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Anchoring effect
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===Anchoring-and-adjusting === The most prevalent explanation of the anchoring effect is the argument originally made by Tversky and Kahneman, termed anchoring-as-adjusting.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Tversky |first1=Amos |last2=Kahneman |first2=Daniel |date=October 1992 |title=Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty |url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF00122574 |journal=Journal of Risk and Uncertainty |language=en |volume=5 |issue=4 |pages=297β323 |doi=10.1007/BF00122574 |issn=0895-5646|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Based on this theory, individuals set an anchor according to available information, whether it is provided or individuals already have an anchor in mind, and use this anchor as a point of reference to adjust their answers. This theory explains inaccuracy in guessing by suggesting that people adjust insufficiently, rendering their final guess closer to the anchors.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Epley |first1=Nicholas |last2=Gilovich |first2=Thomas |date=2004-04-01 |title=Are Adjustments Insufficient? |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0146167203261889 |journal=Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin |language=EN |volume=30 |issue=4 |pages=447β460 |doi=10.1177/0146167203261889 |pmid=15070474 |issn=0146-1672|url-access=subscription }}</ref> This phenomenon was further investigated in other studies and used as an explanation for biases such as hindsight bias and egocentric bias.<ref>{{Citation |last=Epley |first=Nicholas |title=A Tale of Tuned Decks? Anchoring as Accessibility and Anchoring as Adjustment |date=January 2004 |work=Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making |pages=240β257 |editor-last=Koehler |editor-first=Derek J. |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470752937.ch12 |access-date=2025-03-29 |edition=1 |publisher=Wiley |language=en |doi=10.1002/9780470752937.ch12 |isbn=978-1-4051-0746-4 |editor2-last=Harvey |editor2-first=Nigel|url-access=subscription }}</ref> For instance, when asked to guess the price of a drink in a coffee shop, individuals often look for the price of other drinks or recall the price of similar drinks at other stores, and base their answer on the anchor that they set.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Tversky |first1=Amos |last2=Kahneman |first2=Daniel |date=October 1992 |title=Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty |url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF00122574 |journal=Journal of Risk and Uncertainty |language=en |volume=5 |issue=4 |pages=297β323 |doi=10.1007/BF00122574 |issn=0895-5646|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Specifically, the original study found that by simply providing an arbitrary anchor to each group, people provided significantly different responses, suggesting that their answers were generated through anchoring and adjusting. In addition, this finding suggests that individuals are gullible when setting an anchor, and almost automatically begin the anchoring-and-adjusting process. On the other hand, Epley and Gilovich found that when anchors are self-generated, people will stop adjusting once they believe they have adjusted their answers to an acceptable range. Although this process does not guarantee insufficient adjustments, it does result in an answer that is as close to the anchor as possible in the acceptable range. However, insufficient adjustments are diminished when individuals are able and motivated by external factors, such as monetary compensation, to continue adjusting for a more accurate answer, thereby reducing the anchoring effect.<ref name=":03">{{Cite journal |last1=Epley |first1=Nicholas |last2=Gilovich |first2=Thomas |date=2006-04-01 |title=The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why the Adjustments Are Insufficient |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01704.x |journal=Psychological Science |language=EN |volume=17 |issue=4 |pages=311β318 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01704.x |pmid=16623688 |issn=0956-7976|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The anchoring effect is also reduced when individuals know which way to adjust from the anchor because it eliminates the possible answers by half.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |last1=Simmons |first1=Joseph P. |last2=LeBoeuf |first2=Robyn A. |last3=Nelson |first3=Leif D. |date=2010 |title=The effect of accuracy motivation on anchoring and adjustment: Do people adjust from provided anchors? |url=https://doi.apa.org/doi/10.1037/a0021540 |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |language=en |volume=99 |issue=6 |pages=917β932 |doi=10.1037/a0021540 |pmid=21114351 |issn=1939-1315}}</ref> Besides general knowledge, anchoring is also observed in social settings. The simulation theory of empathy suggests that people use their own mental state and reasoning to infer the actions of others. People assume that those who are similar to us will act in a similar way. Aligned with this idea, Tamir and Mitchell found that judgments of the attitude of others are made more quickly for those who are similar to the judge, and greater self-other discrepancy resulted in longer reaction time.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Tamir |first1=Diana I. |last2=Mitchell |first2=Jason P. |date=2013 |title=Anchoring and adjustment during social inferences. |url=https://doi.apa.org/doi/10.1037/a0028232 |journal=Journal of Experimental Psychology: General |language=en |volume=142 |issue=1 |pages=151β162 |doi=10.1037/a0028232 |pmid=22506753 |issn=1939-2222|url-access=subscription }}</ref> In this case, individuals use their own attitudes as an anchor and make adjustments to predict the attitude of others. Note that this process only takes place when the judge perceives great similarity between self and others. Overall, this theory describes the process of anchoring and adjusting away from the anchor, as well as the phenomenon of inaccurate responses due to insufficient adjusting. However, proponents of alternative theories argued that adjusting is only possible when the original anchor lies outside the acceptable range. According to Epley and Gilovich, individuals will not adjust at all and give an answer that is identical to their anchor if the anchor is already within the acceptable range.<ref name=":03" /> Using the previous example, the actual price of the drink can be identical to other drinks served at that store, meaning that people should theoretically consider their anchor as a potential answer rather than adjusting. When a reasonable anchor is given, there will be no adjustment. Therefore, this theory does not explain all cases of anchoring.
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