Editing Vote counting (section)

==Electronic counting==
{{main|Electronic voting|Electronic voting machine}}
Electronic machines for elections are being procured around the world, often with donor money. In places with honest independent election commissions, machines can add efficiency, though not usually transparency. Where the election commission is weaker, expensive machines can be fetishized, waste money on kickbacks and divert attention, time and resources from harmful practices, as well as reducing transparency.<ref name="chee">{{Cite journal |last1=Cheeseman |first1=Nic |last2=Lynch |first2=Gabrielle |last3=Willis |first3=Justin |date=2018-11-17 |title=Digital dilemmas: the unintended consequences of election technology |journal=Democratization |volume=25 |issue=8 |pages=1397–1418 |language=en |doi=10.1080/13510347.2018.1470165|s2cid=150032446 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

An Estonian study compared the staff, computer, and other costs of different ways of voting to the numbers of voters, and found highest costs per vote were in lightly used, heavily staffed early in-person voting. Lowest costs per vote were in internet voting and in-person voting on election day at local polling places, because of the large numbers of voters served by modest staffs. For internet voting they do not break down the costs. They show steps to decrypt internet votes and imply but do not say they are hand-counted.<ref name="kri">{{Cite journal |last1=Krimmer |first1=Robert |last2=Duenas-Cid |first2=David |last3=Krivonosova |first3=Iuliia |date=2021-01-02 |title=New methodology for calculating cost-efficiency of different ways of voting: is internet voting cheaper? |journal=Public Money & Management |volume=41 |pages=17–26 |language=en |doi=10.1080/09540962.2020.1732027|s2cid=212822266 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

===Optical scan counting===
{{main|Optical scan voting system}}
{{further|Voting machine#Optical scan (marksense)|Electronic voting#Paper-based electronic voting system|Electronic voting in the United States#Optical scan counting}}
[[File:2018 Ballots being counted in Santa Clara County.webm|left|thumb|Counting ballots by an optical scanner, San Jose, California, 2018]]
[[File:2010 Iowa Republican Primary ballot.jpg|thumb|2010 Iowa Republican Primary ballot]]
[[File:AutoMARK.jpg|thumb|Ballot marking device]]
[[File:Black line on scanned ballot.png|thumb|Scanner marked multiple candidates with black line]]
[[File:State audits.png|400px|thumb|Some states check election machine counts by hand.]]

In an [[optical scan voting system]], or marksense, each voter's choices are marked on one or more pieces of paper, which then go through a scanner. The scanner creates an electronic image of each ballot, interprets it, creates a tally for each candidate, and usually stores the image for later review.

The voter may mark the paper directly, usually in a specific location for each candidate, either by filling in an oval or by using a patterned stamp that can be easily detected by OCR software.

Or the voter may pick one pre-marked ballot among many, each with its own barcode or QR code corresponding to a candidate.

Or the voter may select choices on an electronic screen, which then prints the chosen names, usually with a bar code or QR code summarizing all choices, on a sheet of paper to put in the scanner.<ref name="vv-bmd">{{Cite web |url=https://www.verifiedvoting.org/ballot-marking-devices/ |title=Ballot Marking Devices |website=Verified Voting |language=en-US |access-date=2020-02-28 |archive-date=2020-08-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200805185249/https://www.verifiedvoting.org/ballot-marking-devices/ |url-status=dead }}</ref> This screen and printer is called an electronic ballot marker (EBM) or [[ballot marking device]] (BMD), and voters with disabilities can communicate with it by headphones, large buttons, sip and puff, or paddles, if they cannot interact with the screen or paper directly. Typically the ballot marking device does not store or tally votes. The paper it prints is the official ballot, put into a scanning system which counts the barcodes, or the printed names can be hand-counted, as a check on the machines.<ref name="bmd-cohn">{{Cite news |last=Cohn |first=Jennifer |url=https://medium.com/@jennycohn1/what-is-the-latest-threat-to-democracy-ballot-marking-devices-a-k-a-electronic-pencils-16bb44917edd |title=What is the latest threat to democracy? |date=2018-05-05|work=Medium |access-date=2020-02-28 |language=en}}</ref> Most voters do not look at the paper to ensure it reflects their choices, and when there is a mistake, an experiment found that 81% of registered voters do not report errors to poll workers.<ref name="bmd">{{Cite web |url=https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/bmd-verifiability-sp20.pdf |title=Can Voters Detect Malicious Manipulation of Ballot Marking Devices? |last=Bernhard |first=Matthew |author2=Allison McDonald |author3=Henry Meng |author4=Jensen Hwa |author5=Nakul Bajaj |author6=Kevin Chang |author7=J. Alex Halderman |date=2019-12-28 |website=Halderman |access-date=2020-02-28}}</ref>

