Editing X Article (section)

==="The Sources of Soviet Conduct"===
{{quote box|quote=...{{nbsp}}it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant [[containment]] of Russian expansive tendencies.{{sfn|Kennan|2012|p=125}} |source=– "X" (Kennan), ''The Sources of Soviet Conduct'', Section II|width=25%|align=right|style=padding:8px;}}
Kennan's piece opens with a description of how the Soviet leaders were shaped by Marxism-Leninism, serving as the "pseudo-scientific justification"<ref>{{harvnb|Kennan|2012|p=115}}, quoted in {{harvnb|Gaddis|2011|p=259}}.</ref> for why Stalin and the other leaders ought to remain in power despite lacking popular support.{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=259}} At times quoting [[Edward Gibbon]]'s ''[[The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire|The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire]]'',{{sfn|Kennan|2012|p=115}} he writes that the Soviet leaders' "aggressive intransigence" against the outside world compelled them "to chastise the contumacy" which they had provoked.<ref>{{harvnb|Kennan|2012|p=118}}, quoted in {{harvnb|Gaddis|2011|p=259}}.</ref> In order to maintain power, the Soviet leaders would need to maintain the illusion of external threats:{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=259}} {{blockquote|...{{nbsp}}the [Soviet] leadership is at liberty to put forward for tactical purposes any particular thesis which it finds useful to the cause at any particular moment and to require the faithful and unquestioning acceptance of that thesis by the members of the movement as a whole. This means that truth is not a constant but is actually created, for all intents and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves.<ref>{{harvnb|Kennan|2012|p=123}}, quoted in {{harvnb|Gaddis|2011|pp=259–260}}.</ref>}}

The Soviets, however, were not prepared to attempt an immediate overthrow of the West, it being implicit in their ideology that capitalism would inevitably fail.{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=260}} They would instead turn their focus to the long-term goal of "[filling] every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power."<ref>{{harvnb|Kennan|2012|p=125}}, quoted in {{harvnb|Gaddis|2011|p=260}}.</ref> To oppose them, the United States would need long-term strategies to [[Containment|contain]] Soviet expansionary ambitions. [[Containment]] against the Soviets, Kennan explains, would require an application of "counter-force" along shifting points of geographical and political interests.{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=260}} This "perimeter defense" concept, in which all geographic areas were considered of equal importance,{{sfn|Gaddis|2005a|p=56}} required the United States "to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."<ref>{{harvnb|Kennan|2012|p=132}}, quoted in {{harvnb|Gaddis|2005a|p=57}}.</ref>

Containment would prove its success in the long-term because the Soviet economy was rudimentary and the government leadership lacked procedures for orderly succession.{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=260}} Any disruption in Soviet politics held the possibility of "[changing the state] overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies."<ref>{{harvnb|Kennan|2012|p=131}}, quoted in {{harvnb|Gaddis|2011|p=260}}.</ref> Containment was particularly suited for use against the Soviets, Kennan thought, because of their Marxist-Leninist ideology, which encourages a patience not evident with leaders like [[Napoleon]] or [[Adolf Hitler]].{{sfn|Gaddis|2005a|pp=381–382}} He continues: "...{{nbsp}}the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term valididty{{nbsp}}... It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future."<ref>{{harvnb|Kennan|2012|p=124}}, quoted in {{harvnb|Gaddis|2005a|p=382}}.</ref>

{{quote box|quote=...{{nbsp}}the possibility remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the capitalist world of its conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced.{{sfn|Kennan|2012|p=132}} |source=– "X" (Kennan), ''The Sources of Soviet Conduct'', Section III|width=25%|align=right|style=padding:8px;}}

The end result of containment would allow for "either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power".<ref name="KqG134">{{harvnb|Kennan|2012|p=134}}, quoted in {{harvnb|Gaddis|2011|p=261}}.</ref> The indefinite frustration the Soviets were bound to face would necessitate their adjustment to the reality of their situation.{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=261}} The strategy would require the United States to manage its own issues successfully,{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=261}} with Kennan concluding that: "To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation. Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this."<ref>{{harvnb|Kennan|2012|p=134}}, quoted in {{harvnb|Gaddis|2005a|p=35}}.</ref>