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Binding problem
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=== Summary of problem === [[John Raymond Smythies|Smythies]]<ref name="Smythies 1994">{{Cite book|last1 = Smythies|first1 = John R. (John Raymond)|title = The walls of Plato's cave : the science and philosophy of (brain, consciousness, and perception|year = 1994|publisher = Avebury|location = Aldershot; Brookfield, USA|isbn = 978-1-85628-882-8|oclc = 30156912}}</ref> defines the combination problem, also known as the subjective unity of perception, as "How do the brain mechanisms actually construct the phenomenal object?". Revonsuo<ref name="Revonsuo 1999"/> equates this to "[[consciousness]]-related binding", emphasizing the entailment of a phenomenal aspect. As Revonsuo explores in 2006,<ref>Revonsuo, A, (2006) Inner Presence: Consciousness as a biological phenomenon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.</ref> there are nuances of difference beyond the basic BP1:BP2 division. Smythies speaks of constructing a phenomenal object ("local unity" for Revonsuo) but philosophers such as [[René Descartes]], [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]], [[Immanuel Kant]], and James (see Brook and Raymont)<ref>The Unity of Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-unity/</ref> have typically been concerned with the broader unity of a phenomenal experience ("global unity" for Revonsuo) – which, as Bayne<ref name="Bayne">Bayne, T. and Chalmers, D. (2003) What is the unity of consciousness? In Cleeremans, A. ''The Unity of consciousness, Binding, Integration and Dissociation'', Oxford University Press.</ref> illustrates may involve features as diverse as seeing a book, hearing a tune and feeling an emotion. Further discussion will focus on this more general problem of how sensory data that may have been segregated into, for instance, "blue square" and "yellow circle" are to be re-combined into a single phenomenal experience of a blue square next to a yellow circle, plus all other features of their context. There is a wide range of views on just how real this "unity" is, but the existence of medical conditions in which it appears to be subjectively impaired, or at least restricted, suggests that it is not entirely illusory<!--[26]-->.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Parra|first1=Mario A.|last2=Abrahams|first2=Sharon|last3=Logie|first3=Robert H.|last4=Méndez|first4=Luis G.|last5=Lopera|first5=Francisco|last6=Della Sala|first6=Sergio|date=2010-09-01|title=Visual short-term memory binding deficits in familial Alzheimer's disease|journal=Brain|volume=133|issue=9|pages=2702–2713|doi=10.1093/brain/awq148|pmid=20624814|issn=0006-8950|doi-access=free|hdl=20.500.11820/20fdff3b-6b93-478a-bd74-dfc81dc43ae3|hdl-access=free}}</ref> There are many neurobiological theories about the subjective unity of perception. Different visual features such as color, size, shape, and motion are computed by largely distinct neural circuits but we experience this as an integrated whole. The different visual features interact with each other in various ways. For example, shape discrimination of objects is strongly affected by orientation but only slightly affected by object size.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Norman|first1=J. Farley|last2=Swindle|first2=Jessica M.|last3=Jennings|first3=L. RaShae|last4=Mullins|first4=Elizabeth M.|last5=Beers|first5=Amanda M.|date=June 2009|title=Stereoscopic shape discrimination is well preserved across changes in object size|journal=Acta Psychologica|volume=131|issue=2|pages=129–135|doi=10.1016/j.actpsy.2009.03.009|issn=1873-6297|pmid=19389660}}</ref> Some theories suggest that global perception of the integrated whole involves higher order visual areas.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last1=Stoll|first1=Susanne|last2=Finlayson|first2=Nonie J.|last3=Schwarzkopf|first3=D. Samuel|date=2020-10-15|title=Topographic signatures of global object perception in human visual cortex|journal=NeuroImage|volume=220|pages=116926|doi=10.1016/j.neuroimage.2020.116926|issn=1053-8119|pmc=7573540|pmid=32442640}}</ref> There is also evidence that the posterior parietal cortex is responsible for perceptual scene segmentation and organization.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last1=Grassi|first1=Pablo R.|last2=Zaretskaya|first2=Natalia|last3=Bartels|first3=Andreas|date=2018-08-08|title=A Generic Mechanism for Perceptual Organization in the Parietal Cortex|journal=The Journal of Neuroscience|volume=38|issue=32|pages=7158–7169|doi=10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0436-18.2018|issn=1529-2401|pmc=6596091|pmid=30006362}}</ref> Bodies facing each other are processed as a single unit and there is increased coupling of the extrastriate body area (EBA) and the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) when bodies are facing each other.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Bellot|first1=Emmanuelle|last2=Abassi|first2=Etienne|last3=Papeo|first3=Liuba|date=2021-03-31|title=Moving Toward versus Away from Another: How Body Motion Direction Changes the Representation of Bodies and Actions in the Visual Cortex|journal=Cerebral Cortex|volume=31|issue=5|pages=2670–2685|doi=10.1093/cercor/bhaa382|issn=1460-2199|pmid=33401307}}</ref> This suggests that the brain is biased towards grouping humans in twos or dyads.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last=Papeo|first=Liuba|date=November 2020|title=Twos in human visual perception|journal=Cortex; A Journal Devoted to the Study of the Nervous System and Behavior|volume=132|pages=473–478|doi=10.1016/j.cortex.2020.06.005|issn=1973-8102|pmid=32698947|s2cid=220074584|url=https://osf.io/yuxza/}}</ref> The boundary problem is another unsolved problem in neuroscience and phenomenology that is related to the binding problem. The boundary problem is essentially the inverse of the binding problem, and asks how binding stops occurring and what prevents other neurological phenomena from being included in first-person perspectives, giving first-person perspectives hard boundaries. Topological segmentation and electromagnetic field topology have been proposed as possible avenues for solving the boundary problem as well as the binding problem.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gómez-Emilsson |first1=Andrés |last2=Percy |first2=Chris |date=3 August 2023 |title=Don't forget the boundary problem! How EM field topology can address the overlooked cousin to the binding problem for consciousness |journal=Front Hum Neurosci |volume= 17|issue= |pages= |doi=10.3389/fnhum.2023.1233119 |doi-access=free |pmid=37600559 |pmc=10435742 }}</ref>
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