Two companies, Hart and Clear Ballot, have scanners which count the printed names, which voters had a chance to check, rather than bar codes and QR codes, which voters are unable to check.<ref name="oset1">{{Cite web |url=https://trustthevote.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/29Mar19-OSETBriefing_GeorgiaTechAcquisitionAnalysisFinal.pdf |title=Georgia State Election Technology Acquisition, Assessing Recent Legislation in Light of Planned Procurement |last=Perez |first=Edward |author2=Joy London |author3=Gregory Miller |date=March 2019 |website=OSET Institute |access-date=2020-03-05}}</ref>

====Timing of optical scans====
The machines are faster than hand-counting, so are typically used the night after the election, to give quick results. The paper ballots and electronic memories still need to be stored, to check that the images are correct, and to be available for court challenges.

====Errors in optical scans====
{{main|Electronic voting in the United States#Errors in optical scans}}
Scanners have a row of photo-sensors which the paper passes by, and they record light and dark pixels from the ballot. A black streak results when a scratch or paper dust causes a sensor to record black continuously.<ref name="md-eac">{{Cite web |url=https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/event_document/files/day1-2017-02-13-09_15-03-natasha-Post-Election-Audits-final.pdf |title=2016 Post-Election Audits in Maryland |last=Walker |first=Natasha |date=2017-02-13 |website=Elections Advisory Commission |access-date=2020-02-27}}</ref>
<ref name="md-pima">{{Cite web |url=https://webcms.pima.gov/UserFiles/Servers/Server_6/File/Government/Elections%20Department/Election%20Integrity%20Commission/2016/2016%20Agenda%20Item%20Materials/Email_Ballot%20Images_White_Ryan.pdf |title=Transcript of Email on Ballot Images |last=Ryan, Tom and Benny White |date=November 30, 2016 |website=Pima County, AZ |access-date=February 15, 2020}}</ref> A white streak can result when a sensor fails.<ref name="yakima">{{Cite web |url=http://www.votersunite.org/info/yakimaproblemreport.asp |title=Hart InterCivic Optical-Scan Has A Weak Spot  |last=Gideon |first=John |date=July 5, 2005 |website=www.votersunite.org |access-date=February 15, 2020}}</ref> In the right place, such lines can indicate a vote for every candidate or no votes for anyone. Some offices blow compressed air over the scanners after every 200 ballots to remove dust.<ref name="dust">{{Cite web |last1=McKim |first1=Karen |date=2015-02-17 |title=Unregistered Dust Bunnies May be Voting in Wisconsin Elections: Stoughton Miscount Update |url=https://www.wisconsingrassroots.net/dust_bunnies_may_be_voting |access-date=2020-06-26 |website=Wisconsin Grassroots Network}}</ref>
Fold lines in the wrong places can also count as votes.<ref name="appel-nh">{{Cite web |last=Appel |first=Andrew |date=2021-06-07 |title=New Hampshire Election Audit, part 2 |url=https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2021/06/07/new-hampshire-election-audit-part-2/ |access-date=2021-06-07 |website=Princeton University}}</ref>

Software can miscount; if it miscounts drastically enough, people notice and check. Staff rarely can say who caused an error, so they do not know whether it was accidental or a hack. Errors from 2002 to 2008 were listed and analyzed by the Brennan Center in 2010.<ref name="bren10">{{Cite web |last=Norden |first=Lawrence |date=September 16, 2010 |title=Voting system failures: a database solution |url=https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Voting_Machine_Failures_Database-Solution.pdf |access-date=July 7, 2020 |website=Brennan Center, NYU}}</ref> There have been numerous examples before and since.

