Editing Anti-Comintern Pact (section)

==== Japanese societal militarization and aggression against China ====
{{Main|Mukden Incident|January 28 incident|Pacification of Manchukuo|Defense of the Great Wall|Battle of Rehe|Actions in Inner Mongolia (1933–1936)}}
[[File:Mukden 1931 japan shenyang.jpg|thumb|Japanese troops entering [[Shenyang]] during the 1931 [[Mukden Incident]]]]
The Mukden Incident of 18 September 1931 began the period of Japanese aggression in Asia between 1931 and 1945, sometimes called the ''Fifteen Years War''.<ref name="Nish-2000">{{Cite book |title=The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1931–2000 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=2000 |isbn=9781403919670 |editor-last=Nish |editor-first=Ian |series=The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000 |volume=2 |location=Houndmills |editor-last2=Kibata |editor-first2=Yoichi}}</ref>{{Rp|1–2}}

The diplomatic reaction of the European great powers to Japan's attack against China was insufficient to stop the Japanese advance, despite continued Chinese appeals to the [[League of Nations]]. This attack, which had no central order from Tokyo precede it and was rather an autonomous decision by the [[Kwantung Army]] leadership,<ref name="Martin-1970" />{{Rp|608–609}} was kept confined to [[North East China]] by the Japanese commanders in the hopes that this would be enough to keep European responses lukewarm and thus further Japanese advances. This estimation proved to be accurate, and the United Kingdom in particular was more than happy to let Japan proceed in Manchuria as long as British interests in southern and central China remained undisturbed. Even after the [[Shanghai Incident]] of 28 January 1932, the British attitude remained on the whole friendly to the Japanese cause and indifferent towards Chinese pleas for assistance. Among the few exceptions to this were British efforts to bring about peace in the city of Shanghai itself, where the UK had direct economic interests.

The Japanese [[Pacification of Manchukuo]] on the other hand was viewed in Britain as a positive development that ultimately would help to disperse bandit activity.<ref name="Nish-2000" />{{Rp|3–6}} In February 1932, the Japanese established a puppet state in North East China, the [[Manchukuo|State of Manchuria]], nominally headed by [[Puyi]], the dethroned last emperor of the [[Qing dynasty]] (r. 1908–1912, 1917).<ref>{{Cite book |last=Duara |first=Prasenjit |title=Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers |year=2003 |isbn=0742525775 |location=Oxford}}</ref>{{Rp|65–73}}

Following the [[Lytton Report]], which laid the blame for the conflict in Manchuria firmly at the feet of the Japanese, [[Sir John Simon]], the foreign secretary of the United Kingdom, failed to condemn Japan in his speech on 7 December 1932, and subsequently earned the favor of Japanese politicians such as [[Yōsuke Matsuoka]], who viewed the lackluster British response as further encouragement for the Japanese course in China. Japan left the League of Nations as a result of the Lytton Report in February 1933.<ref name="Nish-2000" />{{Rp|6–7}}

The [[Tanggu Truce]] ended the hostilities in Manchuria, but Japanese ambition in China was not yet satisfied. Between 1933 and 1936, Japanese foreign minister [[Kōki Hirota]] pursued the {{transliteration|ja|Hirota wakyo gaiko}}, the 'friendly diplomacy of Hirota'. Summed up by the [[Amau Doctrine]] of 1934, Japan viewed itself as the protective power of all of East Asia, mirroring the role of the United States in the Americas under the [[Monroe Doctrine]] of 1823. This posturing was again permitted by the European great powers, and [[Neville Chamberlain]] even attempted to negotiate an Anglo–Japanese non-aggression pact to improve British relations with Japan in 1934.<ref name="Nish-2000" />{{Rp|6–7}} In secret, Hirota's foreign policy leadership set an array of highly ambitious goals for Japan's diplomacy. This included an industrial buildup in Manchukuo, the acquisition of resources from North China via subjugation, conquest of the western Pacific and South East Asia, and preparations for a war against the Soviet Union.<ref name="Bix-2007" />{{Rp|308}}{{Quote box
| quote = Cooperative diplomacy will not solve the present emergency, which is not an isolated incident but represents a world emergency that has come about despite the great efforts that have been made by all countries since the World War. Japan must take advantage of the glorious challenge posed by the Manchurian Incident and our withdrawal from the League of Nations. We must accept our fate, firmly refusing to be weakened by avoiding the challenge, and must have the courage to use this opportunity to formulate a great plan for our country's next hundred years.
| source = Ohata, Tokushiro (1976). "The Anti-Comintern Pact, 1935–1939". In Morley, James William (ed.). "Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935–1940". p. 12. {{ISBN|9780231089692}}.
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}}The Japanese army in October 1934 published a pamphlet entitled "The Essence of National Defense and Proposals to Strengthen It", going directly against the attempt of diplomatic reconciliation that was at the same time (at least half-heartedly) attempted by the civilian government in Tokyo (named "Shidehara diplomacy" after former Prime Minister [[Kijūrō Shidehara]]). The pamphlet demanded a complete subjugation of all aspects of foreign and domestic policy to the all-encompassing question of "national defense" and the nation's preparation for total war. It further denounced "cooperative diplomacy", lauded the Japanese decision to withdraw from the League of Nations, and called upon Japan to accept its fate and to formulate a great plan for the next 100 years.

The military subsequently continued its practice of publishing pamphlets with overt political content without prior coordination with the civilian government. In November 1936, about the time of the Anti-Comintern Pact's conclusion, the army pamphlet "Perfecting the Army's Preparedness and the Spirit Required" advocated strengthening the army and openly called for the reform of the civilian government and the reform of the Japanese state to better suit the military's goals.<ref name="Ohata-1976" />{{Rp|12–13}}