024|loc=§ 3. Value Personalism}} }}</ref>{{efn|In some places, Scheler talks about four levels instead of five: sensory, vital, spiritual, and holy.<ref>{{harvnb|Perrin|1991|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-6ewCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA76 76–80]}}</ref>}}

Radical pluralists reject this approach, putting more emphasis on diversity by holding that different types of values are not comparable with each other. This means that each value type is unique, making it impossible to determine which one is superior.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 142–143]}} | {{harvnb|Hsieh|Andersson|2021|loc=§ 1.2 Incommensurable or Incomparable?}} }}</ref>{{efn|More specifically, this implies that one value is not better than the other, not worse than the other, and not as good as the other.<ref>{{harvnb|Hsieh|Andersson|2021|loc=§ 1.2 Incommensurable or Incomparable?}}</ref>}} Some value theorists use radical pluralism to argue that value conflicts are inevitable, that the gain of one value cannot always compensate for the loss of another, and that some [[ethical dilemmas]] are irresolvable.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 4.4 Accepting Incomparability}} | {{harvnb|Hsieh|Andersson|2021|loc=§ 3.2 Moral Dilemmas?}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 142–143]}} }}</ref> For example, philosopher [[Isaiah Berlin]] applied this idea to the values of [[liberty]] and [[Social equality|equality]], arguing that a gain in one cannot make up for a loss in the other. Similarly, philosopher [[Joseph Raz]] said that it is often impossible to compare the values of career paths, like when choosing between becoming a [[lawyer]] or a [[clarinetist]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 4.4 Accepting Incomparability}} | {{harvnb|Hsieh|Andersson|2021|loc=§ 1.2 Incommensurable or Incomparable?}} | {{harvnb|Cherniss|Hardy|2023|loc=§ 4.1 Berlin’s Definition of Value Pluralism}} }}</ref> The terms ''incomparability'' and ''incommensurability'' are often used as synonyms in this context. However, philosophers like [[Ruth Chang]] distinguish them. According to this view, incommensurability means that there is no common measure to quantify values of different types. Incommensurable values may or may not be comparable. If they are, it is possible to say that one value is better than another, but it is not possible to quantify how much better it is.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 4. Pluralism and Rational Choice}} | {{harvnb|Hsieh|Andersson|2021|loc=§ 1.2 Incommensurable or Incomparable?}} }}</ref>

=== Others ===
Several controversies surround the question of how the intrinsic value of a [[Mereology|whole]] is determined by the intrinsic values of its parts. According to the additivity principle, the intrinsic value of a whole is simply the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. For example, if a virtuous person becomes happy then the intrinsic value of the happiness is simply added to the intrinsic value of the virtue, thereby increasing the overall value.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|2001|pp=313, 318}} | {{harvnb|Dancy|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_78SDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA188 188]}} }}</ref>

[[File:1914 George Edward Moore (cropped).jpg|thumb|alt=Black-and-white photo of man wearing a suit with a pipe in his mouth|[[G. E. Moore]] introduced the idea of organic unities to describe entities whose total intrinsic value is not the sum of the intrinsic values of their parts.<ref>{{harvnb|Hurka|2021|loc=§ 4. The Ideal}}</ref>]]

Various counterexamples to the additivity principle have been proposed, suggesting that the relation between parts and wholes is more complex. For instance, [[Immanuel Kant]] argued that if a vicious person becomes happy, this happiness, though good in itself, does not increase the overall value. On the contrary, it makes things worse, according to Kant, since viciousness should not be rewarded with happiness. This situation is known as an ''organic unity''{{em dash}}a whole whose intrinsic value differs from the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|2001|pp=313, 318}} | {{harvnb|Dancy|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_78SDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA176 176–177]}} }}</ref> Another perspective, called ''holism about value'', asserts that the intrinsic value of a thing depends on its context. Holists can argue that happiness has positive intrinsic value in the context of virtue and negative intrinsic value in the context of vice. Atomists reject this view, saying that intrinsic value is context-independent.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA98 98–100]}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021a}} | {{harvnb|Dancy|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_78SDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA176 176–177]}} }}</ref>