*In a 2020 election in Baltimore, Maryland, the private company which printed ballots shifted the location of some candidates on some ballots up one line, so the scanner looked in the wrong places on the paper and reported the wrong numbers. It was caught because a popular incumbent got implausibly few votes.<ref name="sun20">{{Cite news |first=Emily |last=Opilo |author2=Talia Richman |author3=Phil Davis |date=June 3, 2020 |title=Concern from candidates, officials as error creates delay in release of returns; Dixon leads in Baltimore mayoral count |work=Baltimore Sun |url=https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/elections/bs-md-pol-ballot-error-baltimore-district-1-20200603-n26t43fkmjadplqeqybloj4dki-story.html |access-date=July 30, 2020}}</ref>
*In a 2018 New York City election when the air was humid, ballots jammed in the scanner, or multiple ballots went through a scanner at once, hiding all but one.<ref name="humidity">{{Cite news |last=MacDougall |first=Ian |url=https://www.propublica.org/article/new-york-city-polling-places-midterms-2018-humidity |title=What Went Wrong at New York City Polling Places? It Was Something in the Air. Literally. |date=November 7, 2018|work=ProPublica |access-date=February 18, 2020 |language=en}}</ref>
*In a 2000 Bernalillo County (Albuquerque area), New Mexico, election, a programming error meant that straight-party votes on paper ballots were not counted for the individual candidates. The number of ballots was thus much larger than the number of votes in each contest. The software was fixed, and the ballots were re-scanned to get correct counts.<ref name="wsj0">{{Cite news |last=Gruley |first=Bryan |author2=Chip Cummins  |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB976838091124686673 |title=Election Day Became a Nightmare, As Usual, for Bernalillo County |date=2000-12-16 |work=Wall Street Journal |access-date=2020-03-11 |language=en-US |issn=0099-9660}}</ref><ref name="abq4">{{Cite news |last=Baker |first=Deborah |url=https://www.abqjournal.com/elex/apvotes10-31-04.htm |title=ABQjournal: Contentious 2000 Election Closest in N.M. History |date=2004-10-31 |work=Albuquerque Journal |access-date=2020-03-11 |archive-date=2020-04-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200411015052/https://www.abqjournal.com/elex/apvotes10-31-04.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref>
*In the 2000 Florida presidential race the most common optical scanning error was to treat as an overvote a ballot where the voter marked a candidate and wrote in the same candidate.<ref name="nh"/>

Researchers find security flaws in all election computers, which let voters, staff members or outsiders disrupt or change results, often without detection.<ref name="defcon">{{Cite web |url=https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2027/votingvillage-report-defcon27.pdf |title=DEF CON 27 Voting Machine Hacking Village |last=Blaze |first=Matt |author2=Harri Hursti |author3=Margaret Macalpine |author4=Mary Hanley |author5=Jeff Moss |author6=Rachel Wehr |author7=Kendal L Spencer |author8=Christopher Ferris |date=2019-09-26 |website=Defcon |access-date=2020-03-11 }}{{Dead link|date=February 2022 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>
Security reviews and audits are discussed in [[Electronic voting in the United States#Security reviews]].

