Editing War of Devolution (section)

==Aftermath==
[[File:Map Peace of Aix la Chapelle (English).png|thumb|left|French gains by Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle: Louis returned [[Cambrai]], [[Aire-sur-la-Lys|Aire]] and [[Saint-Omer]], but retained the rest]]
France withdrew from Franche-Comté and the Spanish Netherlands, with the exception of eleven towns and their surrounding areas. Lille, [[Armentières]], [[Bergues]] and [[Douai]] were considered essential to reinforce France's vulnerable northern border and remain French to this day. The retention of Tournai, Oudenaarde, Kortrijk, [[Veurne]], [[Binche]], Charleroi and [[Ath]] made future offensives much easier, as demonstrated in 1672.{{Sfn|Macintosh|1973|p=165}}

From a military perspective, France strengthened its northern border, and [[Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban|Vauban]] began work on the defence line that became known as the ''Ceinture de fer''. Possession of towns like Charleroi and Tournai facilitated future campaigns through the control of vital routes into the Spanish Netherlands, but they were easily isolated and required expensive garrisons.{{Sfn|Sonino|1989|p=31}}

[[File:Charles Rochussen - Anno 1668. De vrede van Aken - SA 4971 - Amsterdam Museum.jpg|thumb|right|Spanish and French diplomats at the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. Both sides were unhappy with the Dutch. The Spanish envoy said it was now Holland's turn. The French envoy [[Godefroi, Comte d'Estrades|d' Estrades]] noted that they would repay the cheese merchants for their duplicity with usury.]]

The political results were mixed; in the Partition Treaty, Leopold recognised Louis' right to inherit part of the Spanish Empire, much to the anger of Spain. However, Louis' expansionist ambitions sparked discussions on an anti-French coalition, culminating in the formation of the [[Grand Alliance (League of Augsburg)|1689 Grand Alliance]].{{Sfn|Young|2004|p=220}}

The role of the Triple Alliance in the peace is debated by modern historians, including [[Herbert H. Rowen|Herbert Rowen]], "arguably the most important English-speaking historian of the Dutch Republic since [[John Lothrop Motley]]".{{Sfn|Harline|1999}} Its real significance was aligning English and Dutch objectives, despite the brief interruption in 1672 of the deeply unpopular [[Third Anglo-Dutch War]]; the Dutch viewed Aix-la-Chapelle as a diplomatic triumph.{{Sfn|Macintosh|1973|pp=163–167}}

Concern over French ambitions also revived the Orangist party, increasing internal political conflict with De Witt's Republican faction. One result was the deliberate neglect of the Dutch army, generally seen as bolstering the power of the [[William III of England|Prince of Orange]]; this had catastrophic repercussions in 1672.{{Sfn|Geyl|1936|pp=312–316}} Louis went to war in 1667 believing the Dutch would never voluntarily agree to the concessions he required in the Spanish Netherlands; he now decided the best way to achieve this was to first defeat the Republic, and began planning the [[Franco-Dutch War]].{{Sfn|Lynn|1996|pp=109–110}}