Theories of value aggregation provide concrete principles for calculating the overall value of an outcome based on how positively or negatively each individual is affected by it. For example, if a government implements a new policy that affects some people positively and others negatively, theories of value aggregation can be used to determine whether the overall value of the policy is positive or negative. Axiological [[utilitarianism]] accepts the additivity principle, saying that the total value is simply the sum of all individual values.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Holtug|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA267 267–268]}} | {{harvnb|Peterson|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KscNwy-F3u8C&pg=PA147 147]}} | {{harvnb|Hirose|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=m-5jBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25–27]}} }}</ref> Axiological [[Egalitarianism|egalitarians]] are not only interested in the sum total of value but also in how the values are distributed. They argue that an outcome with a balanced advantage distribution is better than an outcome where some benefit a lot while others benefit little, even if the two outcomes have the same sum total.<ref name="auto6">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Holtug|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA273 273]}} | {{harvnb|Peterson|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KscNwy-F3u8C&pg=PA147 147]}} | {{harvnb|Hirose|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=m-5jBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25–27]}} }}</ref> Axiological [[Prioritarianism|prioritarians]] are particularly concerned with the benefits of individuals who are worse off. They say that providing advantages to people in need has more value than providing the same advantages to others.<ref name="auto6"/>

Another debate addresses the [[meaning of life]], investigating whether life or existence as a whole has a higher meaning or purpose.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Metz|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Cowan|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25–26]}} | {{harvnb|Groothuis|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA160 160–162]}} }}</ref> [[Ethical naturalism|Naturalist]] views argue that the meaning of life is found within the physical world, either as objective values that are true for everyone or as subjective values that vary according to individual preferences. Suggested fields where humans find meaning include exercising [[freedom]], committing oneself to a cause, practicing [[altruism]], engaging in positive [[social relationships]], or pursuing personal [[happiness]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Metz|2023|loc=§ 3. Naturalism}} | {{harvnb|Cowan|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25–26]}} | {{harvnb|Yalom|2020|pp=431–435}} }}</ref> [[Supernatural]]ists, by contrast, propose that meaning lies beyond the natural world. For example, various religions teach that [[God]] created the world for a higher purpose, imbuing existence with meaning. A related outlook argues that immortal [[soul]]s serve as sources of meaning by being connected to a [[transcendent reality]] and evolving [[Spirituality|spiritually]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Metz|2023|loc=§ 2. Supernaturalism}} | {{harvnb|Groothuis|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA162 162–164]}} | {{harvnb|Seachris|loc=§ 3. Theories of Meaning ''in'' Life}} }}</ref> [[Existential nihilism|Existential nihilists]] reject both naturalist and supernaturalist explanations by asserting that there is no higher purpose. They suggest that life is meaningless, with the consequence that there is no higher reason to continue living and that all efforts, achievements, happiness, and suffering are ultimately pointless.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Metz|2023|loc=4. Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 3. Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Groothuis|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA165 165–169]}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA30 30–32]}} }}</ref>

Formal axiology is a theory of value initially developed by philosopher [[Robert S. Hartman]]. This approach treats axiology as a [[formal science]], akin to [[logic]] and [[mathematics]]. It uses [[axiom]]s to give an abstract definition of value, understanding it not as a property of things but as a property of concepts. Value measures the extent to which an entity fulfills its concept. For example, a good car has all the desirable qualities of cars, like a reliable engine and effective brakes, whereas a bad car lacks many. Formal axiology distinguishes between three fundamental value types: intrinsic values apply to people; extrinsic values apply to things, actions, and social roles; systemic values apply to conceptual constructs. Formal axiology examines how these value types form a hierarchy and how they can be measured.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Edwards|2021|pp=2–4}} | {{harvnb|Hartman|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1UX7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA104 104–105, 305–306]}} }}</ref>