When a ballot marking device prints a bar code or QR code along with candidate names, the candidates are represented in the bar code or QR code as numbers, and the scanner counts those codes, not the names. If a bug or hack makes the numbering system in the ballot marking device not aligned with the numbering system in the scanner, votes will be tallied for the wrong candidates.<ref name="oset1"/> This numbering mismatch has appeared with direct recording electronic machines (below).<ref name="buell">{{Cite report |url=http://www.lwvsc.org/files/buell-lwvscreport2018scelection.pdf |title=Analysis of the Election Data from the 6 November 2018 General Election in South Carolina |last=Buell |first=Duncan |date=December 23, 2018 |work=League of Women Voters of South Carolina |access-date=February 5, 2020 |archive-date=February 24, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190224163525/http://lwvsc.org/files/buell-lwvscreport2018scelection.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref>

Some [[Election audit#Overview|US states check]] a small number of places by hand-counting or use of machines independent of the original election machines.<ref name="vvstates"/>

====Recreated ballots====
Recreated ballots are paper<ref name="milwaukee">"observers from both political parties there... ballots have to be recreated in every election for a number of reasons, ranging from damaged mail-in ballots, to early voters who use pencils which can’t be read by ballot tabulators." {{Cite news |last=Jordan |first=Ben |date=2018-11-07 |title=MKE Election Commission responds to criticism |language=en |work=WTMJ TV Milwaukee |url=https://www.tmj4.com/news/local-news/milwaukee-election-commission-responds-to-absentee-ballot-criticism |access-date=2020-05-17}}</ref>
or electronic<ref name="spokane">"With the new digital procedure, staff will be able to fix whatever race couldn’t be counted, instead of duplicating a voter’s entire ballot." {{Cite news |last=White |first=Rebecca |date=2019-11-18 |title=One Washington County Plans to Speed Vote Counting with Tech |language=en |work=Government Technology |url=https://www.govtech.com/civic/One-Washington-County-Plans-to-Speed-Vote-Counting-with-Tech.html |access-date=2020-05-17}}</ref>
ballots created by election staff when originals cannot be counted for some reason. They usually apply to optical scan elections, not hand-counting. Reasons include tears, water damage and folds which prevent feeding through scanners. Reasons also include voters selecting candidates by circling them or other marks, when machines are only programmed to tally specific marks in front of the candidate's name.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Miller |first=Steve |date=2006-11-07 |title=Oddly marked ovals bane of poll workers' day |language=en |work=Rapid City Journal |url=https://rapidcityjournal.com/news/local/top-stories/oddly-marked-ovals-bane-of-poll-workers-day/article_99cdf7c2-e489-581f-9cde-c804a5679419.html |access-date=2020-05-17}}</ref>
As many as 8% of ballots in an election may be recreated.<ref name="spokane"/>

Recreating ballots is sometimes called reconstructing ballots,<ref name="milwaukee"/> ballot replication, ballot remaking or ballot transcription.<ref name="csg">{{Cite web |last=Shafer |first=Michelle |date=2020-07-20 |title=Ballot Duplication: What it is, what it is not, and why we are talking about it |url=https://ovi.csg.org/ballot-duplication-what-it-is-what-it-is-not-and-why-we-are-talking-about-it-in-2020/ |access-date=2022-06-15 |website=Council of State Governments |language=en-US}}</ref>
The term "duplicate ballot" sometimes refers to these recreated ballots,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Black |first=Eric |date=2008-12-17 |title=Recount's next big issue: duplicate ballots |language=en-US |work=MinnPost |url=https://www.minnpost.com/eric-black-ink/2008/12/recounts-next-big-issue-duplicate-ballots/ |access-date=2020-05-17}}</ref> and sometimes to extra ballots erroneously given to or received from a voter.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Tomasic |first=Megan |date=2020-05-14 |title=Some Allegheny County voters received duplicate mail-in ballots due to system glitch |work=Tribune Review |url=https://triblive.com/local/pittsburgh-allegheny/some-allegheny-county-voters-received-duplicate-mail-in-ballots-due-to-system-glitch/ |access-date=2020-05-17}}</ref>

