Editing Autonomy (section)

=== According to Audi ===
[[Robert Audi]] characterizes autonomy as the self-governing power to bring reasons to bear in directing one's conduct and influencing one's propositional attitudes.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality |date=2001 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTAO-3 |access-date=2020-11-20 |archive-date=2021-06-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210619215025/https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTAO-3 |url-status=live }}</ref>{{rp|211–212}}<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Haji |first1=Ish |title=Review of The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality |url=https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-architecture-of-reason-the-structure-and-substance-of-rationality/ |website=Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews |date=9 March 2002 |access-date=20 November 2020 |archive-date=23 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201023025553/https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-architecture-of-reason-the-structure-and-substance-of-rationality/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Traditionally, autonomy is only concerned with practical matters. But, as Audi's definition suggests, autonomy may be applied to responding to reasons at large, not just to practical reasons. Autonomy is closely related to [[freedom]] but the two can come apart. An example would be a political prisoner who is forced to make a statement in favor of his opponents in order to ensure that his loved ones are not harmed. As Audi points out, the prisoner lacks freedom but still has autonomy since his statement, though not reflecting his political ideals, is still an expression of his commitment to his loved ones.<ref name="Audi">{{cite journal |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=Autonomy, Reason, and Desire |journal=Pacific Philosophical Quarterly |date=1991 |volume=72 |issue=4 |pages=247–271 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-0114.1991.tb00320.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDARA |access-date=2020-11-20 |archive-date=2021-04-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210414111939/https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDARA |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref>{{rp|249}}

Autonomy is often equated with self-legislation in the [[Kantian]] tradition.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kleingeld |first1=Pauline |last2=Willaschek |first2=Marcus |author-link2=Marcus Willaschek |date=2019 |title=Autonomy Without Paradox: Kant, Self-Legislation and the Moral Law |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KLEAWP |url-status=live |journal=Philosophers' Imprint |volume=19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210205024216/https://philpapers.org/rec/KLEAWP |archive-date=2021-02-05 |access-date=2020-11-20}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Dryden |first1=Jane |title=Autonomy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/autonomy/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=20 November 2020 |archive-date=11 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201111213519/https://iep.utm.edu/autonomy/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Self-legislation may be interpreted as laying down laws or principles that are to be followed. Audi agrees with this school in the sense that we should bring reasons to bear in a principled way. Responding to reasons by mere whim may still be considered free but not autonomous.<ref name="Audi"/>{{rp|249, 257}} A commitment to principles and projects, on the other hand, provides autonomous agents with an identity over time and gives them a sense of the kind of persons they want to be. But autonomy is neutral as to which principles or projects the agent endorses. So different autonomous agents may follow very different principles.<ref name="Audi"/>{{rp|258}} But, as Audi points out, self-legislation is not sufficient for autonomy since laws that do not have any practical impact do not constitute autonomy.<ref name="Audi"/>{{rp|247–248}} Some form of motivational force or executive power is necessary in order to get from mere self-legislation to self-government.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=Weakness of Will and Rational Action |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |date=1990 |volume=68 |issue=3 |pages=270–281 |doi=10.1080/00048409012344301 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDWOW |access-date=2020-11-20 |archive-date=2021-01-21 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210121205346/https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDWOW |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> This motivation may be inherent in the corresponding practical judgment itself, a position known as ''motivational internalism'', or may come to the practical judgment externally in the form of some desire independent of the judgment, as ''motivational externalism'' holds.<ref name="Audi"/>{{rp|251–252}}

In the [[Humeanism#Practical reason|Humean]] tradition, intrinsic desires are the reasons the autonomous agent should respond to. This theory is called ''instrumentalism''.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Cohon |first1=Rachel |title=Hume's Moral Philosophy |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=20 November 2020 |date=2018 |archive-date=10 January 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180110170335/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Setiya |first1=Kieran |title=Hume on Practical Reason |journal=Philosophical Perspectives |date=2004 |volume=18 |pages=365–389 |doi=10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00033.x |jstor=3840940 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3840940 |issn=1520-8583 |access-date=2020-11-20 |archive-date=2020-11-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201128024940/https://www.jstor.org/stable/3840940 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> Audi rejects instrumentalism and suggests that we should adopt a position known as ''axiological objectivism''. The central idea of this outlook is that objective values, and not subjective desires, are the sources of normativity and therefore determine what autonomous agents should do.<ref name="Audi"/>{{rp|261ff}}