Recreating can be done manually, or by scanners with manual review.<ref name="csg3">{{Cite web |last=Shafer |first=Michelle |date=2020-08-31 |title=Ballot Duplication Technology: What is it and how does it work? |url=https://ovi.csg.org/ballot-duplication-technology-what-is-it-and-how-does-it-work/ |access-date=2022-06-15 |website=Council of State Governments |language=en-US}}</ref>

Because of its potential for fraud, recreation of ballots is usually done by teams of two people working together<ref>Duplicate ballot procedures in Ventura County, CA https://recorder.countyofventura.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/BALLOT-DUPLICATION-PROCESS-FACTS-2-Final-1.pdf</ref> 
or closely observed by bipartisan teams.<ref name="milwaukee"/> 
The security of a team process can be undermined by having one person read to the other, so only one looks at the original votes and one looks at the recreated votes, or by having the team members appointed by a single official.<ref>Duplicate ballot procedures in Michigan https://www.michigan.gov/documents/sos/XII_Precinct_Canvass_-_Closing_the_Polls_266013_7.pdf</ref>

When auditing an election, audits need to be done with the original ballots, not the recreated ones.

====Cost of scanning systems====
List prices of optical scanners in the US in 2002–2019, ranged from $5,000 to $111,000 per machine, depending primarily on speed. List prices add up to $1 to $4 initial cost per registered voter. Discounts vary, based on negotiations for each buyer, not on number of machines purchased. Annual fees often cost 5% or more per year, and sometimes over 10%. Fees for training and managing the equipment during elections are additional. Some jurisdictions lease the machines so their budgets can stay relatively constant from year to year. Researchers say that the steady flow of income from past sales, combined with barriers to entry, reduces the incentive for vendors to improve voting technology.<ref name="vv-price">{{Cite web |last=Caulfield |first=Matthew |author2=Andrew Coopersmith |author3=Arnav Jagasia |author4=Olivia Podos |date=2021-03-30 |title=Price of Voting |url=https://verifiedvoting.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Price-of-Voting-FINAL2.pdf |website=Verified Voting}}</ref>

If most voters mark their own paper ballots and one marking device is available at each polling place for voters with disabilities, Georgia's total cost of machines and maintenance for 10 years, starting 2020, has been estimated at $12 per voter ($84 million total). Pre-printed ballots for voters to mark would cost $4 to $20 per voter ($113 million to $224 million total machines, maintenance and printing). The low estimate includes $0.40 to print each ballot, and more than enough ballots for historic turnout levels. the high estimate includes $0.55 to print each ballot, and enough ballots for every registered voter, including three ballots (of different parties) for each registered voter in primary elections with historically low turnout.<ref name="oset-reality">{{Cite web |url=https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5766827-OSET.html |title=Georgia State Election Technology Acquisition, A Reality Check |last=Perez |first=Edward |author2=Gregory Miller |date=March 2019 |website=OSET Institute |language=en |access-date=2020-03-06}}</ref><ref name="bmd-ga">{{Cite news |last=Fowler |first=Stephen |url=https://www.gpbnews.org/post/here-s-what-vendors-say-it-would-cost-replace-georgia-s-voting-system |title=Here's What Vendors Say It Would Cost To Replace Georgia's Voting System|work=Georgia Public Broadcasting |access-date=2020-02-28 |language=en}}</ref> The estimate is $29 per voter ($203 million total) if all voters use ballot marking devices, including $0.10 per ballot for paper.

The capital cost of machines in 2019 in Pennsylvania is $11 per voter if most voters mark their own paper ballots and a marking device is available at each polling place for voters with disabilities, compared to $23 per voter if all voters use ballot marking devices.<ref name="pitt cost">{{Cite web |url=https://www.cyber.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/PDFs/voting-system-selection-one-pager%20%282%29.pdf |title=Pennsylvania Counties' New Voting Systems Selections: An Analysis |last=Deluzio |first=Christopher |author2=Kevin Skoglund |date=2020-02-28 |website=University of Pittsburgh |access-date=2020-02-28 |archive-date=2020-06-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200626032838/https://www.cyber.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/PDFs/voting-system-selection-one-pager%20(2).pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> This cost does not include printing ballots.

New York has an undated comparison of capital costs and a system where all voters use ballot marking devices costing over twice as much as a system where most do not. The authors say extra machine maintenance would exacerbate that difference, and printing cost would be comparable in both approaches.<ref name="bmdny">{{Cite web |url=https://www.nyvv.org/paperballotCostsMain.shtml |title=NYVV - Paper Ballots Costs |website=www.nyvv.org |access-date=2020-02-28 |archive-date=2020-02-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200228224035/https://www.nyvv.org/paperballotCostsMain.shtml |url-status=dead }}</ref> Their assumption of equal printing costs differs from the Georgia estimates of $0.40 or $0.50 to print a ballot in advance, and $0.10 to print it in a ballot marking device.<ref name="oset-reality"/>

===Direct-recording electronic counting===
{{main|DRE voting machine}}
{{further|Voting machine#Direct-recording electronic (DRE)|Electronic voting#Direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting system|Electronic voting in the United States#Direct-recording electronic counting}}
[[File:Paper roll with votes from numerous voters, on iVotronic election computer.png|thumb|Roll of paper from direct-recording machine, with votes from numerous voters, Martinsburg, West Virginia, 2018]]

A touch screen displays choices to the voter, who selects choices, and can change their mind as often as needed, before casting the vote. Staff initialize each voter once on the machine, to avoid repeat voting. Voting data and ballot images are recorded in memory components, and can be copied out at the end of the election.

The system may also provide a means for communicating with a central location for reporting results and receiving updates,<ref>[http://www.eac.gov/VVSG%20Volume_I.pdf 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060208184233/http://www.eac.gov/VVSG%20Volume_I.pdf |date=2006-02-08 }} from the US [[Election Assistance Commission]]</ref>
which is an access point for hacks and bugs to arrive.

Some of these machines also print names of chosen candidates on paper for the voter to verify. These names on paper can be used for [[election audit]]s and [[recount]]s if needed. The tally of the voting data is stored in a removable memory component and in bar codes on the paper tape. The paper tape is called a [[Voter-verified paper audit trail]] (VVPAT). The VVPATs can be counted at 20–43 seconds of staff time per vote (not per ballot).<ref name="votersunite">{{Cite web |url=http://www.votersunite.org/info/CostEstimateforHandCounting.pdf |title=Cost Estimate for Hand Counting 2% of the Precincts in the U.S. |last=Theisen |first=Ellen |date=2005-06-14 |website=VotersUnite.org |access-date=2020-02-14}}</ref><ref name="ga"/>

For machines without VVPAT, there is no record of individual votes to check.

====Errors in direct-recording electronic voting====
This approach can have software errors. It does not include scanners, so there are no scanner errors. When there is no paper record, it is hard to notice or research most errors.
*The only forensic examination which has been done of direct-recording software files was in Georgia in 2020, and found that one or more unauthorized intruders had entered the files and erased records of what it did to them. In 2014-2017 an intruder had control of the state computer in Georgia which programmed vote-counting machines for all counties. The same computer also held voter registration records. The intrusion exposed all election files in Georgia since then to compromise and malware. Public disclosure came in 2020 from a court case.<ref name="lamb">{{Cite web |url=https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.699.10.pdf |title=SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF LOGAN LAMB |last=Lamb |first=Logan |date=2020-01-14 |website=CourtListener |access-date=2020-02-03}}</ref><ref name="cgg">{{Cite web |url=https://coaltionforgoodgovernance.sharefile.com/d-s0dce50c25084f0da |title=Coalition Plaintiffs' Status Report, pages 237-244 |date=2020-01-16 |website=Coalition for Good Governance |access-date=2020-02-03}}</ref><ref name="bajak">{{Cite news |url=https://apnews.com/39dad9d39a7533efe06e0774615a6d05 |title=Expert: Georgia election server showed signs of tampering |last=Bajak |first=Frank |date=2020-01-16 |work=Associated Press |access-date=2020-02-03}}</ref> Georgia did not have paper ballots to measure the amount of error in electronic tallies. The [[FBI]] studied that computer in 2017, and did not report the intrusion.<ref name="zetter-ga">{{Cite news |last=Zetter |first=Kim |url=http://politi.co/2heBRW2 |title=Will the Georgia Special Election Get Hacked?|work=Politico |access-date=2020-02-16 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="lamb"/>
*A 2018 study of direct-recording voting machines (iVotronic) without VVPAT in South Carolina found that every election from 2010 to 2018 had some memory cards fail. The investigator also found that lists of candidates were different in the central and precinct machines, so 420 votes which were properly cast in the precinct were erroneously added to a different contest in the central official tally, and unknown numbers were added to other contests in the central official tallies. The investigator found the same had happened in 2010. There were also votes lost by garbled transmissions, which the state election commission saw but did not report as an issue. 49 machines reported that their three internal memory counts disagreed, an average of 240 errors per machine, but the machines stayed in use, and the state evaluation did not report the issue, and there were other error codes and time stamp errors.<ref name="buell"/><ref name="freed">{{Cite news |url=https://statescoop.com/south-carolina-voting-machines-miscounted-hundreds-of-ballots-report-finds/ |title=South Carolina voting machines miscounted hundreds of ballots, report finds |last=Freed |first=Benjamin |date=2019-01-07|work=Scoop News Group |access-date=2020-02-05 |language=en}}</ref>
*In a 2017 York County, Pennsylvania, election, a programming error in a county's machines without VVPAT let voters vote more than once for the same candidate. Some candidates had filed as both Democrat and Republican, so they were listed twice in races where voters could select up to three candidates, so voters could select both instances of the same name.<ref name="ydr7">{{Cite news |last1=Kessler |first1=Brandie |last2=Boeckel |first2=Teresa |last3=Segelbaum |first3=Dylan |url=https://www.ydr.com/story/news/2017/11/07/problem-york-county-voting-machines-could-allow-extra-votes-some-candidates/841010001/ |title='Redo' of some York County races - including judge - possible after voting problems |date=2017-11-07 |work=York Daily Record |access-date=2020-03-11 |language=en}}</ref> They recounted the DRE machines' electronic records of votes and found 2,904 pairs of double votes.<ref name="ydr20">{{Cite news |last=Lee |first=Rick |url=https://www.ydr.com/story/news/2017/11/20/no-change-after-election-recount/869905001/ |title=UPDATE: York Co. election judicial winners: Kathleen Prendergast, Clyde Vedder, Amber Anstine Kraft |date=2017-11-20 |work=York Daily Record |access-date=2020-03-11 |language=en}}</ref>
*In a 2011 Fairfield Township, New Jersey, election a programming error in a machine without a VVPAT gave two candidates low counts. They collected more affidavits by voters who voted for them than the computer tally gave them, so a judge ordered a new election which they won.<ref name="nj-cw">{{Cite news |last=Thibodeau |first=Patrick |url=https://www.computerworld.com/article/3126820/if-the-election-is-hacked-we-may-never-know.html |title=If the election is hacked, we may never know |date=2016-10-05|work=ComputerWorld |access-date=2020-02-18 |language=en}}</ref>
*A 2007 study for the Ohio Secretary of State reported on election software from ES&S, Premier and Hart. Besides the problems it found, it noted that all "election systems rely heavily on third party software that implement interfaces to the operating systems, local databases, and devices such as optical scanners... the construction and features of this software is unknown, and may contain undisclosed vulnerabilities such trojan horses or other malware."<ref name="everest">{{Cite report |url=https://nordicinnovationlabs.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/everest.pdf |title=EVEREST: Evaluation and Validation of Election-Related Equipment, Standards and Testing |last=McDaniel |display-authors=etal |date=2007-12-07 |issue=Ohio Secretary of State |access-date=2020-02-05}}</ref>